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Abstract
Local governments in China have influenced both the success and failure of 
economic growth in their jurisdictions, and have shaped the transition process itself 
through their behaviour and response to Central government incentives. This study 
investigated the behaviour of China’s local governments through the transition 
period, from a planned economy with state ownership, through the “duel track” 
economy and hybrid ownership, to the market oriented development today. Creating 
a nuanced classification of local government behaviour, this study attempts to 
explain the success or failure of their economic development policies. Two cities, 
Wenzhou and Yangzhou, were studied and compared to highlight the role of local 
governments in their development.
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Chapter 1: The local government in China’s economic development
Between 1978 and 2007, China’s economy underwent a period of extensive 
change and growth. In comparison with the “shock therapy” applied to the 
transitional economies of the former Soviet Union, China’s gradual economic 
reforms has allowed China’s formerly centrally planned economy to change into a 
market economy. Moreover, this was achieved with a sustained, high rate of growth, 
a shift in ownership patterns from state to semi-private and private ownership, and 
the restructuring of government at all levels to enable it to facilitate economic 
growth. These changes have taken place simultaneously through the transition 
period, without the benefit of a well defined strategy at the start.
One important theme in China’s economic transition is the decentralisation 
that has taken place. The devolution of economic power and government autonomy 
to the local level replaced the centralised economic planning, allowing localities to 
act -  within constraints -  to develop their own economies. The Central government 
was responsible for macroeconomic regulation, and withdrew from micromanaging 
individual firms in the economy. This set the stage for local governments at all levels 
-  from the provincial level downwards -  to become key actors in their local 
economies.
China is divided into 33 provincial level territories, with 22 provinces, 5 
autonomous regions, 4 municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing, and Tianjin), 
and 2 special administrative regions (Hong Kong and Macao). All of these nominally 
occupy the same provincial level status (see figure 1). Excluding the autonomous 
regions, municipalities and special administrative regions, the provinces has an
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average population of 50.2 million, with the most populous being Henan with a 
population of 96 million, and the smallest being Qinghai with 5.29 million (China 
Statistical Yearbook, 2003).
Figure 1.1: Territorial division in China
660 COUNTY LEVEL CITIES 2461 COUNTIES
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
SUBURBAN LEVEL 
COUNTIES
SUBURBAN LEVEL 
COUNTIES
22 PROVINCES4 PROVINCIAL LEVEL CITIES 
(BEIJING, SHANGHAI, 
CHONGQING. TIANJIN)
5 AUTONOMOUS REGIONS & 
2 SPECIAL ADMINISTRATI VE 
REGIONS
Source: Based on Liberthal (2004)
Provinces differ in wealth, culture, geography and history. Nominally, 
provinces hold the same rank as Central government ministries, thus they occupy a 
very powerful position in the government hierarchy. Their powers, delegated to them 
by the Central government, have been growing since the start o f economic reforms in 
order to achieve economic growth in line with the national strategy (Liberthal, 2004).
There are 2461 counties and 660 county level cities China’s government 
organisation. They fall under the control of the provinces. However, orders from 
levels above take into consideration local conditions, and county level governments 
are given discretion when implementing policies. In comparison with the provincial 
level, county governments have much more contact with the population, serving as 
the interface between the state and local society. They are involved in making key 
decisions affecting regional development (Zhang and Wu, 2006).
The focus of this study is on local government at the county level, where 
policies from the Central government are interpreted and implemented. The success
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of China’s economic reform process has depended on the actions of local 
governments at this level, which have been transformed from agents carrying out the 
objectives of central economic plans, to economic actors in their own right. This 
change in responsibility and focus has brought about a variety of responses by 
China’s local governments. They have had to continuously adapt themselves to the 
changing economic conditions at the national level as reforms proceeded, and also 
react to the evolution of the local economy under their jurisdiction.
The gradual speed of China’s economic reforms gave local governments time 
to adopt development strategies as they saw fit, but without an overall objective they 
could not guess the future direction of Central government policies. The progress of 
their development strategies was therefore the result of ongoing interaction between 
the local government, the local economy, prevailing trends in the national economy, 
and the Central government. This placed the local governments as actors within a 
web of interactions in managing and developing their local economies, and they need 
to be seen in this context. Rather than having an “end state”, Chinese local 
governments constantly evolve in sympathy to the changes in their local economies.
The evolution of Chinese local governments has resulted in an uneven 
outcome. Some local governments have been relatively more successful than others, 
both in terms of outright economic growth, as well as in terms of perception. 
Wenzhou, Kunshan, Shenzhen are all examples of where leading economic growth 
rates have “placed them on the map”, so to speak. The approach they took in order to 
reach that success have been widely publicised and studied, but when compared to 
teach other, their actions seem contradictory.
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For instance, Chinese local government compliance with Central government 
policies range from active participation and co-operation (as in Shenzhen), to 
outright disobedience (as in Wenzhou). However, these extreme examples have both 
achieved economic success. This strengthens the suggestion that the way local 
governments implements of the economic reform policies determines the policy’s 
success, rather than the intrinsic worth of the policy itself. This suggests it is the 
interaction between local governments and the local economy that determine the 
success of Central government economic policies in a particular locality.
This study is interested in the factors determining the success or failure of 
local governments to develop their local economies. As all local governments 
ostensibly operate within the same sets of regulations and constraints, and enjoy the 
same privileges and leeway, the cause of their success or failure to develop the local 
economy need to be understood in the context of the approaches taken by Chinese 
local governments towards development.
Studies on local governments in China’s economy have already identified a 
number of strategies used by Chinese local governments. These include “local state 
corporatism” (Oi, 1992), “capitalism with Chinese characteristics” (Solinger, 1993) 
“state entrepreneurialism” (Duckett, 1996, 2001), and “local market socialism” (Lin, 
1995). In a review of studies done on Chinese local governments, Baum and 
Shevchenko (1999) created a simple typology of Chinese local governments using 
the degree of government connection to local firms and the incentive for local 
governments to increase productivity within the local economy as variables to 
determine local government type (see figure 1.2).
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Figure 1.2: Typology o f local government involvement in local economic activity
Local government has incentive to increase productivity?
Yes
Local governemnt 
connected to 
enterprises?
No
(after Baum & Shevchenko, 1999)
This simple framework serves as a useful starting point for constructing a 
new, integrated approach to understanding the actions of Chinese local governments. 
However, the behaviour of local governments do not fall neatly into the four 
categories proposed by Baum and Shevchenko (1999). This study proposes to 
address this shortcoming by viewing local governments in terms of a continuum, and 
recognising that the close interaction between the local state and the economy means 
implementing economic development policies can create both positive and negative 
results simultaneously in the local economy and for the local government. The 
benefits of a policy to promote economic growth do not necessarily coincide with the 
interests of the local government, and vice versa. So an examination of development 
must also see local governments as independent actors with interests that sometimes 
-  but not always -  coincide with the interests of economic growth. This study 
proposes that the contradictions in local government behaviour can be explained by 
them pursuing their own objectives, which may be at cross purpose to the goal of 
maximising local economic growth.
This proposed framework places Chinese local governments within three 
contexts -  the context of their objective, the context of Central government 
influences, and the context of local conditions. This helps to integrate local 
governments into the wider context of the national economy, while also emphasising
Yes No
Entrepreneurial Clientelist
Developmental Predatory
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the fact that China’s local governments are far from being identical. This variation 
between them creates a rich backdrop against which to examine the process of 
economic development.
This study is based on two in depth case studies of the counties of Wenzhou 
and Yangzhou. They were chosen for their comparable characteristics -  size, 
population, geography, and economic background. By choosing counties of 
comparable characteristics, this study hopes to eliminate external variables that 
influence the decision making process of local governments, and thus allow a 
relatively unbiased comparison to take place between the actions of the local 
government in the two counties.
Wenzhou and Yangzhou adopted different development strategies from the 
start of China’s reforms in 1978. Wenzhou created the “Wenzhou model” (discussed 
in detail in chapter 7), encouraging entrepreneurship, small businesses, private 
ownership, and private investment. It has succeeded in spite of Central government 
opposition. Yangzhou followed a similar strategy to Sunan (discussed in chapter 8), 
with an emphasis on developing large-scale industries led by local state firms and 
managed by the local government. Despite enjoying local government support, 
Yangzhou’s economy experienced a slowdown in the mid 1990s.
This study placed special emphasis on uncovering the developmental history 
of the two cases, used to understand the responses of the two local governments to 
the economic and political changes resulting from China’s economic transition. This 
serves to illustrate the adaptability of local governments, as well as revealing 
fundamental underlying consistencies in their mode of behaviour. By seeing local
13
governments as responsive entities attempting to reconcile conflicting objectives 
under rapidly changing circumstances, it becomes easier to grasp the dynamic nature 
of their decision making processes. Moreover, this no longer limits the debate to 
whether a certain local government “succeeded” or “failed” in developing its local 
economy, which may be important but beside the point in understanding local 
governments. This study hopes to show that success and failure are a function of the 
attitude and alignment of local governments, fundamental attributes that go beyond 
the superficial application of particular policies and strategies. This is particularly 
important in the context of local governments learning and adopting economic 
models, since the form of the models may arise from particular local circumstances, 
and may not be applicable outside the original context.
This study begins with an overview of China’s economic history, starting 
from the formation of the People’s Republic in 1949. This allows the following 
chapters to be set in the context of China’s 50 years of economic development, and 
serves to illustrate some of the ongoing issues affecting Chinese economic 
development. Next, the fiscal relationship between the Central and local 
governments are explored. This covers the process of fiscal decentralisation, which 
has been used as an incentive for local governments to pursue economic 
development. However, a number of issues have arisen from the resulting struggle 
between Central and local interests which affects Central-local relationships. The 
relationship between local governments and local firms is then examined, which is 
necessary to understand the types of local government intervention in the local 
economy. Refining the simple typology of Baum and Shevchenko (1999), local 
governments are seen as economic actors with their own agendas, agendas that can 
coincide and also contradict the interests of the local economy.
14
With this understanding serving as the background, the two counties -  
Wenzhou and Yangzhou -  are described, their development history and 
characteristics outlined. The rich background for both cases demonstrate that both 
local governments evolve and adapt to new circumstances, though they differ in 
being active and passive. Interestingly, being active does not necessarily lead to 
success, nor does passivity result in stagnation. A comparison between the two cases 
is followed by the conclusion, where the fundamental alignments of the local 
governments are discussed. It is recognised that even though the Central government 
hoped to create an economically oriented development, local governments may align 
their aims differently, towards political gains, or personal gains, or otherwise 
undermine the development objective. The conclusion then examines future avenues 
of research based on the results of this study.
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Chapter 2: An overview of economic development in China
2.1 Introduction
China’s modern economic development can roughly be split into two periods 
-  pre and post reform, with 1978 marking the date o f the start o f the new economic 
reforms. It is the speed and success o f China’s post reform economic growth that has 
been spectacular and surprising. China’s GDP per capita (see figure 2.1) grew from 
379 Yuan in 1978 to 8184 Yuan in 2003. In real terms, China’s GDP grew 9.5 times 
over the period (Lardy, 2004).
Figure 2.1: C hina’s nominal GDP per capita, 1978-2002
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2003
The decentralisation o f power and devolution o f responsibilities for economic 
development to local governments made them important actors in determining the 
development o f their own economies, but also in influencing the policies and 
objectives o f the Central government. The size of China’s population and territory, 
its history and culture meant that a single economic policy was unlikely to be 
suitable for all its regions. Thus China’s early effort at economic reform was
16
characterized by its gradual, experimental approach, more intent on “tinkering” with 
the existing socialist system than executing a wholesale overhaul (Rawski, 1995). As 
a result, China’s experimental reforms constitute a continuous process, where Central 
government policy represents only one facet -  albeit an important one -  of the 
whole.
[If] reform is a process rather than an event, policy 
decisions represent only one aspect of a complex 
dynamic that revolves around interactions among 
reform initiatives, decentralized responses to specific 
policies, economic trends associated with underlying 
socioeconomic forces, and changes in perceptions and 
attitudes within and outside the policy elite. Initial 
conditions influence both the range of feasible reform 
measures and the impact of policies actually 
implemented. The same policy will yield different 
results i f  implemented under different circumstances 
(Rawski, 1995, pi 169, emphasis mine)
The importance of local governments as the implementers of Central 
government policy is that they operate under very different conditions, depending on 
their geographical location, local history and culture, previous economic 
development programs, political links, and so on. Their implementation of Central 
government policy then feeds back into the system of China’s reforms, initiating new 
policies and new responses.
The most important impact on China’s productivity has 
always followed measures to decentralize decision 
making in agriculture, and rural and urban industry.
Success on a local basis of experimentation has spurred
17
replication and eventual national acceptance. (Gelb et 
al, 1993, pl24—125)
Thus to understand China’s post reform development, it is necessary to 
understand the behaviour and motivations of China’s local governments, operating 
within the historical and cultural context of China’s economic development.
One of the most important features of China’s development is the emergence 
of multi-level economic disparity (Fujita and Hu, 2001, Tian, 2001, Wang and Ge, 
2004, Chen and Gu, 2005). This can be seen in the regional division between the 
coastal and inland regions, between urban and rural areas, and in terms of the 
treatment of different areas by the Central government’s economic policies. This 
difference between separate areas affects the behaviour and response of local 
governments to particular policies, and needs to be examined. A brief overview of 
China’s economic development since 1949 will help frame the country’s subsequent 
development patterns.
2.2 China’s economic development, 1949-1978
2.2.1 The economy o f the nascent People's Republic
At the time of its formation in 1949, the People’s Republic of China was a
predominantly rural and agrarian society. The economy and the population were
badly damaged by the Second World War and by the subsequent civil war between
the Nationalist government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It was by most
measures a backward economy, dominated by traditional handicrafts, and with a
modem but small industrial sector that was created by foreign capital from the
European colonial powers while they occupied various concessionary territories, and
18
by the Japanese in Manchuria (Spence, 1999). Thus it was a “two speed” economy, 
predominantly rural and agricultural, with a modem industrial sector developed 
generally within coastal enclaves.
Singh (1985) observes that China’s industrial production in 1949 was mainly 
for consumer goods -  textiles and food processing were important industries. Heavy 
industries were underdeveloped, largely reliant on foreign capital and expertise. 
Existing heavy industrial capacity was concentrated in the north-eastern regions of 
China -  where the Japanese created a heavy industrial base during their occupation 
between the 1930s and 1945 -  and along the coastal port cities of Shanghai, Tianjin 
and in Guangzhou province -  where the Western colonial powers sought to enter the 
Chinese economy through the concessions they won in the treaty ports. Thus the 
modem sectors of China’s economy germinated from those industries created by 
foreign countries to serve foreign interests, rather than being the result of Chinese 
economic development.
The transportation network of railways and highways reflected the 
geographically concentrated needs of the colonial economy, rather than the national 
need to open up undeveloped areas further inland. Moreover, it was a seriously 
underdeveloped network even when compared with other economies in the 
developing world. In 1949 China had only 22000 km of railways of various gauges 
and 80000 km of highways, as compared to India -  a similar colonial economy 
overlaid on a traditional economy -  with 66000 km of tracks and 156000 km of 
highways. Almost two thirds of China’s railways were concentrated in the 
northeastern and coastal provinces, and more than half of the provincial capitals did 
not have rail links to Beijing (Comtois, 1990).
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Consequentially, the coastal economy was not well integrated with the more 
remote and inland areas of China. Physically and economically, inland China 
remained separate from the colonial economy, and neither economy benefited from 
the market and resources offered by the other. Inland regions were backward but 
resource rich -  possessing deposits of coal, minerals and so on -  which they had 
neither the need to access nor the means of accessing without the demand of and 
support from coastal industries.
This lack of mutual contact and inadequate transportation links not only 
served to divide the coast from the remainder of the country, it also meant that local 
economies remained closed from each other. Without modem road and rail networks, 
inland regions were separated from each other as well. The division between urban 
and rural areas also existed, in terms of the physical separation presented by distance, 
but also in terms of the mismatch between modem industrial production in the towns 
and cities, and the traditional agricultural practices in the countryside. Neither was in 
contact with the other, thus neither had any reason to adapt to the need of the other.
The task facing the newly formed Communist government in 1949 was 
therefore daunting. China’s economy, fragmented and damaged by colonial powers 
and misgovemment, war and strife, desperately needed stability and coherent, 
comprehensive economic development. Aside from the need to lift millions from 
poverty, rapid development through industrialisation was also seen as being 
necessary in order to strengthen the country against its enemies, which included not 
only the former Nationalist government in Taiwan, but also the United States and its 
allies in Asia, as well as most of the Western alliance opposed to the spread of
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Communism. China’s intervention in the Korean War demonstrated the concerns of 
its leaders about the strategic vulnerability of China against the industrialised and 
advanced countries -  especially the United States -  arrayed against it. Intervention in 
the conflict on the Korean peninsula was thought to be necessary as China believed it 
could ill afford to have another potential military threat along its border (Hao &
Zhai, 1990). Thus feeling both economically and strategically vulnerable, China 
began its first phase of development by following the example of the Soviet Union, 
which displayed both economic and martial prowess in defeating an aggressive and 
industrialized Germany in the Second World War (Spence, 1999).
2.2.2 The first Five Year Plan
Agriculture was the dominant economic activity throughout China’s history, 
with the majority of the population living in rural areas. In 1952, 88% of China’s 
workforce lived in rural areas, with 95% of those being employed in agricultural 
tasks, mainly farming (Taylor, 1988, p736). Agriculture was thus not only an 
important economic activity, it was the biggest employer of China’s vast labour 
force. Industry, by contrast, was relegated to a few enclaves.
In order to overcome this under development, the first five year plan (FYP), 
from 1953 to 1957, was based on the Soviet strategy for rapid industrialisation. 
Politically, the Soviet victory in the Second World War against the industrial power 
of Germany proved to be a strong argument in favour of adopting the Soviet style 
plan (Spence, 1999). In just 20 years since the revolution in Russia, the Soviet Union 
had become a world power capable of defeating a major industrial nation and 
threatening the traditional Western powers. In order to achieve the same rapid 
development, China’s economic planners decided to seek Soviet aid in material and
in terms of copying its economic development strategy.
However, it is important to bear in mind that there were fundamental 
differences between the economic positions of China and Russia. China’s industrial 
capacity and national infrastructure at the beginning of its first five year plan in 1952 
was much weaker than that of the Soviet Union when the first Soviet Five Year Plan 
was introduced in 1928. China’s output of key industrial materials was 
comparatively inadequate. On a per capita basis, China’s electricity output in 1952 
was only 37% of that produced by Russia in 1928. Similarly, coal (46%), petrol 
(1%), steel (8%) and iron (15%) were in short supply (Singh, 1985). Considering the 
key characteristics of the Soviet industrialisation model -  requiring high rates of 
industrial capital formation, investment in capital goods production, with particular 
emphasis on developing heavy industries in large scale plants with capital intensive 
production techniques (Cheng, 1971) -  it is surprising that the Chinese economic 
planners felt it appropriate to transplant the Soviet plan onto the Chinese economy.
In order to support and sustain industrialisation on such a massive scale, the 
development of Chinese industries depended on the economic surplus produced by 
agricultural activities. The strategy used to transfer agricultural surplus from rural to 
urban areas was called the “primitive social accumulation”, or “price scissors”. This 
entailed fixing the prices of agricultural products at a relatively low level against 
those of industrial products (Brodsgaard, 1983, p41). Industrial workers in urban 
areas were thus ensured a supply of food at low prices, while agricultural workers 
lived on subsistence wages.
National gross investment rose to 20% of GDP (compared with 6% in the pre
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war period), with 48% of investment in capital construction for industry (of which 
40.8% was invested in heavy industry) (Spence, 1999). Most of these projects were 
for large-scale industrial plants and were capital intensive. With the increase in total 
investment and with the lion’s share going to industry, it was inevitable that the 
agricultural sector became continually squeezed for surpluses and resources, and the 
priority for developing agriculture was placed far below that of industrial 
development. Although the program enjoyed early success, with GDP growth 
reaching 8.9% per annum and an 18% increase in industrial production, the 
development in this period was fundamentally unbalanced and ultimately 
unsustainable. The pressure on agriculture meant that food production in China 
barely managed to keep pace with population growth. The rate of agricultural 
production grew at 3.8% per annum through the period covered by the first FYP. 
Slow agricultural growth, low rates of investment, coupled with concerns over 
feeding a growing population, eventually forced a re-examination of the five year 
plan (Spence, 1999).
Recognising the threat posed by such an unbalanced development plan, a 
political consensus emerged that the Soviet model may not be entirely suitable for 
China’s development (Brodsgaard, 1983). By 1957 gross investment rates were 
curtailed to 7.4% of GDP. The Chinese politburo concluded in 1958 that:
All the experience of the Soviet Union, including its 
fundamental experience, is bound up with definite 
national characteristics, and no country should copy it 
mechanically (Rue, 1972).
For a brief period in 1957-1958 the Chinese economy entered a period of
23
“retrenchment”, where more cautious economic planning took place to rebalance 
from the excessive concentration on industrial growth.
China’s centralised planning mechanism subjected the economy to frequent 
periods of hyperactivity, followed by a forced retrenchment and cooling down while 
the economy is repaired and the development strategy reconsidered. This tendency 
for dramatic policy shifts can be seen in the next, disastrous phase of China’s 
development. Even as economic planners were reining in the unbalanced 
industrialisation, the Great Leap Forward was beginning to take shape, fuelled by 
anti rightist campaigns, the call for increased economic vigour, and zealous but often 
baseless claims by local officials of growing agricultural productivity (Li, 2005). Led 
by the belief that the communalisation program of the first Five Year Plan had 
succeeded in increasing agricultural output, the Great Leap posited extraordinary 
aims for industrial growth and output for the Chinese economy, with disastrous 
consequences.
2.2.3 The Great Leap — 1956-1960
It is possible to see the Great Leap Forward, beginning in 1957 and ending in
1960, as an attempt to achieve rapid economic growth through a more balanced
development strategy. Agriculture and industry were to be developed
simultaneously, although priority was still accorded to heavy industry. Rather than
employing capital-intensive production techniques as called for by the Soviet model,
labour intensive techniques were emphasised. By mobilising the entire population in
agriculture, in industry, and in local infrastructure construction, it was hoped that the
agricultural bottleneck that had previously impeded China’s economic development
could be overcome. Thus mass campaigns were launched to employ idle rural labour
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for construction projects such as flood protection and irrigation, and for small-scale 
industries producing consumer goods and products for large-scale industries. Many 
of the projects were financed through local savings (Singh, 1985). Labour intensive 
agricultural techniques were also introduced, and in order to fill the labour shortage 
(as so many workers were mobilised for large construction projects) communisation 
was encouraged, which consolidated not only land plots, but also created mass dining 
halls, child care Centres and so on in order to release the female workforce from 
housekeeping tasks to work in the fields. This labour intensive approach to 
agriculture meant that the scarce capital available was concentrated for the purposes 
of developing industry, and it ensured that all surplus labour was mobilised to 
increase productivity (Tiewes & Sun, 1999).
The aims of the Leap were varied and ambitious. They included overtaking 
Britain’s steel production in 15 years, the formation of large rural communes from 
smaller existing collectives on a massive scale, and wildly ambitious growth targets 
for grain production which was increased throughout the period, from doubling 
annual production to increasing 10 fold or more annually (Tiewes & Sun, 1999). 
However, with the goals for industrial production set so high, much of the productive 
gains in agriculture were directed away from rural households, and farmers did not 
enjoy any improvements in their standard of living, reducing their incentive for 
sustaining agricultural growth (Dutt & Costa, 1980). In addition, many of the 
construction projects were financed through local savings, further draining resources 
from rural areas (Singh, 1998). Nevertheless, the political climate and the call for 
sustained enthusiasm meant that criticisms were rarely raised, and it was common for 
exaggerated production figures to be reported, which resulted in the continuation of 
policies that were ineffective or harmful.
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The Great Leap Forward suffered from a number of flaws in policy and 
execution. Although it could be argued that the mobilisation of surplus labour made 
more sense than an attempt to employ capital intensive techniques for economic 
development, simply because of the relative shortage of raw materials and the 
relatively abundance of available labour -  China’s in 1957 population stood at 646 
million (Spence, 1999) -  the appropriation of food produce away from the 
countryside was so harsh that those responsible for growing it fell victim to 
malnutrition and starvation, all the while suffering from additional calls for increased 
levy because of the unrealistic claims of abundant harvests by local officials (Li, 
2005). Furthermore, the development of small scale industries such as the back yard 
steel furnaces resulted in a massive waste in resources, as the quality of the products 
were substandard and could not be used, yet diverted both precious raw materials and 
labour from more critical tasks.
The disastrous outcome of the Great Leap can be measured in the millions of 
deaths caused by malnutrition. The use of locally available capital, combined with 
the transfer of labour away from the fields compounded the inefficiencies of the 
agricultural commune to lower productivity to dangerous levels. Meanwhile, 
unrealistic expectations, exaggerated reports from zealous local officials concealed 
the scale of the disaster (Tiewes & Sun, 1999). The unbalanced industrialization 
program was ultimately wasteful, and the unbalanced program of development 
eventually collapsed, forcing the Central economic planners to re-evaluate their 
strategy once again.
2.2.4 Recovery and retrenchment
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In the wake of the Great Leap, China’s economic planners retreated to 
developing the agricultural sector, abandoning the fantastic rates of industrial growth 
they had recently tried to pursue. Capital and labour were reallocated from heavy and 
light industries to agricultural production. Between 1960 and 1961 some 20 million 
workers were relocated from the cities to the countryside (Cheng, 1971), while 
development efforts were focussed on providing agricultural goods such as chemical 
fertilisers and tractors. Compared with 1960, the use of chemical fertilisers tripled in 
1964, and tripled again by 1974 (Singh, 1985). By 1967, agricultural production had 
recovered from the excesses of the Leap, and output levels had returned to pre Leap 
(1957) levels (Spence, 1999).
As the Leap slowly ground to a halt, Central government planners refocused 
their development priorities from industrial development to agriculture. While 
maintaining that industry was to be the ‘leading factor” of China’s economy, 
agriculture was to be taken as the “foundation”, which warranted higher levels of 
resources and aid (Brodsgaard, 1983, p54). Although heavy industries continued to 
receive the lion’s share of investment (49.8% of total investment in 1963-65), the 
share allocated to agriculture increased from 12.3% in 1958-62 to 18.8% in 1963-65 
(Brodsgaard, 1983, p72). More importantly, the investment went into the “technical 
transformation” of agriculture, including the electrification of rural areas, irrigation, 
mechanisation, use of chemical fertilisers, and so on, making a substantial change to 
the rural economy. Heavy industries were slated to support agricultural development 
and growth, providing the equipment and machinery necessary for a modem rural 
economy to take shape.
2.2.5 Cultural Revolution
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From 1965 to 1969, the Cultural Revolution disrupted economic development 
in China as millions of students around the country were mobilised to attack “old 
customs, old habits, old culture, and old thinking” (Spence, 1999, p575), paralysing 
educational institutions, government offices, and destroying many precious cultural 
artefacts. However, although the Cultural Revolution was undeniably violent, it did 
not fundamentally damage the economy in the same way as the Great Leap, and 
disruptions occurred mainly at the managerial levels (Dutt & Costa, 1980). 
Nevertheless, it did divert attention from the development of the economy, and even 
though special notice was given to the Red Guards not to attack technical personnel, 
the education system was shut down and many intellectuals were killed or sent to 
special “May Seventh Schools” for re-education.
Violent and destructive, the Cultural Revolution did not have a specific 
economic aim. Unlike previous periods in China’s development, the Cultural 
Revolution was not an economic campaign, and thus its effects on the economy were 
mostly secondary, the primary focus of the campaign being politically and 
ideologically motivated. As it reached its natural conclusion, with the population 
exhausted from years of feverish terrors, China’s economy entered a phase of 
stagnation.
2.2.6 China on the eve o f reform
As was argued above, the development of the pre reform Chinese economy 
was influenced by a number of political, ideological and strategic concerns.
Although economic policy was ostensibly aimed at developing and modernising 
China’s national economy, it was more often than not distorted by political and 
ideological aims. It is not possible to attribute to any one person, group of people or
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any agency responsibility for the turbulent economic development process, since it 
can be argued that all actors were simply responding to the unpredictable political 
climate of the time:
Mao cannot be entirely blamed because he was 
deceived by false reports sent by ambitious officials.
As always in China, the Emperor is never wrong, only 
misled by his ministers who flatter him ad who in turn 
are deceived by dishonest lower-ranking officials. On 
the other hand, they cannot be blamed either, because 
they have no choice but to follow orders from above.
So in the end no one is responsible (a peasant’s 
reflection on the Great Leap, cited by Tiewes & Sun,
1999).
This expressed the significant demoralisation of China’s population after the 
turbulence of the past 25 years. Economic growth took place at an average rate of 7% 
per annum between 1953 and 1978, and the industrialisation programmes reduced 
the share of agricultural output from 57% to 28% of GMP (Gross Material Product) 
in the same period. However, this masked certain underlying deficiencies in the 
economy. The bias towards developing heavy industries meant that the average 
annual growth in real consumption per person was at only 2.2%, while an annual 2% 
average increase in population trades off much of the economic gains. The policy of 
self-sufficiency and isolation meant that China’s share of world trade dropped to just 
0.4% in the 1970s (Zhang, 1996). In terms of agriculture, the communisation of rural 
areas and the abolition of private land holdings, coupled with the introduction of 
work teams, meant that farm workers have no personal incentive to increase 
production. China’s industries also suffered from a lack of motivation and initiative, 
compounded by the location of industrial activities on the basis of ideology rather
than efficiency. The allocation of funds and capital for development were issues of 
political gain, as provincial officials tried to secure projects for their areas, regardless 
of suitability. Factories located inland lacked the transportation links and 
communications to operate, far from raw materials, markets, and the human capital 
necessary to run the machinery, while coastal cities were deliberately run down. 
Conditions inside factories were similarly uninspiring, with over employment, lack 
of responsibility, and lack of competition presiding over a stagnant economy.
China operated under a centralised economy for 30 years. During that time, 
there was constant change to the objectives of the planners and the ideologies driving 
them. Economic power was centralised, decentralised and recentralised. Rather than 
allowing economic rationality to dictate growth and the allocation of resources, 
political objectives and considerations shaped China’s economic landscape.
However, this was to change dramatically in the next phase of China’s development, 
with the introduction of gradual, but sweeping economic reforms.
2.3 Economic development in post reform China
The death of Mao in 1976 marked the beginning of a reassessment of China’s 
socialist economy. The damage done to the economy in the past was put down to the 
“leftist” policies. Economic imbalance and serious mismatch between economic 
sectors, consumption and accumulation, and between production relations and 
productive forces were criticised for being the generic culprits (Nolan & Ash, 1995). 
Hua Guogfeng, Mao’s anointed successor, embarked on a series of readjustments for 
the Chinese economy between 1976-1978 in order to facilitate the recovery of the 
Chinese economy. However, these readjustments fell short of being a thorough 
reform of the underlying economic system, and the task was taken up by Deng
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Xiaoping to start the new phase o f economic development at the third plenum o f the 
11th CCP central committee in 1978, where development would be led by economic 
considerations rather than motivated by politics and ideology.
Figure 2.2: C hina’s post reform GDP growth rate, 1978-2003
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2004
As can be seen in figure 2.2, China’s post reform GDP growth rate has been 
both breathtaking -  reaching almost 35% in 1995 -  and volatile. From the peaks and 
troughs, it can be seen that the economy underwent three phases o f extreme growth, 
followed by periods o f  cooling down between 1982-1986, 1987-1991, and 1991— 
1999.
Deng aimed to double China’s GDP from 1980 to 1990, and again from 1990 
to 2000. The nominal economic growth meant that China managed to double her 
GDP by 1986, from 451.7 billion Yuan in 1980, to 1020.2 billion Yuan in 1986, and 
by 2000 the GDP had exceeded 1990 levels by more than four times, growing from 
1854.8 billion Yuan to 8940.3 billion Yuan (National Statistics Bureau, 2000). The
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rapid growth in the economy caused inflation to rise as well, reaching a peak in 
1988-1989 (17%) and 1994 (over 20%) (Lin, 2004), leading the Central government 
to implement measures to slow economic growth.
Deng adopted a gradualist approach to economic reforms. “Crossing the river 
by feeling the stones” (Goldstein, 1995) was one way to describe this approach, 
where each step was the result of pragmatic and practical experience. There were no 
clear objectives, nor any blueprints to direct China’s economy. Overall, the reforms 
cautiously allowed for market mechanisms to play a greater role in the economy, 
pursuing proportionate and balanced growth in all sectors, decentralised the decision 
making process, and called for a closer integration of China with the world economy 
(Noland & Ash, 1995).
The lack of an overall blueprint to development led to the emergence of 
different models for economic growth in China. The gradual decentralisation of 
economic allowed some regions to experiment with different development policies. 
Where the policies became successful, they were formalised and promoted as 
“models” (mo shi), held up for other regions to emulate. The Sunan model, Pearl 
River Delta model (also known as the zhuhai model) and Wenzhou model are the 
three best known models, all named after the regions they originated from.
However, the diversity in economic models also indicated an underlying 
difficult with China’s gradualist reforms. Legacies from the planned economy 
introduced distortions into the operation of the economy at both national and local 
levels while the transition economy ran on the “dual tracks” of planned economy and 
market economy. At the same time, local governments and other economic actors
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operated in a regulatory and policy vacuum as the necessary mechanisms to manage 
a free market economy were formed out of necessity through the process of trial and 
error. As Wong (1992) points out, the incremental reforms often created 
contradictory incentives, resulting in unintended and reactionary development that 
was harmful to economic growth.
For instance, the decentralisation of fiscal responsibilities, coupled with local 
governments becoming responsible for their own economic development, created the 
phenomena of regionalism in China, or what some have referred to as “dukedom 
economies”, during the late 1980s and early 1990s. With the considerable autonomy 
that Chinese local governments enjoy -  compared with their status before the 
reforms -  local governments were more interested in developing their own 
economies, creating independent “dukedoms” with little regard for regional division 
of labour and specialisation (Shen & Dai, 1992). This resulted in waste as resources 
as the lack of co-operation and inter-provincial competition led to duplication and 
the creation of surplus capacity. This was especially harmful as provinces attempted 
to invest scarce resources in the same “hot” industrial sectors (such as automobile 
manufacturing or electronics), leading to the neglect of developing other lower 
profile industries that were more suitable to regions lacking basic infrastructure and 
human capital. Moreover, the fierce competition between the localities created 
overcapacity that did not being the necessary returns to the initial investments.
This competition also led to distrust between provinces as each struggled to 
compete in the same market, leading to farther isolation and a decline in inter­
provincial trade. Kumar (1994) showed that while China’s economy grew in the 
early 1990s, the share of inter-provincial trade declined as a proportion of China’s
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total volume of trade. However, it is necessary to point out that the fragmentation of 
the Chinese economy occurred under specific circumstances. Naughton (1999) 
suggests that the emphasis on inter provincial trade barriers has been over 
emphasised, and Fan and Wei (2006) also conclude that the evidence does not 
support the view of China as a fragmented economy. Nevertheless, China is 
challenged by the problem of economic divergence, created by the emergence of 
high growth and low growth areas. This disparity is seen in a rural-urban, inland- 
coastal division. What is more interesting, however, is that this economic divergence 
is in part deliberate and a key component of China’s development policy.
2.4 China’s economic divergence
Although inequality was controlled to a certain extent in the pre reform 
economy, this was achieved largely through the highly centralised fiscal system. The 
centralised fiscal system was used for co-ordinating the centralised economic 
planning, and in combination they allowed for a substantial redistribution of wealth 
to take place across the country. With its turbulent history of economic development, 
it is reasonable to conclude that if the role of this centralised system for redistributing 
wealth was reduced or removed entirely, inequality would return as significant 
differences remain between the economies of various provinces.
Bias in Central government policies towards coastal regions has been put 
forward as one possible explanation for the creation of the coastal-interior division. 
The coastal development strategy was a deliberate policy of the Central government 
to promote the Chinese economy as a whole by opening up the economically more 
advanced coastal regions first. The creation of the four Special Economic Zones in 
1980 and the opening of 14 coastal Open Cities in 1984 were all efforts deliberately
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aimed at attracting foreign investors into China though investment into the coast 
(Spence, 1999). The origin of special economic areas was based on the idea of 
Taiwan’s Export Processing Zones, automatically ruling out the interior areas as 
possible locations, and rule in coastal and port cities as possible destinations for 
greater reforms, more extensive and intensive development measures, greater 
experimentation and so on. Furthermore, the “two ends abroad” (liangiou zaiwai) 
approach of coastal development called for reliance on world trade. Thus instead of 
creating backward linkages to the interior for raw materials and capital, the coast was 
to rely on world trade for both exports and imports (the two ends) (Chang, 1998). 
This had the advantage of allowing coastal regions to become relatively independent 
of (slower growing) interior regions, and instead linked the coast to the world 
economy directly, creating the conditions for rapid growth while insulated from the 
rest of the country’s economy. The coastal regions already possess the advantage of 
being accessible to world markets. The city ports can take advantage of their 
proximity to Asian economies such as Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, for 
investment and trade.
Fan (1997) attributes China’s decision to adopt an uneven development 
strategy to three factors: First, the experiences of the pre reform economy suggested 
that equality and a redistributive development strategy is inefficient, slowing 
economic growth across the entire country. Instead, a concentration of resources to 
develop smaller regions would create much more impact. Second, Western theories 
of development (most notably Williamson’s inverted U model) suggest that regional 
inequality is a painful but largely unavoidable step in the development of the 
economy. The Kuznets inverted U curve (Kuznets, 1955), is often cited as an 
explanation of increasing disparity with economic growth. It suggests that with an
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increasing income per capita, disparities between incomes in different regions are 
expected to widen first, then to decline. Thus regional income inequality is an 
expected outcome of economic growth that would be eliminated with further growth 
via the operation of the free market. Empirical studies by Barro and Sala-I-Martin 
(1991, 1992) of long term regional income trends the United States and Japan 
suggests that differences in regional incomes tend to be eliminated in the long run. 
Thus as Western economic theory became more accepted, “temporary” uneven 
development became more acceptable. Finally, the experience of developed 
countries seem to confirm that inequality is a function of the stage of economic 
development, where inequality is reduced with more economic development. Thus it 
should be kept in mind that while uneven development was part of the Central 
government’s post reform development strategy, it was seen as the price for rapid 
development which would eventually benefit the whole country. However, the 
question of how much inequality was acceptable or desirable in order to achieve 
eventual development of the entire country remains unanswered. Nor was it known i f  
regional income in China would necessarily tend towards convergence.
2.5 Conclusion
China’s economy went through many changes, from an agrarian economy 
under colonial control, through a period of war and civil strive, to the volatile politics 
and ideologies imposed through a planned economy, and finally to the transition 
away from central planning towards a free market economy. Even as economic 
policies shifted to favour gradual transition, China’s economic growth rate still 
swung between periods of extremely high growth, and economic stagnation. 
“Crossing the river by feeling the stones” successfully accelerated economic growth, 
but it has also created challenges over how to manage the contradictions of old, pre
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reform legacies co-existing alongside the new, market oriented economy.
The emergence of economic disparities and the importance of the various 
regional economic models, mean that local actors, in particular local governments, 
must be considered when trying to understand China’s development. Their 
interaction with the Central government informs and influences economic policy. 
The interaction is important in determining the behaviour of local governments in 
China, and with fiscal decentralisation being a key component of China’s economic 
reform process, it is necessary to understand the potential effects that fiscal 
decentralization has on local government behaviour. The next chapter will examine 
the relationship between economic development by local governments and he 
decentralization process.
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3. Relevance of the local government in local economic development in 
transition economies
3.1 Introduction
There has been a general trend over the past 15 years for countries 
undergoing economic transition to undergo decentralization and assigning greater 
economic responsibilities to local governments (Rodriguez-Pose and Bwire, 2004, 
Martinez-Vasquez and McNab, 2003, Bardhan, 2002). To varying degrees, it is the 
assumption that local governments are able to achieve economic gains that has 
driven this trend. This has sparked interest in the function of local government in 
achieving economic development, and in the potential economic gains to be had 
from decentralization. Both the theoretical debate and the empirical studies have 
proven to be inconclusive as to whether local governments and decentralization leads 
to greater efficiency gains. This has been further confused in the transition 
economies of Eastern Europe, where intervention from the West after the collapse of 
the communist economies proved to be heavy handed and largely deleterious to local 
economies and the functions of local governments (Bateman, 2000).
The debate over the potential gain in economic efficiency with increased 
decentralization or more autonomous local governments is further complicated by 
the economic transition process, itself a contentious and complex process. Indeed, 
Martinez-Vasquez and McNab (2003) point out that the label of “decentralization” 
can have very different meanings across countries.
Decentralization may actually appear to be more
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popular among developing and transitional countries 
than it truly is because there is often a confusion in 
terminology. What some transitional and developing 
governments call fiscal decentralization is actually 
nothing more than the geographical deconcentration of 
central government bureaucracy and service delivery.
(Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003, p i597)
Advocates of the economic efficiency of local governments and 
decentralization argue that local governments are better able to efficiently provide 
goods and services than a single, centralized government. Indeed, in the formerly 
centralized economies of eastern Europe, the failure of central governments to 
achieve and sustain economic growth appears to be the most obvious indictment 
against an overly centralized system for economic efficiency. Decentralization 
appears to be an effective panacea -  or at least a necessary step -  towards an 
effective reform of the old economy.
However, the process of devolution, of transferring new functions and 
responsibilities onto local level governments is not simple, and the outcome is not 
assured. Classic economic literature argue that government at the local level are 
more efficient that central governments, since they can better tailor the provision of 
goods and services to suit local demand, resulting in less waste and more satisfaction 
among the population. This has been a highly influential argument in favour of 
decentralization. Modem economic literature, especially from authors of the new 
institutional economics (NIE), identify shortcomings with the work of the classic 
works. NIE authors -  such as Ronald Coase (1998), Douglas North (2005) and Barry 
Weingast (2005) -  suggest that local governments, and indeed all organizations, are 
governed by hard and soft institutions. This perspective brings a key assumption of
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the classic writers into question. In particular, it questions the assumption of 
government benevolence, where local governments are assumed to act in the best 
interest of the local population. Local government corruption is a common problem, 
with their closeness to the local population making them vulnerable to being 
captured by powerful local interest groups that are harmful to the local economy. 
Even when local government do act in local interests, there are spillover effects and 
challenges to macroeconomic stability (if enough numbers of local governments 
acted in the same way simultaneously). Thus, for national governments undergoing 
decentralization (which includes fiscal decentralization), there is the need to strike a 
balance:
In light of the possible effects -  that depend on the 
institutional design -  of fiscal decentralization on 
economic growth, macro-fiscal balances and 
corruption, a key challenge for many transition 
economies has been to reap the economic benefits of 
decentralization while maintaining control over public 
expenditures and borrowing, restoring growth and 
improving accountability of local governments and 
officials to limit corruption. (Dabla-Norris and Wade,
2002, p4)
The challenge to decentralize economic functions to local governments rests 
on the advantage they have over national level governments in their closeness to the 
local population. This advantage is pointed out by the classic economic writers, 
examined in the next section. However, the response of local governments depends 
on their interaction with the national government and the incentives and punishments 
they are given. This is examined in section 3.3, and it is the local govememnt’s 
response which determines their behaviour towards the local economy and local
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economic actors.
3.2 Local government and economic gain in classic literature
In the classic economic literature, there are three main channels whereby the 
economic benefits from decentralization are realized -  inter-jurisdicitonal 
competition, informational advantages, and higher population and preference 
homogeneity (Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya, 2007). This is premised on the ability of 
local governments to match the supply of goods and services to the preferences of 
the local population, compared with a national government which provides goods 
and services uniformly across the whole population, ignoring differences in 
preferences, thereby creating waste and inefficiency.
Hayek (1939) introduced the concept of differential information, where local 
citizens, local governments, and the central government have different quality of 
information on the preferences and demands for goods and services. Local 
governments close to local citizens will have a much better idea of local preferences 
than a relatively distant central government. Therefore local governments will be 
able to make more informed decisions when implementing policies to tailor them to 
suit local conditions, and also provide goods and services that are needed and 
relevant to local preferences. In comparison, the national government needs to deal 
with a relative paucity of information regarding preferences. In addition, the 
objectives and perspective of national governments can be different or irrelevant to 
local interests. Thus goods and services provided by the national government for 
local consumption may not match local demand and this then leads to wastage.
The failure to match preferences occurs not only at the level of individuals,
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but also at the intra government level. Weingast (2005) provides an example where 
federal subsidies for local governments in the United States results in waste because 
it failed to reflect local priorities, which is often quite different from national 
priorities.
For example, a recent crime bill provided funds for hi- 
tech squad cars. These cars are quite expensive, and 
most smaller jurisdictions would not purchase them if 
they have to pay for the cars from their own funds. The 
bill offered to pay for 95% of the cost of the cars, so, at 
5% of the cost, a large number of jurisdictions will 
elect to put up their (small) share and buy obtain the 
cars. Yet for most jurisdictions, this is not the highest 
priority use of the subsidy. Some need newer 
electronic communications; others need more 
policeman, and so on. But the bill did not offer the 
items most needed by the local governments; so 
instead the local governments chose what was 
available. This example could be repeated almost 
endlessly given the huge range of federal expenditure 
programs in the United States that foster local public 
goods provision. (Weingast, 2005, p i52)
This example points out the inherent inefficiency of providing goods and 
services and implementing policy in a uniform way, failing to take into account local 
needs and preferences. With better access to information, local governments are able 
to minimize this waste. Tiebout (1956) elaborated on this, proposing that the local 
population also plays a role in creating an optimal solution for local goods and 
service provision.
Tiebout (1956) contended that individuals choose to live in areas that provide
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the goods and services which are best matched with their preferences. He assumes 
that taxpayers are mobile and rational, and thus they will move to the region that 
offers them the best match of goods and services according to their preferences. This 
will lead to the economically optimal situation where everyone’s preferences are 
perfectly met by the local government, and converse, where the waste of goods and 
services are minimized. Compared with the national government, providing goods 
and services uniformly across the whole country, service provision at the local level 
will enjoy much better efficiency.
Tiebout’s (1956) model also introduces the effect of inter-regional 
competition, further enhancing efficiency. Competition from neighboring regions 
force local governments to provide goods and services efficiently, and also 
discourages rent seeking behaviour by local bureaucrats. Furthermore, the 
competition stimulates local governments to innovate, which can result in greater 
economic gains. At the same time, the cost of taking innovative risks is reduced. 
Compared with the cost of the national government introducing a risky innovative 
policy, the cost of innovating at the regional level is spread across different regions 
and bom by different local governments, and the cost of failure is thus much lower.
While Tiebout’s (1956) argument depended on a mobile population of 
taxpayers for local governments to achieve economic efficiency, Oates (1972) argues 
that the ability of local governments to match the preferences of local inhabitants 
means it is more efficient for local governments to provide goods and services than 
to have uniform provision by a central government, even if the population were not 
mobile. The greater the variation in local preferences, the more inefficient a uniform 
provision will be, since a greater proportion of the population will not be catered for
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by the uniform provision of goods and services. Conversely, local governments 
enjoy greater economic efficiency with greater variation in local preferences.
Musgrave (1959) argues that local government efficiency also depends on the 
assignment principle, where the authority over the provision of goods and services 
needs to be assigned to the level of government which can most efficiently produce 
it. This in turn depends on the economies of scale, congestion of goods per additional 
unit of consumption, and the scope or coverage of the goods and services provided. 
Defence is a good example which enjoys economy of scale, with small congestion 
per additional unit of consumption, and which has truly national coverage. Thus the 
national government is best suited to providing it. Conversely, a school or day centre 
has low economy of scale, high congestion, and is local in scope, and thus local 
governments are best placed to providing them.
The level of assignment it also important in dealing with negative 
externalities that cross local government jurisdiction. Since local governments are 
assumed to cater only to the needs of their population, negative externalities borne by 
other regions will be ignored. Overall, this would result in a “tragedy of the 
commons” problem, with local governments failing to to bear the full cost of their 
actions, and therefore they will not reach the economically optimal outcome for the 
whole country. In that case, intervention at the national level, or assigning that 
responsibility to the national government, will be necessary to solve the problem.
The classic theories paint a very favourable image of local governments. The 
combination of rational, mobile taxpayers, responsive local governments under 
competitive pressure to provide efficient local services, and the correct assignment of
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responsibilities for goods and service provision should create an optimal economic 
outcome. However, modem economics tend to be more circumspect regarding local 
government efficiency and local government behaviour. In particular, one criticism is 
leveled at the assumption of government benevolence that is made by the classic 
writers. Shirley (2005) points out that government organizations and officials are not 
necessarily inclined to facilitate economic development, and this can be seen in most 
of the developing economies, which have remained under developed even with 
outside support and substantial financial and material aid. Thus an additional 
dimension needs to be introduced in order to examine local government behaviour. 
The new institutional economists suggest that it is necessary to examine governments 
within the context of existing institutions.
3.3 The role of local governments in new institutional economics
The view that institutions play a key role in determining the behaviour of 
local actors was proposed by Coase (1995), who argues that economics has become 
too abstract and uninterested with the actual interaction of human beings and 
organizations, who inhabit a world governed by relationships and the rules -  written 
and unwritten -  by which those relationships are formed. A simple definition of 
institutions is given by Douglas North (2005) who defines institutions thus:
Institutions are the rules of the game—both formal 
rules, informal norms and their enforcement 
characteristics. Together they define the way the game 
is played. Organizations are the players. They are made 
up of groups of individuals held together by some 
common objectives. Economic organizations are firms, 
trade unions, cooperatives, etc.; political organizations 
are political parties, legislatures, regulatory bodies;
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educational organizations are universities, schools, 
vocational training centers. The immediate objective of 
organizations may be profit maximizing (for firms) or 
improving reelection prospects (for political parties); 
but the ultimate objective is survival because all 
organizations live in a world of scarcity and hence 
competition. (North 2005, p22)
Thus the behaviour of local governments -  indeed, any economic 
organization -  and whether they achieve economic efficiency, does not depend on 
their defined functions. In viewing organizations as being interested in survival, 
operating within the constraints of written rules and unwritten ‘norms’, the 
assumption that local governments will operate efficiently because they possess 
inherent advantages (local information advantage) can be challenged. Weingast 
(2005) states the problem succinctly:
As the Federalist observed more than 200 years ago,
“if men were angels” we would not have to worry 
about structuring incentives through the appropriate 
design of political institutions; but as they observed, 
because men are not angels, we must be concerned 
with creating political institutions that provide 
government officials with the appropriate incentives.
(Weingast, 2005, p i56)
Thus the importance of providing incentives (and its counterpart, appropriate 
punishments) needs to be recognized. In the same vein, Shirley (2005) emphasises 
the importance of institutional factors in determining the pace of economic 
development in a country. She argues that the institutional structure in a country is 
correlated with whether economic actors are encouraged to trust each other and
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encourage exchange, and for powerful political actors to protect private property, or 
if they are encouraged instead to rent seek and engage in short term activites that 
damage future economic growth (Shirley, 2005, p611). Deformed institutional 
structures encourage short term behaviour and discourage investment, which in turn 
feeds back into a destructive cycle.
This does not contradict the classic models of local government efficiency. 
Regional competition, access to information, the pressure to innovate, and deviation 
in the preferences of individuals (who may or may not be mobile) all remain 
important factors affecting economic efficiency. However, from the institutional 
point of view, without the right institutional structure, these conditions may not exist, 
or could produce perverse incentives that cause local governments to engage in 
damaging behaviour. For instance, if local governments were not accountable to the 
local population or if local interest can be circumvented or superceded, then it is 
unlikely local governments will strive for local interests. Overly strong central 
governments weaken the ability and the necessity for local governments to act in 
local interests, since there is a strong incentive to obey the central government rather 
than to listen to the local population.
Ultimately then, the survival of the local government as an organization (or, 
more practically, the “survival’' of individual officials within the local government, 
and their desire to avoid punishment) can be taken as the fundamental objective. 
However, once the issue of survival is settled, the issue for local governments 
becomes one of incentives -  in this case, incentives to pursue economic growth. I f  
government benevolence is not taken for granted (and neither is the government 
assumed to be malevolent), and the national and local governments are assumed to
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behave in response to the necessity of survival and also to maximize incentives, then 
local government behaviour can be seen in terms of its relationship with the national 
government and local firms.
The national government is ultimately responsible for determining the terms 
of devolution and the delegation of responsibilities to the local government. Given 
that devolution or decentralization aims to improve economic performance, the 
assumption is that local governments will be rewarded or punished in terms of their 
ability to produce economic results. Thus local governments will pursue objectives 
that maximize their rewards, and avoid behaviour which could result in punishment 
(eg, removal of key officials from office, the removal of local government power and 
recentralization). Nevertheless, how much effect the incentives have, and whether 
they produce perverse or undesirable outcomes, can depend on the relationship 
between the national and the local government.
If local government survival (or avoiding punishment) is contingent on 
complying with the national government, then the local government is likely to 
pursue that as a priority. Any benefit accruing from pursuing incentivized objectives 
is subject to the survival of the local government, and one punishment for non- 
compliance can be the removal of the incentives. In this case, the local government 
would choose compliance if the cost of non-compliance is greater than the cost to the 
economy and to local interests. Thus, if the national government set the cost of non- 
compliance to be too high, then local governments remain in effect agencies of the 
national government, regardless of the power and resources devolved to them, and 
regardless of the incentives given.
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However, this also leads to the possibility that if the cost of non-compliance 
was lower than the cost to local economic interests -  which could also threaten local 
government survival -  then local government would act in favour of local economic 
interests, even at the risk of being punished for non-compliance. In the same 
instance, local government would act regardless of the incentives given.
This does not necessarily mean that a low level of national government 
oversight and enforcement would persuade local governments to pursue economic 
growth. On the contrary, Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) suggest that local 
officials best serve local interests when their political incentives are aligned with 
those of the governing party. The appointment of local officials belonging to the 
government party of the country ensures that the politicians act in accordance to the 
best interest of the party as the party is held accountable through local elections.
Thus in order to gain political promotion, local officials will act in the local interest. 
This alignment of local officials to the national government also means that their 
actions will take into account externalities (positive and negative) that cross outside 
their jurisdictions, since that too will affect the popularity of the party nationally. 
Thus a strong political system, working on the basis of individual interest -  mainly 
the political prospect of local officials -  also provides the local government with 
incentives to pursue economic growth.
3.4 Local government, local economic development, and incentives
The classic economic literature proposed that local government, by virtue of 
being closer to the local population, and being in charge of subational regions, are in 
a more suitable position to cater for local needs and preferences. However, the 
models neglect to explain why local governments would be inclined to act in the
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local interest. There is no intrinsic reason why local governments would serve the 
local population, a problem that is particularly apparent in transitional countries, 
many of which are also simultaneously undergoing political transformation as well. 
Thus local governments may not necessarily be democratically accountable to local 
population. Furthermore, the concentration of power -  whether held at the national 
level, or devolved to local levels -  leaves local officials scope to abuse their power 
and to engage in rent seeking activities, if the decentralization process is not careful 
enough to take this into account.
Institutional economists seek to examine local governments in terms of the 
institutions they operate within, and emphasise that to encourage local governments 
to behave in non-corrupt ways and to coerce them to engage in economic 
development, it is necessary to give them the incentives to do so. However, it is then 
necessary to consider the response by local governments to the incentives. It is 
possible for local governments to pursue perverse actions in order to maximize the 
benefits accruing from specific incentives.
This suggests that, for transitional countries, it may not be the specific 
allocation of governmental power or responsibilities that underlie a local 
government’s willingness to pursue development objectives. The incentives they are 
offered may direct them more towards one set of behaviours or another, and given 
that both formal and informal institutions outside the government structure are likely 
to be weak or non-existent, the structure of these incentives gain even more influence 
over local government behaviour.
Having examined the theoretical reasons and potential effects that
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decentralisaiotn has on local governments, it will be useful to examine the process in 
the context of China’s economic reform. Fiscal decentralization was necessary for 
China’s local governments to gain the autonomy they needed to facilitate economic 
development. However, as was pointed out in this chapter, the incentives given to 
local governments sometimes led to perverse and negative outcomes, some of which 
became a threat to macroeconomic stability. The next chapter describes the fiscal 
reform process, and the effect this had on local-central relationships.
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Chapter 4: The effects of fiscal reforms on intergovernmental relations in China
4.1 Intergovernmental relations in China
Economic reforms in China since 1978 called for changes to the relationship 
between the Central and local governments. Under the planned economy, the 
government hierarchy acted as the channel for the economic plan to be passed down 
from the Central government to governments at lower levels. The economic plan was 
formulated in Beijing, and implemented through local governments acting as agents 
of the Centre. However, with the increased emphasis placed on market mechanisms 
and the phasing out of central economic planning, it became increasingly important 
for a new working relation to be forged. Local governments, no longer simply agents 
of Central government policy, needed the necessary resources and incentives to 
develop their economies, while the Central government needed to be careful, 
allowing enough freedom for economic development in the regions, but without 
losing control over local government behaviour, nor allowing local actors to become 
a destabilizing influence.
Figure 4.1: Changes to local government responsibilities pre and post reform
Local government - pre 
reform
Local government - post 
reform
Benefits to economic 
development Potential negative effects
Assigned
responsibility
Responsible for carrying 
out Central governemnt 
plans and directives
Responsible for pursuing 
and maximising economic 
growth
Free to maximise economic 
benefits for the locality
Short termism, harmful 
competition with other 
regions
Relationship  
with Central 
government
Non negotiable relationship 
with Central government
Negotiation between 
Central government and 
local government fo 
policies, budget etc
More flexibility to suit 
different local economic 
conditions
Difficult to assess impact ol 
Central government policies 
in different regions, and 
difficult to monitor
Budget
allocation
Budget allocated and 
dictated by Central 
government
Budgetary independence 
and more expenditure 
resonsibilities
Spending targeted on 
priority services
Heavy expenditure burdem 
cannot be met, leading to 
cutbacks
Budget
constraint Soft budget constraint Hard budget constraint
More responsible fiscal 
management, more efficient 
use of existing budget
Uneven distribution of 
regional incomes, 
encourage use of 
unminitored "extra 
budgetary" funds
(source: various)
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The main changes to Chinese local government responsibilities are shown in 
figure 4.1, a summary of the economic responsibilities assigned from the Central 
government to local governments. The Central government devolved more economic 
control to local governments since the start of reforms in 1978, albeit on an 
intermittent manner consistent with the gradual approach of the reform itself. Periods 
of decentralization were followed by recentralization and a careful reconsideration of 
the power of the provincial governments. Nevertheless, the key theme underlying the 
process of decentralisation was the enhancement of local government powers to 
carry out more effective economic development, and further measures to facilitate 
that goal.
A key component of the decentralization process has been the use of fiscal 
incentives to encourage local governments to act on economic development, which 
would result in benefits to both local government and to China as a whole. In theory, 
allowing the benefits of economic development to accrue to the individual local 
governments responsible for fostering it should lead to more willingness on the part 
of local governments to pursue economic development. Coupled with the devolution 
of expenditure responsibilities and the removal of the need for the central Ministry of 
Finance to approve budgets, this represented a significant freedom for local 
governments to act.
However, the changes have had unforeseen consequences. In the process of 
decentralization, the gradual nature of China’s economic reforms left many 
distortions in the economy, as well as weaknesses in the command of the Centre over 
the regions. As Wong (1992) pointed out, the gradual approach of Chinese economic
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reforms meant that the policies lacked a coherent direction, were often reactive rather 
than proactive to emerging problems, and were implemented in a piecemeal fashion, 
creating unintentional ripple effects that cause further problems in the system (pi 98- 
199). The piecemeal change created a defective institutional arrangement that 
provided distorted incentives, encouraging local governments to pursue limited 
development strategies that maximised benefits to the local state rather than to 
encourage overall local economic growth (Wang, 2002).
Another concern of the Central government was the steady weakening of its 
ability to exercise macroeconomic control. Between the start of economic reforms 
and 1994, China’s economy grew by more than 5 times, while in real terms Central 
government revenue remained at 1978 levels (Wang, 1997). The ratios of both 
Central government revenue to GDP and Central government revenue to total 
government revenue has been falling since the first major fiscal reform in 1980, and 
continued to decline after a second attempt in 1985 designed to correct the 
shortcomings of the first. Both reform attempts failed to increase the two ratios, 
creating the paradox of the government barely able to meet its expenditure 
commitments while the Chinese economy continued to grow at astonishing rates 
(Wang, 2002). Finally, in 1994, the Central government introduced another fiscal 
reform.
The third reform in 1994 recognised that intergovernmental fiscal relations 
were defective, and that the incentives for local governments encouraged 
opportunistic behaviour. Despite the apparent incentive of localities increasing their 
overall budget through higher revenue collection, local governments nevertheless 
faced disincentives due to the way their revenue was shared with the Central
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government, and were thus reluctant to increase their revenue. The new reform 
remedied this by implementing a new tax sharing scheme with clearer guidelines on 
the distribution of revenue between the local and Central governments. All the fiscal 
reforms from 1980 onwards are discussed in the following section.
4.2 China’s fiscal reforms
While operating under a centrally planned economy, China had a simple 
system that was referred to colloquially as “eating from one big pot” (chi daguofari). 
This is a centralized system where almost all revenue was remitted to the Central 
government, which was responsible for redistributing it via the Ministry of Finance 
in accordance to the aims and objectives of the economic plan. All taxes and profits 
from local governments and state owned industries were remitted to the Central 
government. The Ministry of Finance was responsible not only for the consolidated 
(national) budget, but it also approved of the annual revenue and expenditure plans at 
the provincial level, and determined the appropriate level of revenue to be 
transferred. Provincial governments were in turn responsible for approving revenues 
and expenditures for lower levels of government. This meant pre-reform local 
governments in general (at provincial and sub provincial levels) had very little 
autonomy or scope for manoeuvring, with both their revenue and expenditures 
predetermined by higher levels of government. The unified system meant that all 
taxes were collected by local agencies, although their ability to collect revenue for 
themselves was limited as rates were set by the Central government and applied 
uniformly across the whole country. The ability of local governments to allocate 
resources was also restricted. Major items of expenditure were limited to those 
prescribed by the plan, and local governments were not allowed to budget for a 
deficit, ruling out the possibility of borrowing money to finance additional spending
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(Wong, 1992).
With the drive towards rapid industrialisation and strategic concerns dictating 
economic development during the Maoist period, the collection and allocation of 
revenue from individual provinces were rarely linked. Massive transfers from one 
province to another were often necessary in order to fulfil development objectives. 
The centralised fiscal system facilitated targeted regional development, and was used 
in lieu of fiscal policy. However, with almost no autonomy and little say in the 
disposition of their budgets, local governments had few incentives for collecting 
revenues and for keeping to their budget. Since all revenues were remitted to the 
Centre, any growth in local revenues -  either through increased collection efforts, or 
through prudent management of the local economy -  had no impact on the benefits 
to the local government. Nor did keeping to the allocated budget produce any 
benefits. Indeed, because it was almost impossible for the Central government to 
monitor, analyze, and spot irregularities for all local expenditures, it was possible to 
disguise the losses from poorly planned expenditures and revenue shortfalls at the 
local level and to pass it up to the state budget.
In order to pursue more rapid economic growth, it was necessary to overcome 
the inefficiencies of the old fiscal system. In the period immediately after Mao’s 
death, it was recognized that the economy was in a dire position. Hua Guofang 
stabilized the economy between 1976-1978, but his actions did not alter the 
fundamental weaknesses in China’s economy (Nolan & Ash, 1995). Nevertheless, 
the urgency of the situation did stimulate critical assessment of the economy, and 
encouraged a decentralization of the existing economic system. Thus China’s fiscal 
system underwent major changes in 1980, 1985, 1988 and 1994 (Lee, 2000, Wang,
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2002). All the changes were designed with the same aim in mind -  that is, to 
maximize resource mobilisation in all provinces in order to promote economic 
growth while also strengthening the fiscal power of the Central government (Wang, 
2002). The main changes introduced in each fiscal reform can be seen in Figure 3.2.
Figure 4.2: Sum m ary of C hina’s fiscal reform s, 1980-1996
Sharing Specific Revenue Fixed Rate of Remittance 
(17  provinces and cities)
Contracted Incom e  
Increase (10  Provinces and 
Cities)
(1 5  provinces)
Fixed Rate of Rem ittance  
(3  Provinces)
Fixed Rate of Remittance 
(Jiangsu)
Lump-sum Remittance 
(Heilongjiang)
Variable Rate of Remittance 
(3  Provinces)
Central, local and shared  
revenue based on non-
Ethnic Minority System  (8  
provinces)
Lump-sum Subsidy (4  
provinces)
Increased Rate of 
Remittance (2 Provinces)
negotiable ratios (All 
provinces)
The Metropolitan System  
(Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin)
Ethnic Minority System  (8  
provinces)
Lump-sum Rem ittance (3  
Provinces)
Lump-sum Transfer 
(Guangdong and Fujian)
Lump-sum Transfer 
(Guangdong and Fujian)
Lump-sum Subsidy (16  
Provinces and Cities)
(Source: After Wang, 1997, 2002)
From figure 4.2 it is possible to see the variations and provincially specific 
fiscal policies adopted by the Central government since 1980. The large number o f 
different arrangements between the Central and provincial governments made it 
difficult to maintain fiscal control. Both the central and local governments were not 
able to properly establish a stable effort to increase their extractive capacities and as 
a result, not only did Central government revenue fall in relation to GDP, total 
government revenue also declined. This affected the government at all levels, 
limiting the Central government’s ability to maintain macroeconomic stability, and 
curtailing the services provided at the local level (Wang, 1997).
The ambiguous outcome of China’s first three attempts to reform the fiscal 
system gave rise to a series o f debates over whether the Central government was 
losing control over the provincial and local governments. Falling revenue, and
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determined efforts by the local governments to undermine, exploit and resist 
corrective measures by the Central government painted a rather unpromising picture 
o f Central power, especially in regard to its control over the economy.
The localities have obtained de facto control over 
effective tax rates and tax bases, while the lack of 
coordination between the decentralization o f  revenue 
collection and the decentralization of expenditure 
responsibility has restricted the center’s [sic] flexibility 
in using expenditure policy. As for monetary policy, it 
is argued that the central bank has not been able to 
effectively control money supply as the localities can 
react strategically to the central bank’s policy. [...] As 
for regulatory issues, [...] under the decentralized 
system local governments have tended to abuse their 
(vaguely defined) administrative and regulatory 
powers in order to protect local economies (Ma, 1995, 
p2)
Figure 4.3 C entral versus local government budget deficits
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Budget deficits of the central and local governments, 1980 -  1990 (Tsang & Cheng, 1994)
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The mismatch between central and local government budgets can be seen in 
figure 4.3. Between 1980 and 1990, the gap between the Central government deficit 
and local government surplus widened despite China’s GDP growth averaging 9% 
annually (China Statistical Yearbook, 2000). At the same time, total government 
revenue fell from 25.9% of GNP in 1980 to 16.6% in 1990 (Tsang & Cheng, 1994). 
This suggested that there was a problem with the existing fiscal system in terms of its 
ability to distribute revenue within the government, and also it indicated a problem 
with overall revenue collection, which fell despite a rapidly growing economy.
4.3 China’s fiscal system, 1980-1993
The first major reform to the fiscal system came in 1980, where a revenue 
sharing scheme was implemented. The "contract responsibility system" divided 
revenues into three types: local fixed revenues (revenue for the local government); 
central fixed revenues (revenue remitted to the Central government), and shared 
revenues (revenue to be shared between local and Central government). The Central 
government retained the ability to determine all the tax rates (Ma, 1997). However, 
the reform was not applied to all Chinese regions (see figure 4.2). Many provinces 
had different arrangements with the Central government, with fixed remittances and 
fixed subsidies (for poorer provinces that were unable to finance their own 
expenditures). Individual expenditure items in provincial budgets no longer need to 
be approved by the Ministry of Finance, although restrictions were imposed on how 
the revenue was to be used -  for example, limits were placed on government 
employee wage levels and on the items which government agencies were allowed to 
purchase.
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Figure 4.4 E xpend itu re  responsibilities of C h in a ’s local and  C en tra l  governm ents
Central governm ent 
expenditu re  responsibilities
Local governm ent 
expenditure  responsibilities
National defence Rural production assistance
Foreign aid /  foreign relations Social welfare
Social welfare Urban maintenance
Agricultural assistance Administrative expenditures
Environmental conservation at 
the central level
Environmental conservation at 
the local level
Running costs of centrally 
owned enterprises
Running costs of locally owned 
enterprises
Running of centrally owned 
universities and hospitals
Education, health, culture 
and social services
Major construction projects Obligated to contribute to  
construction projects
Price subsidies
Geological surveys
Repayment of public debt
Administrative expenditures
Overlapping responsibilities are m arked in bold (after Bahl, 1999)
Expenditure responsibilities were devolved downwards to different levels o f 
government. Figure 4.4 shows the division expenditure responsibilities. Aspects o f 
national security and defence, foreign policy and foreign aid, nationally owned 
industries, infrastructure construction and industrial and commercial operations o f 
national importance, agriculture, national subsidies and other matters which affect 
the entire country are the responsibility o f the Central government. Local 
governments are responsible for the maintenance and upgrading of local 
infrastructure, health, education, welfare and other social services, subsidies and aid 
to local agriculture, the running o f locally owned enterprises, and so on.
In practice, the reform complicated China’s fiscal system. The huge variety 
o f revenue sharing schemes and the practice of setting the rate for shared revenues 
through individual negotiation rather than through the imposition o f a universal 
formula severely weakened the ability o f the Central government to impose control. 
Provinces could renegotiate, and had the incentive to do so if other provinces
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benefited from a better rate. This uncertainty was also applicable to the Central 
government, which could change the set rate for individual provinces. The lack of 
any fixed rules determining the behaviour of either the Centre or the provinces meant 
that neither party could truly trust the other (Wang, 2002). Instead of aligning the 
interests of the Centre and provinces, this served to set up a situation akin to the 
prisoner’s dilemma, with each player seeking to maximize their own advantage.
Another unforeseen consequence of the 1980 reform was the uneven 
distribution of expenditure responsibilities. The blurred boundaries between local 
and central expenditure responsibilities means there were a large number of overlaps. 
For example, universities could be centrally or locally funded, depending on whether 
they are national or regional, so education is the responsibility of both central and 
local governments. Large infrastructure projects such as power stations, 
communications and transportation require both funding and approval from the 
Centre, but provincial funding is also required.
This confusion over expenditure responsibilities stem from the failure to 
enact laws and regulations clearly defining what services are to be provided by 
which level of government. Thus although expenditure responsibilities appear clear 
enough in principle, there are areas of confusion where administrative 
responsibilities overlap, or where expenditure decisions can be influenced by their 
political impact (such as the provision of subsidies to old state industries) rather than 
by their economic efficacy (Bahl, 1999, p71).
4.3.1 The Central-local government tug-of-war
Two separate sets of problems resulted from the various distortions
61
introduced by China’s fiscal reforms between 1980 and 1993. One is the discordant 
relationship between the Central and local governments. The other is the 
implementation of economically inappropriate development policies and objectives 
because of local governments attempting to take advantage of the distorted 
incentives. Both were dangerous to the growth of China’s economy.
Poor central-local government relations threatened China’s hard won 
economic progress by risking macroeconomic stability (Wang, 1997, Brean, 1998, 
Lin, 2000). More drastically, some authors claim it threatens the stability of China as 
a single political entity (Wang & Hu, 1993, cited by Huang, 1996). Viewed through 
the lens of Central and local government revenue sharing, there does appear to be a 
struggle, with the Central government constantly attempting to increase its revenue, 
and the provinces countering its policies while expanding their revenues and 
reducing their remittance to the Central government.
The Central government appeared to be fighting a losing battle against the 
provinces, as a quick examination of the division of total revenue between the 
Central and local governments shows. Local fiscal autonomy came at the cost of 
central revenues, with local governments exercising what powers they possess to 
expand their budgets and to reduce their payments to the Centre, through measures 
such as the use of “extra budgetary funds” that are neither recorded nor reported. 
Although it may be far fetched to suggest that local autonomy posed a threat to 
China’s political stability, it is nevertheless clear that the Central -  local fiscal 
arrangements needed to be corrected, and the reforms in 1994 could be taken as an 
admission of this fact.
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However, others disagree with the zero sum approach of examining China’s 
fiscal system. Chung (1999) argues that although localities have obtained more 
discretionary powers over the past twenty years, it is too simplistic to assume that the 
balance of power has shifted in favour of the localities. Fiscal relations is but one 
facet of Central -  local relations. To suggest that fiscal irregularities on the part of 
provinces unwilling to hand over their revenues is a sign of local domination over the 
Central government is misleading, and misses the point. Falling Central government 
revenues is a cause for concern, but it does not imply that provinces are out of 
control. Nor does it imply the Central government’s ability to bring provinces into 
line has been reduced. Huang (1996) argues that even with economic 
decentralization, and the Centre apparently forfeiting control of the economy to local 
governments, the political position of the Centre has not been weakened. Its ability to 
appoint provincial leaders means it retained a form of sanction over unruly 
provinces. Lary (1997) puts it succinctly:
The Centre today faces a continuous series of regional 
challenges, predictable, aggravating, irritating. Some 
commentators see these challenges as threatening the 
continuation of an integrated state, but, if we go with 
the historical record, none of them threatens the 
survival of the centre. Instead, they force it into 
constant negotiations, accommodations and bargaining, 
in place of the uncompromising combination of tough 
and subtle means of dominance which earlier rulers 
used. (Lary, 1997, p i92)
However:
Individual provinces are not passive or docile. They
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now employ their own repertoire of tactics, some 
learned during the warlord period, when there was no 
centre, some during the anarchy of the Cultural 
Revolution. Compliance with central orders is often 
discretionary rather than mandatory, directives are 
watered down, altered or ignored. (Lary, 1997, p i93)
Thus the dynamic at work is far more complex than a simple, two 
dimensional tug-of-war between the Centre and the provinces measurable by the 
budgetary remittance and balance. Instead, the key change in the Central-local 
relationship is the introduction of negotiation and exchange. There is a recognition 
that the interests of the Centre and the localities sometimes come into conflict, but 
with the series of economic reforms it is no longer possible for the Central 
government to exert total control over the behaviour of the localities without stifling 
their ability and / or willingness to pursue economic growth, which remained the 
overriding objective of instituting economic change in the first place.
It is not necessarily in the interests of local and provincial governments to 
threaten Central power or to usurp Central control. Indeed, Lary (1997) points out 
that direct and outright challenges to Central authority and the unity of China have 
not taken place even under extremely chaotic periods of China’s history. Seceding 
from the state is treasonable and unthinkable, thus most challenges take place in 
more subtle ways, mainly for economic gains rather than political independence. 
This can be seen in the progression of fiscal reforms from 1980 to 1994, where 
measures taken by the Centre to ensure relative equality in budget distribution and 
remittance was always met with a series of regional and local countermeasures. A 
common expression used by Chinese local officials during the interviews of this 
study- shang you zhengce, xia you duice — the Centre has policies, the regions have
countermeasures -  expresses this dynamic succinctly.
This conflict of interest between the Centre and the regions remains the key 
cause of this antagonism. The Central government must fulfil very different 
objectives to those of the local government, and it has the capacity to perform those 
functions well. Similarly, local governments have the capacity and are suited to 
serving only certain tasks and functions. Where the boundary between Central and 
local government tasks is blurred, there is the potential for friction and antagonistic 
behaviour.
Extra budgetary finance is another important source of revenue for local 
governments in China. Before the first fiscal reforms, their significance was limited 
by their relatively small sizes. However, they were significant in that local 
governments can utilize them without needing Central government approval. Indeed, 
there is almost no central control over extra budgets at all, and their collection and 
use is largely unrecorded and monitored, and local governments have almost total 
discretion over the composition and level of extra budgets (Bahl, 1999, Wedeman, 
2000). By shifting the revenue they collected into extra budgets, local governments 
reduced the amount they paid to the Central government through the shared revenue 
under the contract responsibility scheme. Bahl (1999) states that by 1995 the total 
extra budgetary revenue was equivalent to 68% of total budgetary revenue (p75). 
The attraction of extra budgetary incomes influence the development of local 
industries, creating distortions in local development policies based on local 
government revenue rather than rational economic development.
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4.2.2 Distorted local policies
The devolution of the responsibility for economic development to local 
governments is based on the idea that the local government has better access and 
connections with their locality, better information, and therefore are in a position to 
make the best and most appropriate decisions for economic development (Young, 
2000, Lin, 2000). The incentive for local governments to carry out economic 
development -  rather than to rely on Central government subsidies -  was to harden 
their budget constraint, and to link the performance of the local economy with the 
revenues received by the local government through taxation. In theory, the better the 
local economy performed, the more taxation received by the local government. 
Paradoxically, the incentive to maximise economic growth -  and hence maximise 
financial rewards for local governments -  worked too well, and created distortions in 
the economy. Local governments were more concerned with the “stick” of a hard 
budget and the “carrot” of higher tax revenues than they were with implementing 
even, balanced and long term development policies.
[I]n response to fiscal pressures and incentives, local 
governments have vigorously promoted industrial 
development in their attempt to build new and 
profitable industries to offset declining revenues and to 
finance growing expenditures. In the process, they 
have created problems of persistent overinvestment, 
duplication, regional blockades, and continuing 
bureaucratic management of industry (Wong, 1992, 
p.198).
Heady (1998) too, argues that because of the importance of indirect taxes in 
funding local service provision, local governments have a biased incentive to
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develop those industries which are taxed most heavily, even if it is at the cost of 
overall economic well being or at the expense of Central government revenue. For 
instance, Young (2000) mentions an episode where Zhejiang province took 
advantage of the price of silk. The price of raw silk was fixed at a low level by the 
Central government, while finished silk products fetched an artificially high price. 
Thus Zhejiang stood to gain from the difference in price from local processing and 
direct export. With the relaxation of Central government control over rural 
industries, Zhejiang expanded its silk industry to take advantage of this price wedge. 
Zhejiang also erected trade barriers to prevent silk industries in other areas from 
purchasing its raw silk at above the centrally fixed price, as this would diminish the 
rents the Zhejiang government acquired from processing itself. This led to the 
situation where Shanghai received only 40 tons of its allocated 2000 tons of raw silk 
in 1988, even though Zhejiang was one of the main suppliers of raw silk in China. 
Young (2000) continues:
The “ silkworm cocoon war”  described above was just 
one of the many interregional trade conflicts, in both 
raw materials and finished manufactured goods, which 
appeared in the People’s Republic during the 1980s 
and 1990s (Young, 2000, p. 1093)
This shows that the incentive for local governments to industrialize and 
promote local growth is not a neutral one. Local governments will concentrate on 
those industries that can give the highest, and most rapid returns to investment.
Given the remaining price distortions in the Chinese economy at the time, some local 
governments became opportunistic developers, seeking the highest rent. The tobacco 
industry was another industry that attracted the interests of local governments (Zhou, 
2000). Cigarettes were taxed heavily (with 50% product tax and 30% tax on tobacco
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leaf prior to 1994), with a substantial part of the revenue accruing to the local 
government, and being a state monopolized industry the difference between price 
and cost yielded a substantial profit. Thus local governments were keenly interested 
in their development. However, following a period of rapid expansion of the tobacco 
industry in the 1980s, there was a glut of capacity with a bloated an inefficient 
industry, leading to the creation of trade barriers, price fixing, quota trading and 
other measures to protect an inefficient industry. Zhou (2000) argues that even 
though local tobacco firms may be making a loss, their tax revenue to the local 
government brings continued support.
4.3 China’s 1994 fiscal reform
The most obvious outcome of all these pressures on the Central government 
budget is the deficit of the Central government. Wong (2000) points out that the 
decline of the central economic plan as a means of controlling the economy has led 
to the budget and monetary policies becoming increasingly important. They are the 
tools with which to maintain macroeconomic stability, and to allocate resources 
according to policy objectives. While these objectives were fulfilled by the economic 
plan in the past, the reduction of its scope and in terms of the resources available at 
its command has transformed the plan to a set of general guidelines for local 
implementers to follow, rather than acting as a tool for micromanaging the economy. 
Therefore the budget has become the most direct way for the government to carry out 
its policy decisions. This makes the continued and increasing budget deficits all the 
more threatening to China's macroeconomic stability as it undermined the ability of 
the Central government to regulate the economy through fiscal measures (Tsang & 
Cheng, 1994). The fact that the Chinese economy experienced high growth rates and 
high inflation also worked against the pre set (and fixed) tax sharing quotas that were
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arranged with the local governments.
Figure 4.5 Tax division between C h in a ’s C en tra l  and local governm ents  in 1994
C entral tax e s Local taxes S hared  tax e s  (c e n tra l : lo c a l)
Tariffs
B u sin ess tax  (excluding  
insurance, railw ays and banks)
V alue added  tax - 2 5 :7 5
In com e tax o f central In com e tax  from  local Stock tra n saction s g a in s ta x  -
en terp rises en terp r ises 5 0 :5 0
T axes on in su ran ce, railway  
and banking reven u e
Personal in com e tax
O ther resou rce  ta x e s  
(exclud ing oil) - m ostly  to  local 
govern m en t
In com e tax o f financial Capital g a in s  tax  on land and
en terp r ises property sa le s
C onsum ption tax E state duty
O ffshore oil resou rce  ta x e s Stam p  duty
Source: Tsang & Cheng, 1994
It was under these circumstances that the Central government announced a 
new set o f reforms to be implemented at the beginning o f 1994. It had three main 
objectives, outlined in the “Decision of the CCP central committee on issues 
concerning the establishment of a socialist market economic structure” (cited by 
Tsang & Cheng, 1994). First, it was necessary to correct the falling total government 
revenues, and to raise the low central to local budget share to a ratio o f 60%:40%. By 
1993, the ratio had fallen to around 22%:78%. Second, the reform aimed to 
streamline the revenue assignment system. The arbitrary mix o f quotas and 
proportional sharing systems had by 1993 almost become a completely negotiated 
system, with individual provinces determining their revenues and remittances on the 
basis o f one to one negotiations with the Central government. This unwieldy 
arrangement meant that Central government attempts to manage the economy 
through adjusting tax rates was effectively negated, since tax rates were uniform 
throughout the country, while individual provinces had different revenue
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assignments, and the effects from adjustments was difficult to predict. In response to 
this, a rule based system of tax assignments was introduced. Revenue assignment 
was to be determined by three categories of taxes: local, central and shared taxes. 
Unlike the old revenue sharing system, the rates for taxes were fixed and were not 
negotiable. Finally, the reform aimed to rationalize the budgetary system, and to 
control fiscal deficits.
The 1994 reform did succeed in raising Central government revenues. 
However, in order to push through the reform, the Central government had made a 
concession to the provinces. In order to make the reform more palatable, the Central 
government had guaranteed that their revenues would not fall below that of the base 
year, 1993. When local governments learnt of this in September 1993, they 
immediately increased their revenue collection efforts, even to the extent of 
collecting taxes for 1994 in advance in order to increase the amount of rebate they 
received from the Centre (Wang, 1997). This tied up much of the disposable budget 
of the Central government, and even though the proportion of central -  local revenue 
increased in 1994, after the remittances were made the Central government’s budget 
was much the same as before. However, this arrangement of remittance is to be 
phased out slowly, since the growth rate of the remittances is to be slower than the 
revenue growth (0.3% for every 1% revenue growth). Thus as long as revenue 
collection from the provinces continues to grow, the amount given by the Centre to 
the provinces will decrease slowly.
Wang (1997) points out that the 1994 reforms still left many avenues for 
local governments to reduce the payments made to the Centre. Tax avoidance, tax 
evasion and tax arrears are all illegal, but their enforcement falls on the shoulders of
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local governments. Wang (1997) shows that much of the problem stems from local 
governments unwilling to enforce these rules because the benefits for them are 
relatively small. This is illustrated by the collection of the personal income tax.
When it was classified as a shared tax, its collection rate grew slowly. However, 
when it was reclassified as a local tax in 1994, its collection soared. Similarly, two 
thirds of tax evasion cases in 1994 involved VAT (a shared tax), highlighting the 
local governments’ priority of concentrating their resources on collecting local taxes. 
The use and collection of extra budgetary funds also remain outside the scope of 
official monitoring, exposing it to the possibility of abuse by local governments. In 
1993, total extra budgetary revenue was up to 16% of GDP, matching total 
government revenue. In contrast, in 1978, extra budgetary revenue was only 10% of 
GDP and government revenue was 31% (Jin et al, 2005).
4.4 Conclusion
The process of decentralizing government finances and economic control has 
changed the relationship between the Central and local governments. Local 
governments, operating as agents for the Central government in the planned 
economy, were given the incentives to develop their economies.
However, while China’s economy grew spectacularly, both local and Central 
government revenues remained stagnant, despite repeated attempts to correct this 
through reforming the fiscal system. The reforms themselves appear to be the 
problem, as they introduced inappropriate incentives for local governments. The 
gradual pace of reform also meant that other sources of distortion remained in the 
economy, such as fixed pricing, which local governments also exploited. In doing so, 
Central and local governments became locked in a game that neither could win, and
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local governments were locked with each other to protect their own interests. 
Overall, this situation created a series of damaging outcomes, such as falling 
government revenue, reduced inter provincial trade, and the over development of 
inappropriate industrial sectors to take advantage of artificial price distortions, 
diverting crucial and scarce resources from industries that may be more suitable and 
sustainable. These did not serve to bring more prosperity to the Chinese economy.
The change in intergovernmental relations, however, has served to highlight 
the growing importance of local governments in the economic development process. 
While threats of national disintegration due to poor local-central relations may be 
exaggerated, the danger to continued economic growth is very real. Governments at 
the local level have shown that they are now able to bargain with the Central 
government, and their actions can overcome corrective measures of the Central 
government.
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Chapter 5: Local government behaviour and firm ownership in China
5.1 Introduction
China’s fiscal reforms and continuing process of decentralisation aimed to 
provide local governments with the autonomy and incentives to carry out local 
economy development. The reforms did not direct the growth in a balanced or 
sustainable manner, instead leaving most local governments with their own 
initiatives for pursuing economic growth. This resulted in the multitude of 
approaches taken by Chinese local governments towards economic development. 
However, the common underlying theme shared by all local authorities was the fiscal 
incentive to pursue economic development. Arguably, then, local governments 
would aim to maximise the potential benefits to them -  in terms of official and 
unofficial revenue, and in terms of other, non financial benefits, such as personal 
benefits to individual officials (Levy, 1995, Che, 2002).
One important determinant of how local governments could benefit from 
economic development is the predominant type of firm ownership in their area. The 
incentives for local government to develop their economies is tied with how much 
benefit can be extracted from local firms, with firms that are under local government 
ownership being easier to control than firms that are not under local government 
ownership.
The gradual nature of China’s transitions meant that her economy passed 
through the stages between being a centrally planned, state owned economy at the 
start of reforms, and the market driven, privately owned economy that operates now. 
The Central government did not set out to privatise the economy, but the gradual and
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experimental nature of the process resulted in a gradual transition of ownership 
types, from state ownership to private ownership. The experiments of the local 
governments were crucial in shaping this transition process, since local governments 
were the ones “feeling the stones” across the river of economic transition, and their 
experiences informed further reforms by the Central government. In modelling local 
government behaviour, Oi (1992) points out that:
By local state corporatism I refer to the workings of a 
local government that coordinates economic 
enterprises in its territory as if it were a diversified 
business corporation. [...] Whereas the central state set 
the reform process in motion and provided localities 
with the incentives and the leeway to develop 
economically, it is local government that has 
determined the outcome of reform in China. Hence, my 
designation local state corporatism (Oi, 1992, p i 00- 
101)
The process of local government determining the outcome of economic 
transition -  rather than setting the ground rules for it -  meant that China’s transition 
was the result of local government action, and to understand that action it is 
necessary to examine the relationship between local governments and local firms.
The ownership of a firm is crucial in determining firm performance as well as 
the amount of benefits that can be extracted by a local government (Oi, 1992, Edin, 
2003, Li et al, 2004). Throughout China’s transition, local governments have 
changed their relationships with firms in order to maximise the benefits to them. 
Understanding the three main ownership types is therefore useful in understanding 
the role of local government in economic development.
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5.2 The three main ownership types
Firm ownership in China can be divided into three categories: state owned, 
collectively owned, and privately owned. At any time the Chinese economy is a mix 
of firms simultaneously operating under these different ownership models. With 
individual local governments determining the pattern of local firm ownership, each 
locality is also likely to have a different mixture of ownership types. This is one of 
the most unique aspects of China’s transition, with state, collective and private 
sectors all responsible for driving economic growth in different areas, sometimes 
simultaneously.
The sections below examines the three different ownership types in more 
detail. Each ownership type places different constraints on how local governments 
may influence or manage them, as well as requiring different actions from the local 
government to promote their growth. State ownership, for instance, places the 
greatest number of restraints on local government to act, since Central government 
control curtails individual local action, while local and collective ownership allows 
the greatest flexibility for local government action and rent extraction (as evidenced 
by Oi’s (1992) theory of local corporatism). Private firms suffer from the lack of 
legal protection and regulations against local governments, although they are less 
pliable then locally owned firms.
5.2.1 State ownership
China’s reforms exposed state enterprises to the influence of the market. The 
state retained ownership over these firms, but they were to operate in a market, rather
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than under the structure of a planned economy. It was hoped that the pressure of 
market competition would increase efficiency, yet at the same time the ownership 
rights remained with the state.
The reason for the insistence on retaining ownership is both ideological and 
practical. Ideologically, China remained committed to the socialist vision, and this 
commitment was particularly strong at the start of the reform period, with fierce 
debates over the future direction of the economy. Practically, aside from their 
productive functions, China’s state enterprises perform a variety of important social 
and political functions that would be disrupted by outright privatisation. In the 
absence of a nation wide medical, welfare and social security system, the Central 
government was unwilling to upset the existing set up and risk social instability 
through privatisation. Thus the path of enterprise reform was pursued, instead of 
outright privatisation (Cao, 2000). The reforms sought to transform the way in which 
state firms were managed, rather than to transfer their ownership into private hands. 
Management contracts were introduced, in much the same way that contracts for the 
agricultural sector was introduced in the early 1980s. Production from state 
enterprises was to be split into those fulfilling the plan quota, sold at a price level set 
by the state, with any surplus production above quota allowed to be sold at a higher 
price on the free market, the profits retained to be distributed or used as the mangers 
of the firm saw fit. The government (here, the local government) and its agencies 
were to stop their micromanagement of the economy, concentrating instead on 
implementing their governmental duties. In theory, this allowed local governments to 
benefit from the tax base of more efficient and better managed state firms without 
actually going through the process of privatisation. However, as Cao (2000) points 
out:
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Decentralization has broken up the command 
economy, as it indeed was intended to do, but it has 
also resulted in a disaggregated state consisting of 
numerous decentralized agencies and departments 
from various central, regional, and local ministries and 
their respective branches, each eager to exercise 
jurisdiction over the firm and correspondingly,
“extractive authority over firm assets.” (p36-37)
Some local governments, their departments, and agencies, were not satisfied 
with the prospect of an expanding tax base through the growth of these reformed, 
privately managed, publicly owned firms. The separation of ownership and 
management created confusion over how to demarcate control and management 
rights, resulting in conflicting claims over the ownership of a firm. Within this 
confusion, it was easier for local governments to acquire retain de facto management 
rights, and the right to intervene when it felt suitable. Rather than separating the state 
from the firm, these reforms produced a perverse situation, where the overlapping 
claims to ownership and control, and conflicting interests between local stat and 
private management, caused confusion, facilitating rent seeking and predatory 
behaviour.
Chinese local governments were able to exert additional control over local 
state firms by controlling their access to loans. The growth of many local state firms 
in China depended on their ability to secure loans. Whereas under the planned 
economy, firms were given grants from the state, and had many options to delay or 
reduce repayment (Chang, 1983, 1282-1283), the newly introduced reforms 
encouraged firms to access their capital from elsewhere. Being able to obtain grants
77
from the local branches of state owned bank was the easiest way to expand firms, 
and it was the simplest way to expand the local state sector and increase potential 
remittances to the local government. The tendency for over investment is termed 
“investment hunger” by Komai (1986a). Chang (1983) also describes the tendency 
for bureaucratic organisations to expand their sphere of influence through growing 
their organisations, which drives investment. Furthermore, the old style planned 
economy evaluation of gross output (rather than profits) as a measure of progress 
meant that there was constant competition on local governments to obtain grants 
from the Central government to invest in local projects. The consideration of cost 
was secondary, as interest and repayments can be deferred. Under a planned 
economic system, there existed the central planners to curb the over enthusiasm of 
local government investment. However, the introduction of reforms for firms 
removed this restraint, and local governments and local firms alike found many ways 
to increase their investment.
5.2.2 Collective ownership
Many authors agree that local governments were responsible for leading 
China’s economic growth (Hubbard, 1995, Unger & Chan, 1999, Oi, 1992). The 
political acceptability of local collective ownership (Cao, 2000) -  as contrasted with 
outright private ownership (or privatisation of existing state firms) -  makes them a 
natural transition away from state ownership whilst avoiding the stigma of being 
“capitalist”, a term that was still contentious in the early part of the reforms.
Collectively owned firms were the fastest growing firms in China in the 
1980s and early 1990s. Their success seems paradoxical given that collective firms 
were often controlled and surreptitiously owned by the local state. According to
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Komai (1986b), state ownership of firms was highly inefficient, even under 
conditions of market competition, and this situation led to the failure of Hungary’s 
economic reforms in the 1980s. However, China’s collective sector grew rapidly, 
seeming to contradict Hungary’s experience.
Walder (1995a, 1995b) suggests there were three commonly offered 
explanations as to the Chinese economy was successful. First, it has been suggested 
that the small collective rural industries crucial to China’s economic growth -  and 
ostensibly operated by the state -  in fact fall under a different form of ownership to 
the larger industries more traditionally assumed to be SOEs. Unlike larger industries 
constrained by the state plan -  as well as having a soft budget provided by the 
Central government -  smaller, local authorities run local enterprises. These small 
firms face much fiercer competition, and unlike the Central government, local 
governments could not afford a “soft budget” to keep uncompetitive firms alive. It 
would therefore be a mistake to assume the same failures in large, centrally managed 
firms would also happen in these smaller, locally managed firms. Furthermore, the 
label of “public ownership” may disguise a high degree of privatisation that has 
taken place in the firm. Thus “collective” ownership may be no more than a shield 
for entrepreneurs to operate under the aegis of local government protection.
A second explanation suggests that the transition to markets has been 
successful in China due to the incentives given to firms to operate profitably. The 
gradual transition to a market, as opposed to a big bang, introduced competing 
companies and exposed SOEs to increasing competition for both resource inputs and 
for markets for finished products. The transition is therefore able to provide 
managers with the same incentives that would face a private firm and hence replicate
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the same behaviour. A variation of this explanation suggests that, since market forces 
are driving state owned firms to behave in much the same way as privately owned 
firms, the most dynamic of these would be found where the market has become more 
developed, since that is where the greatest competitive pressures would be found.
Nee (1992) suggests that rural collective industries are closest to having a market 
system, and are thus the most competitive, because they were the first sector to have 
benefited from the economic reforms in 1978. In this explanation, the question of 
actual ownership of the firm becomes less important, since they face the same 
incentives and thus act in the same way as a privately owned firm. The emphasis is 
instead on the competitive pressure faced by firms.
The third explanation offered revolves around the fiscal incentives given to 
local officials to generate revenue. The reforms in the fiscal system created what 
could be described as a form of fiscal federalism. It was designed to encourage local 
officials to increase their revenue through achieving economic growth, and collecting 
more taxation from the local economy. By allowing localities to retain a proportion 
of tax revenue, instead of requiring them to remit it all to the Central government for 
redistribution, local governments stood to benefit from increasing total revenue, so 
they would encourage local economic development. Furthermore, since local 
authorities still faced a hard budget constraint (as the Central government was no 
longer redistributing resources to bail out enterprises that were in trouble), they were 
forced to manage the local firms in a prudent manner.
There is a striking difference between the first explanation and the others -  its 
insistence on the importance of clear property rights and ownership. North and 
Weingast (1989) stated that the existence of secure property rights is a necessary
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precondition in order for economic development to take place, and this discussion 
has often been framed in terms of property rights for individual entrepreneurs in 
market economies. However, Oi (1992) argues there is no reason why property rights 
should only be an effective incentive when applied to individuals, as opposed to any 
other entity (which includes the Chinese local governments). Furthermore, there is 
no reason why any entity other than private individuals cannot become effective 
entrepreneurs. So long as the correct incentives are present, Oi argues, the question 
of ownership is a moot point. The same incentives were given to the local state 
through China’s economic and fiscal reforms as would be given to individual 
entrepreneurs.
In Unger and Chan’s (1995) analysis on the East Asian and Chinese 
corporatist models of development, they suggested that corporatism in China, in 
contrast with other East Asian economies, was used as a form of deregulation, which 
freed firms from the direct interventions from the state. Under the pre reform planned 
economy the government had total control, micromanaging the economy through 
detailed economic planning. With the economic reforms, instead of direct economic 
control, the Centre instead allowed various surrogate institutions more freedom to 
make economic decisions. Since most of these consist mainly of bureaucracies and 
local governments, the Centre maintains a degree of control that it would otherwise 
not have if completely independent organisations were created instead. Nevertheless, 
this meant that the structure of the Chinese economy is such that certain forms of 
corporate governance may be favoured more than others. Nee (1992) argues:
The transition economy, characterized by weak market 
structures, poorly specified property rights, and 
institutional uncertainty increases the relative cost of
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redistribution even while rendering costly market 
transactions (Nee, 1992[a]). This characteristic 
condition of partial reform creates an institutional 
environment in which hybrid forms [of corporate 
governance] enjoy a transaction cost advantage over 
alternative governance structures. (p4)
Thus, although the intervention of the local government in the running of 
local enterprises may lead to a softening of the budget constraint (Komai, 1986b), 
and hence lead to inefficiencies, it is possible that under certain circumstances such a 
relationship may be a beneficial one, promoting efficiency and profitability rather 
than the behaviours of a stagnant monopoly. Local governments can enhance the 
domestic and international competitiveness of a firm by providing much needed 
infrastructure support (in the forms of education, training, health and so on), 
facilitate horizontal and vertical interactions along the production chain (through 
information exchange between different local firms), provide subsidies, act as a 
source for physical or human capital, and act as a conduit for information on 
markets, new technologies and opportunities. Thus:
In short, local governments may provide the backing 
and resources needed by entrepreneurs to compete 
effectively in an economy characterized by partial 
reform, in which the still dominant redistributive 
institutions interact with market forces in a manner that 
subordinates market institutions. (Nee, 1992, p4)
This suggests that the economic conditions in China between 1980 and 1990 
may have been more suited to local state corporatism than it was to private 
enterprises. This is more so for smaller, rural collectives, who share a bilateral
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dependency with their local government. In theory, rural collective enterprises were 
owned by all who live within the jurisdiction of the local government, which meant 
the local government had greatest claim over managerial and de facto ownership 
rights. Professional managers may be hired to run the enterprise, but their actions 
remain at the discretion of the local authorities. Maintaining a good relationship 
between the local firm and the government is a necessity, on a collective level, and 
on a personal level. This aspect of social networking, or guanxi, can be found all 
over China, at all levels, so a brief diversion will be made here on a more formalised 
approach to viewing the game of guanxi. As Wu (2001) points out, the nature of 
guanxi means that it is dynamic, without a certain end state, unlike an exchange 
taking place in a market.
This characteristic has important implications for 
calculation in personal connections. Guanxi exchanges 
as a form of ‘gift economy’ stands in sharp contrast to 
market exchange. In a pure market situation, a 
transaction is completed when goods and payment are 
exchanged, whereas in a gift interaction, exchange is 
not yet finished when the gift is offered and accepted.
For instance, one may intentionally present a gift to 
commit a friend to repay favours in the future, but at 
the present moment, one would not know what one 
will require in return and when such a need may arise.
The moratorium makes the values of future goods 
unknown (Wu, 2001, p30)
In this sense, the local officials can be seen as an entrepreneur as well, even if 
they are not directly involved in managing an enterprise themselves. Krug (2000) 
suggests that political entrepreneurship can be seen as a suitable explanation to the 
success of collective enterprises in China. The idea of the individual entrepreneur
appears to be out of place in the Chinese economy, since private individuals lack the 
option of obtaining capital, credit, and land, though the market. Thus the 
establishment of a firm depended on an agreement with those who possessed the 
necessary resources. Krug points out that the village, and by extension, the local 
government, is a collective of those who have the necessary resources.
5.2.3 Private ownership
Private firms found it necessary to cultivate good relations with the local 
government in order to operate successfully. Since the formation of the People’s 
Republic of China, the official stance regarding “individual economy” (firms owned 
and operated by individuals) has fluctuated, but the general trend is unmistakable. 
Between 1952 and 1978, the number of people employed in the private sector 
(sometimes referred to as the “individual” -  geti -  sector) declined from 8.8 million 
to 150 000 (Hershkovitz, 1985). Although permitted to come back again since the 
start of reforms, the Central government was initially cautious about the introduction 
of private ownership. The euphemism “non-state sector” neatly encapsulated this 
ambivalent feeling, qualifying the presence and necessity of private enterprises, yet 
avoided having to admit to their existence. In the absence of clearly defined property 
rights and the enforcement of those rights, as well as the ambivalent political 
atmosphere, establishing relations with the authorities became a necessity to 
compensate for the marginal status of the private firm. In this case, it was easiest to 
access local officials, since they were the most immediate interface between the 
general populace and the state.
The numerous difficulties and restrictions imposed on private firms meant 
that a personal relationship between an entrepreneur and receptive local officials was
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one way to bypass the regulations imposed by the state. Furthermore, the upheavals 
in China’s politics made it difficult for any particular set of political institutions to 
become securely established. The network of personal relations (guanxi) thus 
became an important variable to consider when examining businesses in China. It 
seems that in the face of bureaucratic intransigence, China’s historical preference for 
a personal and moralistic relationship (Dittmer, 1995), rather than impersonal, 
authoritarian relationship, has resurfaced.
Private firms were restricted in their access to capital, since state banks and 
other official sources of credit often consider loans on political rather than economic 
criteria, and private firms on their own lack the political credentials to be considered. 
Funds were therefore available only from private, sometimes informal sources -  such 
as friends and family -  at substantially higher cost (Nee, 1992). A good relation with 
local authorities is useful here since local governments at county, municipal and 
provincial levels have become increasingly influential over the credit decisions of 
local branches of both the central bank and other specialised banks (for example, the 
Industrial and Commercial bank of China, the Agricultural Bank of China, the 
People’s Construction Bank of China) (Qian, 1999). The ability to access capital is 
especially crucial in a transitional economy. The experience of other transitional 
economies shows that the process of transition leads to the creation of many new 
firms, but that they start out undercapitalised and ill equipped since, in the early 
stages of a transition economy banks usually lack the ability to handle small scale 
loans (Naughton, 1994). In China, the situation is similar, in that it is difficult for 
individuals to obtain loans from banks. Thus having a local government serving as a 
financial intermediary is one way to access capital that would not otherwise be 
available.
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There are other benefits to forging a good relationship 
with local officials, who may be willing to overlook 
tax evasions and other regulation infringements, or 
provide a certain amount of political protection for 
firms by registering them as collective enterprises, or 
to collude in exploiting existing loopholes for 
corporate profit (White, 1996).
What is important to note is the interplay between the wish of local 
governments to maximise the benefits to them, and the performance of the firms. An 
inefficient firm may provide the local government with revenues even though it is a 
loss maker. Many of China’s tobacco firms fall into this category (Zhou, 2000), due 
to the distortions introduced by fixed pricing and China’s structure of taxation. 
However, the effect of distorted economic development will eventually impact the 
health of the local economy, and force local government to change their actions.
5.3 Conclusion
The ownership of local firms changed as China’s economic reform 
progressed, from state ownership, through mixed collective ownership, to private 
ownership. This change affected the relationship between local governments and 
local firms, as ownership and control over local firms determined the degree to 
which local governments intervened in the local economy. There is obviously greater 
scope for local government intervention with local government owned firms, or with 
collective firms under local government control, than with privately owned firms.
The relationship between local firms and local government also affected the 
development path of local governments. The relative cost and risk of pursuing
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economic development versus the potential gains might be seen in the light of short 
term benefits and gains. Firms under local government control and management 
provided local governments with greater opportunity to benefit, which was 
sometimes found to be preferable to the risk of developing a privately owned 
economy. Thus economic reform for local governments with a higher degree of 
control over local firms would be expected to be slower than in places where local 
governments had a lower degree of control.
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Chapter 6 Types of local government intervention in the local economy
6.1 Introduction
China’s fiscal reforms have provided local governments with the incentives 
they needed to develop their local economies. The reforms themselves produced a 
range of effects, some positive, some unforeseen and undesirable. However, in the 
main they stimulated efforts by local governments to maximize the use of available 
resources in their local economies, thereby gradually introducing elements of the 
market into a command economy, without the need for the “shock therapy” of the 
Eastern European countries.
The success of this transition raises the question of the role of local 
governments in this process. The variety of “economic models” (jingji moshi) in 
China is impressive, but most are limited to the regions they were named after, being 
the products of specific circumstances which brought about their creation, rather than 
being the result of thoughtful planning or deliberate planning. The geographical 
specificity complicates the task of identifying the specific role played by local 
governments in these models. As Baum and Schevchenko (1999) point out, China’s 
institutional landscape is complex, polymorphous and prone to changes, and its 
current and incomplete transition away from a totalitarian state is unprecedented. 
Furthermore, China’s economic reforms encourage experimentation in order to find 
the most appropriate pathway for economic transition. Variety, rather than 
uniformity, was the outcome.
A number of labels were created to classify the actions of the local 
governments, separate from their geographical locations, including “local state
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corporatism” (Oi, 1992), “capitalism with Chinese characteristics” (Solinger, 1993) 
“state entrepreneurialism” (Duckett, 1996, 2001), and “local market socialism” (Lin, 
1995). These describe the types and degree of local government intervention in the 
developing the local economy. Baum and Shevchenko (1999) synthesized these into 
a simple table of local government typology in figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: Typology of local government involvement in local economic activity
Local governemnt 
connected to 
enterprises?
No
(after Baum & Shevchenko, 1999)
Local government has incentive to increase productivity? 
Yes No
Entrepreneurial Clientelist
Developmental Predatory
The two key variables in this model are whether the local government has 
incentives to improve productivity or not, and whether the local government is 
connected with local enterprises or not. The two variables help classify local 
governments into four types -  entrepreneurial, corporatist, clientelistic, and 
developmental. However, this model excludes the possibility of local governments 
exhibiting behaviours that fit into more than one category. It presents a neat typology 
of government types, but the pairings are not necessarily mutually exclusive. A 
developmental government may behave clientelistically as well, and an 
entrepreneurial government may at times engage in predatory activities. Thus a more 
sophisticated system is needed to capture the full richness of local government 
activities. By incorporating the four categories from Baum and Shevchenko’s (1999) 
model as a means of classifying local government behaviour, rather than local 
governments themselves, it is possible to construct a more nuanced model that may 
be a more useful tool for examining China’s local governments.
89
The discussion of incentives from the previous chapter suggests that local 
governments are motivated by self interest to develop their local economies. China’s 
fiscal reforms linked local government income with local economic growth so that it 
was in the interest of the local government to encourage local economic growth. It is 
also necessary to consider the additional freedom of action that local governments 
have gained from the reforms. The introduction of market transactions in China’s 
dual track economy, and the devolution of economic control to the local level, 
coupled with the incentive to maximize tax revenues at the local level, transformed 
the role of local governments. This decentralization process allowed local 
governments more freedom to respond to their pursuit of the carrot dangled by fiscal 
reforms, and the outcome of their pursuit dictated the path of their local economic 
development. This response by local governments will used as the main criteria for 
classifying local development.
The outcome of local government action may contribute to either a 
successful, growing local economy, or an unsuccessful and stagnant economy. The 
difficulty lies in determining the link between local government action and its actual 
influence on the local economic outcome. Since local government incentives were 
linked with their ability to extract revenue, the link with local economic performance 
was indirect.
Figure 6.2 illustrates the process for local governments and local economic 
development. So long as revenue can continue to be extracted from the local 
economy, there would be no incentive for the local government to change its 
behaviour, as there are costs associated with a change in strategy and direction.
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When the benefits to local government are not forthcoming, then the local 
government will eventually be forced to re-examine its policies and act accordingly. 
This includes influences from the examples o f other local governments, who are 
more successful economically, or changes through introduction o f Central 
government policies that alter the set o f incentives and constraints local governments 
operate under. Central government policy can be affected in turn by the behaviour of 
local governments, which could prompt a re-evaluation o f Central policies that are 
successful and need to be expanded in scope, or unsuccessful policies that have been 
widely circumvented or negated by local governments. This then becomes a mutually 
dependent system that feeds back into itself.
Figure 6.2: C h in a ’s local governm ent economic development process
China’s  local government involveinent 
in the development process
Local government continues the 
same strategy
Local government changes 
behaviour
Benefits accrue to 
local government 
(and/or growing local 
economy)
Benefits not accrue to 
local government 
(and/dr stagnant local 
economy)
Local government attempts to maximise 
benefits with given incentives
Local govemmenl implements economic 
development policy
Economic policy affects local firms and 
local ownership patterns
Success attracts more local 
governments adopt similar 
strategy
Changes in China's economy initiates new  
debate over economic reform
Economic development policy from 
Central g o v erh rfH errt, offering incentives 
for local governments
(source: own elaboration)
Given the variation in local conditions and backgrounds, local governments 
will differ in terms of their strategies for extracting benefits from the local economy. 
Moreover, their behaviour is subject to continuous change, since, as shown in figure 
6.2, there is a continuous process in terms of the changes in China’s economic
91
development. With changes to China’s economy, as well as Central government 
policies, local governments have to change their strategies to retain the benefits that 
can accrue to them.
Thus the role of the local government becomes relevant at the stage where 
they maximize their benefits and to implement economic policies. Between their 
incentives and the outcome (i.e. whether they succeed in realizing the incentives), lie 
the behaviour patterns proposed by Baum and Shevchenko (1999) -  developmental, 
corporatist, clientelistic, and predatory. The following sections will describe the four 
behaviours.
6.2 Entrepreneurial local government
By 2001, almost 38% of all firms remained state owned and managed 
(Jefferson and Su, 2006). Local governments also control collectively owned 
enterprises, which were highly successful especially in rural areas, where they are 
known as township-village enterprises (TVEs). Harrold (1992) reviewed statistics 
that suggests state enterprises grew at an average rate of 9.8% between 1982 and 
1988, while TVEs grew at an astonishing 38.2%. The tremendous success of these 
enterprises is due in large part to their special relationship with the local government. 
The arrangement between them has been likened to that which exists within a 
corporation by Jean Oi (1992, 1995), with hierarchical arrangements of governments 
controlling the means of production and ownership of assets much like corporations 
and divisions and subsidiary companies within them. Walder (1995a) conceives local 
officials as economic actors, and their actions can be understood in the same terms as 
the incentives and pressures that drive the managers of private firms, with profit 
being the key motivation.
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However, there is a more nuanced view of local government behaviour than 
to simply reduce their actions to that of a profit seeking firm. Entrepreneurial local 
governments seem to occupy the middle ground between the pre-reform, planned 
economy and a liberal, market oriented economy. Francis (2001) identified the trend 
towards quasi-public, quasi-private institutions in China’s transition, where the 
conventional boundaries of state and economy are blurred, and become difficult to 
distinguish. She identifies four main areas where this has been the case:
1. The proliferation o f para-governmental organizations to deal with the 
new monitoring, regulatory, welfare and other responsibilities 
required to operate a market economy.
2. Integration o f  nongovernmental entities into the state structure, such 
as private subcontractors and suppliers to local state firms, as well as 
local firms that the local government pressure into organizing and 
providing the welfare functions which used to be provided by state 
enterprises.
3. Corporatist trends that further blur the boundary between state and 
market, creating financially independent organizations that have their 
own economic interests, but which remain within the formal state 
structure, pursuing their own goals while being required to follow the 
directives of the central state.
4. Commercialisation o f the state -  government agencies in business, 
such as the local government, individual departments within the local 
government and other local state organizations which, in addition to 
their original functions, have become profit seeking actors in the local
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economy.
From the descriptions above of China’s economy, the key feature identified 
by Francis (2001) was the mutual interpenetration of the government, society, and 
the economy. Rather than the local government being the board of advisors and 
governors, appointing managers and overseeing local firms, as suggested by local 
state corporatism, Francis (2001) suggested that the local economy also plays a part 
in determining the functions of the local government, capturing local government 
interests through their connections within the local government. The reliance of local 
governments on para-govemmental organizations to regulate the economy, for 
instance, is a two-way exchange, with the organizations regulating local firms, but 
also lobbying the local government on behalf of the firms. This becomes more 
complex with the addition of local government departments and agencies that have 
their own business interests. Saich (1999) gives two examples in Beijing, where the 
Shaoyang branch fire brigade used their high pressure water hoses to operate a 
carwash, and of the Qianmen police station purchasing a Sichuan restaurant to 
generate funds in order to pay informants. This suggests that rather than viewing the 
entrepreneurial local government as a hierarchical arrangement, with orders and 
control imposed “top down”, it is enmeshed in a network of local interests, serving as 
the nucleus for the exchange of information and material within the economy, and 
acting as an interface between the local economy and the state.
The degree to which the entrepreneurial local government can attempt to 
extract rents from the local economy, and the degree to which it is obliged to act in 
the interests of the local population, seems to be dependent on the type of local 
industry and the vulnerability of local government officials to local pressure. Unger
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and Chan (1999) suggest that the variety of arrangements between local governments 
and the local economy has created a gradation of the amount of influence exerted by 
the local government on the local economy, and by the local economy on the local 
government. They have outlined their findings by viewing the differences in local 
government behaviour with regard to the type of industries in the area (see figure 
6.3).
Figure 6.3: Characteristics of China’s local government with regard to local industry
Predominant local industry type
Private industry Collective industry Foreign industry Little or no industry
Societal pressure on 
officials
High, especially in 
villages
Low Low
Medium  to high, 
possibly predatory
Local government 
control of patronage Limited
High Medium Low
W elfare provision Yes Yes Yes Limited
Passive developmental 
approach Medium to high
High Medium Low
After Unger and Chan, 1999
In areas dominated by local collective industries, Unger and Chan (1999) 
found that the local government and its associated organizations and agencies had a 
high degree of dominance over the local economy, which was reliant on government 
patronage to provide access to government resources.
However, an entrepreneurial local government would not necessarily reject 
developing the private sector of their economy. Figure 6.3 suggests that even with a 
predominantly collectively owned local economy, there is simultaneously a 
considerable degree of “developmental! sm”, with local government concentrating on 
developing local infrastructure and attracting industries. This contradicts the 
conventional assumption that collective industries and private industries are mutually 
exclusive, where an interest in developing one led to bias against the growth of the
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other. However, Unger and Chan (1999) and Edin (2003) both suggest that even 
local governments with a vested interest in supporting local collective enterprises 
may be inclined to develop private enterprises as insurance, particularly as private 
firms became more widespread in China’s economy.
From this, it would appear that the entrepreneurial local government could be 
a highly adaptive model of local governance, embracing the opportunities to create 
and utilize new institutions to regulate the emerging market economy, while also 
being able to adapt to circumstances by fostering the growth of local private 
enterprises. The ownership and control of local firms is a salient feature of 
entrepreneurial local governments, but the adaptability of the local government 
suggests that the overriding concern is not ownership and control per se, but rather 
accruing benefits to the local state.
6.3 Developmental local government
The role of China’s local governments have been compared to that of other 
East Asian governments, where economic development takes place under 
government direction, and investments in private industries are influenced heavily by 
government policy. This close involvement of state and economy in producing 
growth describes the dual nature of China’s local governments. Studies of East 
Asia’s economies suggested that the involvement of “strong” developmental states 
were vital in their success, while “weak” developmental states met with failure 
(Grabowski, 1994), with most of the emphasis placed on the role of national level 
governments. Capital was directed with the aid of the national government targeting 
particular sectors for development, or market institutions are created through national 
policies that facilitate the functioning of a free market economy, within which firms
operated with greater efficiency and thus achieved success. Thus the “developmental 
government” in studies of East Asia’s economic development referred to a national 
level entity.
However, Segal and Thun (2001) suggest that the initiation of economic 
growth takes place at the local rather than at the national level. China’s experimental 
and gradual approach to development facilitated the Central government’s withdrawl 
from micro economic management and its devolution of economic power to the local 
level. Thus Xia (2000) suggests that China’s economic development is a function of 
the co-operation between local and national level governments. The initial wave of 
China’s “opening up” to the world can only have been initiated by the Central 
government. The creation of the four Special Economic Zones in 1980, followed by 
the opening of 14 coastal cities in 1984, relied on the Central government’s political 
power and subsidies for the building of infrastructure and the creation of a suitable 
labour force (Spence, 1999). However, once these experiments became politically 
acceptable due to their economic success, the remainder of China’s economic 
transition was increasingly placed in the hands of local governments
Thus there is an issue in the use of the term “developmental” to describe local 
government behaviour. The term was originally created to describe national level 
governments. Howell (2006) provides a summary of the ideal type development 
state.
[It] has a political and policy elite committed to 
economic growth and transformation, with the power, 
authority and legitimacy to promote a developmental 
agenda. Often motivated by strong nationalist
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sentiments, such elites strive to modernize their 
countries, raise economic living standards and bridge 
the technological gap. Second, complementing such a 
development-focused elite is a competent, 
authoritative state administration, particularly in the 
economic sphere, with the technical and managerial 
capacity to guide and steer economic and social 
development. [...] Both the political and policy elite 
and state institutions in general are relatively 
autonomous from particular vested interests, allowing 
them to stand above the demands of specific social 
groups [...] to shape policy for a broader, national 
interest. Third, developmental states tend to have weak 
civil societies, poor civil and political rights records 
and repressive political regimes. [...] Finally, 
developmental states are defined not only by their 
normative agendas, their political and institutional 
structures, and state-society relations, but also by their 
achieved outcomes. Developmental states deliver rapid 
economic growth as well as general well-being, 
measured in terms of social indicators such as literacy, 
health status, life expectancy and per capita income 
(Howell, 2006, 275-276).
China’s local governments do not seem to fit within the context of the 
“developmental state” as outlined by Howell (2006). However, Chinese local 
governments do share some salient features of the developmental state. The existence 
of a “political elite” in the local government is undeniable, with their power 
unconstrained by the conventional, democratic processes of accountability through 
elections. The autonomy of the local government is also not in dispute, for as 
Leftwich (1995) points out:
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‘Autonomy’ in this context also does not mean 
isolation. The reality [...] is more like ‘embedded 
autonomy’. This means that despite the power and 
autonomy of state bureaucracies, they have become 
embedded in a progressively dense web of ties with 
both non-state and other state actors (internal and 
external) through which the state has been able to co­
ordinate the economy and implement developmental 
objectives (Leftwich, 1995,409).
The issue here is that there appears to be some confusion between the 
developmental and entrepreneurial state. Both employ the power of the state to 
influence the local economy. The “strong” developmental state as described by 
Howell (1996) directs and targets investments, manages firms, and otherwise 
behaves much like the developmental state. The entrepreneurial local state, is also 
involved in owning and controlling local means of production, directing local capital, 
and operating with a strong profit motive, necessitates a strong local state with a high 
level of local governmental capacity (Grabowski, 1994).
On the other hand, development under a weaker local government might take 
place without such direct involvement in the economy. The “developmental” 
category, as used by Unger and Chan (1999) and shown in figure 6.3 suggests a more 
“passive” approach to encouraging local growth, especially through the development 
of local private businesses.
At this point it is necessary to introduce the idea of the informal channel of 
communications used by both local governments and firms to communicate. As was 
mentioned in chapter 6, maintaining a good relationship with local governments 
facilitated the conduct of business for private enterprises. In a developmental
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government, with private firms playing a greater role, this unofficial channel of 
communication becomes more important as private businesses sought to enlist 
government help and gain support without being captured by government interests.
One method for local government and local firms to communicate and 
influence each other was through the use of informal, social relations. Wank (1995) 
identified that two strategies were commonly adopted by private enterprises facing 
government bureaucracy. One is the total avoidance of local bureaucracy (insofar as 
it was possible), which was used mainly by owners of smaller businesses and shops. 
They viewed the fees and charges demanded by local government as being 
predatory. More relevant here is the second strategy, usually adopted by larger firms 
which have more to gain from a solid relationship.
[The second strategy] takes bureaucracy as a source of 
opportunity and seeks to increase contacts with 
officials. It is pursued by entrepreneurs running the 
private firms. They often benefit from close association 
with the officialdom. [...] These affiliations give 
entrepreneurs access to scarce commodities and 
restricted opportunities as well as to bureaucratic 
protection from policy fluctuations, central state 
campaigns, and harassment by local officials. For the 
officials, these affiliations institutionalize channels to 
the market economy through which they can turn 
control of public resources into cash profits. As the 
scale o f the private enterprises expands, connections 
with the bureaucracy proliferate, blurring the 
boundaries o f “public” and “private” (Wank, 1995,
67-68, emphasis mine).
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Here, the developmental state is seen as a resource to local private firms, 
allowing them to develop in an environment that lack the formal regulations and 
institutions needed for a market economy to function, while the local government 
adapts its behaviour (albeit unofficially) to suit the development of local private 
enterprises. This mutual, unofficial adaptation by both parties to each other creates 
an informal arrangement to allow the development and growth of the local private 
economy. So even with a “weak” local government, the channel between the 
government and local firms is likely to be beneficial to both the government and to 
entrepreneurs. Thus the “developmentalism” here refers to the development of an 
atmosphere conducive to economic growth, first through unofficial channels, then 
later to be formalized into official regulation and institutions. This view of the 
developmental government allows a local government to be both “entrepreneurial” 
and “developmental” simultaneously, with no categorical conflicts. A local 
government can adopt either or both strategies at different times, depending on the 
appropriateness of each strategy, and the incentives for the local governments.
6.4 Clientelistic and predatory governments
Baum and Shevchanko (1999) characterize a clientelistic local government as 
one which has no incentive to increase productivity, but which is connected with 
local firms. However, the prevalence and variety of ties between Chinese local 
governments and local firms requires a better understanding of these ties and their 
impact on the local economy. The difficulty lies primarily in determining the impact 
of clientelism on development, and to distinguish between clientelism and predation, 
which share many similarities, as well as to reconcile the use of social networks and 
relations (guanxi) within this context.
101
Clientelism can be defined as an exchange of political support for material 
benefits between patron and client. The patron, usually the local government, has 
multiple clients, and patron and client are tied together in a relationship that is 
voluntary and informal, though this does not preclude the use of coercion and 
manipulation (Kurer, 1996). In the context of economic development, this does not 
preclude the possibility of clientelism either facilitating or being detrimental to 
economic productivity. However, clientelistic behaviour is usually seen as being 
“corrupt”, in that it is an abuse of government power in exchange for material gains. 
In this respect it shares some common features with a predatory government, which 
also uses its powers for illicit gain. This requires some clarification.
White (1994) proposes that corruption in China can be set along a continuum 
and divided into three classes, A, B and C, varying in the degree of their illegality 
and prevalence. The characteristics of these can be seen in figure 5.4. This 
continuum provides a useful reference point to examine the actions of the local 
government. White (1996) goes on to elaborate that class A and B represent the 
illegitimate use of official power. The difference lies in who benefits -  private 
individuals (or groups of individuals) in the case of class A, or local corporations and 
organizations (including local government departments) in class B. Class C is a far 
more prevalent and widespread phenomena across all sections of Chinese society, 
and is not limited to government behaviour.
With reference back to the classification by Baum and Shevchenko (1999), it 
can be argued class A activities by the local government are clearly predatory, as it is 
a clear abuse of official powers, reduces local productivity, harms the local economy, 
and benefits only a private individual or group of individuals. While the process of
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economic transition in China may have produced an environment susceptible to such 
behaviour, it is clearly and unambiguously harmful and illegal.
Figure 6.4 White’s continuum of corruption in China
Class A corruption Class B corruption Class C corruption
Clearly illegal practices infringing 
institutional rules for purely private 
purposes (eg stealing, embezzlement, 
fraud, large scale bribery, illegal fees 
and fines)
Semi-legal practices exploiting existing 
loopholes in official policies and 
regulations for personal or corporate 
gain (eg exploitng fixed price system, 
using local state powers to establish 
trading companies, development 
zones)
Use of personal social ties (guanxi) to 
bypass institutional boundaries and 
gain preferential treatment (eg gaining 
access to information, bypassing 
regulations, allocating privilages to 
friends and family)
Predatory behaviour 
Benefits p rivate  individuals
Clientelistic behaviour 
Benefits the  individuals and organisations involved
(source: own elaboration based on White, 1996)
Class B and C corruption are more equivocal, and such behaviour can have 
both positive and negative consequences on the local economy. However, here a 
difference can be seen between the harm done by clientelistic behaviour as compared 
to predatory behaviour. While a predatory local government seeks to gain through 
the exploitation of local firms, clientelism allows entrepreneurial activities to be 
carried out, albeit through illicit means. The issue remains however, whether 
clientelism improves the local economy or whether it is a harmful activity. Kurer 
(1996) suggests that clientelism may influence governments in developing countries 
to adopt and persist with development strategies that are not in the interests of 
developing the economy. The relationship between patron and client begins the 
transfer of resources from the private to the public sector, from economy to state, and 
encourages this flow through the workings of the political process of gaining 
increasing political influence. In the case of China, clientelism -  the process of 
exchanging political or bureaucratic favours for material gains -  was classified by 
White (1996) as a “corrupt” activity. Nevertheless, there are studies to suggest that 
while clientelistic behaviour is undesirable, its effects are not outright harmful.
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For instance, Wank (1995, 1996) argued that the clientelistic tie is a solution 
for businesses operating in an economy that has not completed its transition to 
operating in a free market, where property rights are uncertain, government policies 
are changeable, and where some resources remain under the control of the 
bureaucracy. With the formation of the patron-client relation, businesses receive 
more information regarding upcoming policy and regulatory changes, and can call on 
favours to negotiate particular difficulties or gain access to scarce “resources”. This 
provides a certain degree of stability and removes uncertainty, allowing businesses to 
operate with a greater degree of freedom knowing they are “protected” against the 
actions of the bureaucracy. Wank also suggested that the ties improved competition, 
encouraged innovation, and facilitated market links (1996). He argues that since 
bureaucratic favours are in short supply (for instance, in the form of license 
allocation and permits), entrepreneurs are in competition for these favours. Only 
those entrepreneurs able to afford the material or other benefits for their patrons 
receive the licenses, and as these licenses (or favours) may be due for annual 
renewal, only those entrepreneurs with sufficient resources (those successful enough 
to make a profit) will succeed in the long run. Similarly, only those bureaucrats with 
the most political acumen and ability will be able to grant those favours, and only the 
successful will remain as patrons in the long run. Entrepreneurs with strong ties with 
bureaucrats are also able to gain tacit support and some protection when attempting 
innovations that circumvent state regulations. Both the private entrepreneur and the 
patron must be sufficiently in tune with the pervading attitude and possible future 
changes in order to assess the risks entailed and the potential benefits, otherwise the 
clientelistic relationship would break down.
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Xin and Pearce (1996) make a similar argument, although in more detail. 
They identify that clientelistic ties matter more to private enterprises than enterprises 
owned and run by the local state:
In interviews with executives in Chinese state-owned, 
collective hybrid, and private companies we found, as 
expected, that private-company executives in this 
developing economy sought to compensate for their 
lack of formal institutional support by cultivating 
personal connections. Even after controlling for 
organizational age and size, we found that private- 
company executives' business connections were more 
important to them than the connections of collective- 
hybrid and state-owned company executives were to 
them. Further, as expected, private-company 
executives relied significantly more on building 
connections with government officials to defend 
themselves against threats like appropriation or 
extortion. Finally, the private executives made more 
extensive use of gift giving to build these connections 
and maintained business connections of greater trust 
than did executives in the more structurally secure 
collective-hybrid and state-owned companies.
Private-company executives counteracted their formal 
structural disadvantages by building good guanxi with 
government officials as protection from unstable 
conditions. (Xin & Pearce, 1996, p i654)
The use of Guanxi as a “manager initiated substitute for the kind of formal 
institutional support taken for granted in countries with more reliable business 
environments” (Xin and Pierce 1996, p i642-1643) suggests that it was not a 
government initiated behaviour at all, but rather is the reaction of local businesses
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and entrepreneurs to the environment they found themselves in. On the other hand, 
the devolution of power to local governments contributed to the increased 
opportunities for corruption. Thus, for a clientelistic relationship to exist, the 
participation of both the local government and local businesses is necessary. 
Moreover, Xin and Pearce’s (1996) study suggests that the relationship is strongest 
between the owners of private businesses and local governments. This differs from 
predation, where the local government uses its power to extract rents from local 
enterprises without any returns. Thus in order to understand and clarify the 
relationship between corruption, predation and clientelism, the behaviour of both 
local governments and local firms must be taken into account
Figure 6.5: Distinguishing between predation, corruption, and clientelism
Local government Local firms
Predation
Local government misuse political and 
bureaucratic power to extract rents from 
local firms
Local firms and entrepreneurs operate 
under local government predation
Clientelism Local government exchanges political power for economic gains
Entrepreneurs exchange material goods 
for resources and materials, which are 
otherwise inaccessable
Corruption Local official(s) exchanges political power for personal gains
Entrepreneurs exchange material goods 
for political power for personal gains
(source: own elaboration)
In the definitions given above (figure 5.5), the distinction between corruption 
and clientelism is not based on the collusion that takes place between government 
and officials with local firms and entrepreneurs, but that the intention and end of that 
collusion differs. Clientelistic behaviour allow firms to gain access to resources -  
including administrative resources, such as licenses and permits -  that were 
otherwise limited or unavailable because of underdeveloped regulations and 
institutions. This was especially the case for privately owned firms, which were more
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prone to being exploited by local government. Predatory behaviour extract rent 
without providing an equal or greater return in favours and benefits to the private 
firm.
6.5 Local government behaviour and local economic development
The typology of local governments and behaviours suggests the need for a 
more nuanced analysis of local economic development in relation to local 
governments. A basic list of behaviours categorising local governments can be 
constructed using the discussion above of developmentalist, corporatist, clientelistic 
and corrupt local governments (figure 6.6). This can be a useful rule-of-thumb list in 
assessing local governments.
Figure 6.6: Indicators for categorising local government behaviour 
D evelopm entalist________ Corporatist  Clientelistic _______ Corrupt
Low local government 
ownership or control
Low levels of 
intervention
Encouraging 
development of local 
businesses and 
entrepreneurs
Reforms to facilitate 
growth of local firms
Communication with 
local entrepreneurs
high local government 
ownership or control
High level of local 
government intervention
Concentrating on 
developing governemnt 
owned and controlled 
firms
Resist changes that 
threaten local ownership 
and control
Direct management of 
local firms to fulfil 
government objectives
Close personal 
relationships with local 
businesses
Evidence of exchange of 
favours
Communications 
through informal /  
unofficial channels
Illegal behaviour that 
favours local interest 
against Central 
government
Rent seeking behaviour
Behaviour that 
accumulates benefits to 
individuals at the cost of 
the local communit
Damaging behaviour to 
local economy with short 
term benefits to local 
government
However, the previous discussion also called for caution, and for the need to 
take a nuanced approach. Local government behaviour can fall into two or more 
categories simultaneously. Thus the indicators in this list are not meant to label a
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government as belonging in one column or the other. Rather, it is a summary of local 
government behaviours that need to be combined with an understanding of the 
history of the development process in order to be truly useful.
Two major themes emerge from the discussions of the previous chapters -  
that there is local economic development in terms of benefit or loss to the local 
economy, and development driven by the realization of benefits to the local state. A 
successful local economy may indirectly benefit the local state through increased 
revenues. By comparison, a successful local state -  which includes the local 
government bureaucracy and administration as well as its economic functions -  is 
more interested in maximizing benefits for the local government. This may benefit 
the local economy as well, but could also be detrimental to the development of the 
local economy per se, since the interests of the local state do not always intersect 
with and contribute to the best interests of the local economy.
This provides two axes within which to place local government behaviours 
and their outcomes. Figure 6.7 is an attempt to illustrate this, separating local 
economic productivity from benefits to the local state. Compared with the rigid 
categorization shown in figure 6.1 from Baum and Shevchenko (1999), this is a more 
flexible approach, allowing areas of overlap between local government types.
By disassociating the benefits to the local state and the local economy, it is 
possible to explore the difference between Chinese local governments interested in 
maximizing their own benefits (i.e., maximizing benefits to the local state) and local 
governments that attempt to maximize local economic benefits. Neither approach is 
exclusive -  as can be seen in figure 6.7 below -  there is an intersection between
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China’s “local corporatist” (interested in the local state) and developmentalist 
(interested in the local economy) governments. A successful local corporatist 
government achieves higher levels o f benefits for the local state, while a 
developmentalist local government may achieve lower levels o f local state benefit 
with higher levels o f local economic productivity. As was discussed in section 6.4, 
the two local government types can overlap, as a local corporatist government adopts 
more developmental strategies for their local economy. This also suggests that the 
local government typology is not fixed, since a local government can shift strategies 
(voluntarily or not) and can thus move within the behaviour categories.
Figure 6.7: Chinese local governm ent types with respect to benefits to local state and  local
economy
Increasing efficiency to  
local eco n om y
Increasing  
c o s ts  to  
local s ta te
■  I . n  \
I LOCAL G O V E R N M E N T \
\  / SUC CESSFUL LOCAL \
{ CORPO RA TIST I
v  I  G O VERNM ENT j
j  Increasing 
benefits to 
local s ta te
D ecreasing  
efficiency to  local 
econ om y
(source: own elaboration)
The categories also illustrate the difference between predatory and corrupt 
local governments, recognizing that there is a significant overlap between them. The 
predatory local government may be able to achieve high levels o f benefits to the
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local state, but at the cost o f local economic productivity as the predation decreases 
the willingness and ability o f local firms to operate efficiently and effectively. A 
corrupt local government undermines both the local economy and its own ability to 
function -  since corruption through individuals or groups o f officials can target both 
local firms and harm local government organs by generating mistrust, decreasing 
local government efficiency, etc -  resulting in a failed local state where both the 
economy and local government suffer. O f course, there is significant overlap 
between the two, and features o f predation as well as corruption can be present in 
both developmental and corporatist type local governments.
Figure 6.8: Local firm ow nership  types w ith respect to benefits to local s tate and  local economy
Increasing efficiency to 
local eco n o m y
Increasing  
co st to local ■*" 
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/
I STATE OWNED L^CAL STATE /
ENTERPRISESCOLLQCTIVELY OWNED 
ENTERPRISES
'  Increasing  
V >  b en efits to 
local s ta te
D ecreasin g  
efficiency to  local 
econ om y
(source: own elaboration)
Using the same axis o f local state and local productivity, the three main 
ownership types can also be plotted on the axis (figure 6.9) -  Central state owned
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firms (SOEs), local state and collectively owned firms, and privately owned firms. 
China’s economic transition has created an environment where all three ownership 
types can co-exist simultaneously. State owned enterprises, which are relatively 
inefficient, provide limited benefits to the local government and local economy.
They may even become a drain on the local state, requiring additional support and 
subsidies. In comparison, local collective enterprises are more economically efficient 
and can potentially provide much more benefits to the local state, through taxes, 
remittances to the local government, and employment. Private enterprise are more 
economically efficient, but may “cost” the local state in terms of their ability to out 
compete local state firms and reduce the total revenue available to the local 
government.
Figure 6.9: O verlaying local governm ent types with local ownership  types
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By overlaying local government types with different local firm ownership 
types, it is possible to see the co-incidence between the local government type and 
the corresponding firm ownership pattern (see figure 5.8). The co-incidence of 
interest between different types o f local governments with the development outcome 
o f different local firm ownership types suggests that local corporatist governments 
were more likely to support locally owned or collectively owned enterprises, while 
developmental local governments were more likely to foster the growth o f privately
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owned enterprises.
6.6 Conclusion
China’s local governments have taken a range of different approaches to 
developing their local economy. Through intervening directly in the management of 
local firms as the head of a corporation, or developing the regulations and policies 
that foster growth in particular ways, local governments have had a range of choices 
over the most appropriate course of action. However, two factors need to be 
considered in understanding how the local government took their decision.
The type of development chosen by China’s local government affects the 
type of local ownership patterns, with the outcome of different ownership types 
(increased benefits or cost to the local state, increased or decreased local economic 
efficiency) coinciding with the desire of the local government to benefit the local 
state or to foster greater economic efficiency. In order to maximize the available 
benefits, local governments have behaved in such ways as to develop the type of 
firms that most closely matched their aims. The cost of developing state or private 
firms was dependent on prior factors, such as previous economic development, or the 
relationship between local government officials and local economic actors and the 
state. For example, the presence of collective industries make the development of 
more collective industries easier than developing a new private sector. This path-of— 
least-resistance approach was in turn affected by Central government incentives.
Given that local government incentives rely on Central government reforms, 
and the potential cost of developing state, collective, or private firms also depend on 
Central government regulations, Central government action had an indirect but
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important effect on local government behaviour, and local economic development.
In the case studies, the local government, their relations with the Central 
governments and their local economic structure were examined and compared, in 
order to provide a subtler model of the development behaviours of China’s local 
governments.
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Chapter 7: Case studies and methodology
7.1 Introduction
This chapter is split into two parts: exploring and introducing the case 
studies, and presenting the methodology used to obtain the necessary data.
As was outlined in chapter 1, the purpose of this study is to create an 
integrated framework within which the different approaches taken by Chinese local 
governments to pursue economic development can be examined and compared. The 
aim is to include the specific characteristics of the local governments and their 
jurisdiction, local economic conditions, and their relationship with the Central 
government. A combination of all these factors affect the process of economic 
development by local governments, and they provide a rich background with which 
to understand the motivations and actions of local governments. Within the context 
of China’s economic transition, it is also necessary to appreciate the evolutionary 
nature of China’s local governments as they adapted to the changes as economic 
reforms progressed. A static interpretation of local government behaviour in one 
single time period would omit an important aspect of their dynamism and flexibility.
In order to highlight the importance of the local government’s role in 
determining the direction of local economic development, two local governments 
were chosen for comparison and contrast. They were chosen on the basis of having 
comparable economic backgrounds and location, with similar characteristics at the 
start of China’s economic reforms in 1978. This would allow the effect of the local 
government’s development policies to show up clearer, and make comparison easier.
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To understand the development history of the case studies, interviews, 
statistical data, and local official documents were all required, plus information from 
existing reports and studies. The use of several types of data allowed the rich texture 
of the development process to be captured as much as was possible.
7.2 Selecting case studies: Wenzhou and Yangzhou
China’s rapid economic growth was largely concentrated in the eastern 
coastal provinces. The dynamic economies here were fertile soil for the seeds of 
economic reforms to take root and sprout. The two biggest economic clusters -  
Shanghai and the Pearl Rive Delta near Hong Kong -  managed to lead the 
development of cities in the surrounding provinces. Their growth have been well 
documented and studied. However, it was decided that the case studies needed to be 
located outside the area of influence of these two economies, as local government 
behaviour would otherwise be skewed and be dominated by the actions of Shanghai 
and the Pearl River Delta. To eliminate this possibility, the case studies needed to be 
relatively isolated.
Wenzhou, a medium sized county in Zhejiang province (see figures 7.1 and 
7.2), was chosen as the first case study. It is historically isolated, located 300km 
away from Shanghai, its contact with other cities made difficult by surrounding 
mountain ranges. This choice was influenced by the success of the Wenzhou model 
of economic development (discussed below). In spite of its isolation, Wenzhou 
managed to successfully develop a thriving local economy based on private 
entrepreneurship, and its actions were (eventually) lauded as an example for other 
Chinese local governments to follow. This extraordinary achievement marked 
Wenzhou out as a place of special interest, and the second case study was selected on
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the basis of being a contrast -  albeit a comparable companion -  to Wenzhou’s
success.
Wenzhou’s unique success started from a foundation of a predominantly 
agrarian economy, with only small handicrafts and household industries supporting 
the economy. Before the formation of the People’s Republic, it was a commercial 
port, but the centralised economy stopped that. The selection of the second case 
study was thus limited to these criteria -  that it is located outside the economic 
influence of Shanghai, predominantly agrarian and commercial in nature, with low 
levels of industrial development. Moreover, it must have developed in a different 
way from Wenzhou’s private entrepreneurship, with less successful results.
Sunan, the southern part of Jiangsu province bordering the north of Shanghai, 
experienced rapid economic development, relying on Shanghai’s economic influence 
for its success. Just further north, in Central Jiangsu (Suzhong), economic 
development was not as successful. Historically, the Suzhong region was a 
prosperous commercial area, enriching itself from the trade along the Grand canal. 
This is the location of the second case study, Yangzhou (see figures 7.1 and 7.2), 
through which the Grand canal runs.
Yangzhou’s economic statistics in 1978 is comparable to those of Wenzhou, 
being dominated with agriculture and light industries and handicrafts. The historical 
source of its wealth -  trade -  declined in line with the physical infrastructure and 
importance of the Grand Canal system, and its remaining commercial activity with 
surrounding areas was curtailed by the communisation of agriculture and the 
centralised economy. Yangzhou’s reliance on trade and commerce meant its
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industrial sector was under developed. Moreover, Yangzhou’s transportation link 
with the rest o f Jiangsu province was relatively poor once the Grand Canal fell into 
disuse, and the city was bypassed by provincial railway links. Lying across the 
Yangtze river from Shanghai, Yangzhou was also economically cut off from 
Shanghai. Though physically closer to Shanghai than Wenzhou, the Yangtze river 
acted as a barrier between Yangzhou and Shanghai. Figure 6.3 shows that the 
population of the two counties. Yangzhou’s territorial boundaries were redrawn in 
1996 to form a new county, Taizhou, and all statistical data used in this study are 
disaggregated to reflect Yangzhou’s new, smaller size.
Figure 7.1: A m ap  of the location of  Jiangsu  and Zhej iang  provinces in China
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Figure 7.2: Location of W enzhou and Yangzhou in Zhej iang  and  J iangsu provinces
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Figure 7.3: A com parison of W enzhou and Yangzhou
2003 Data Wenzhou Yangzhou
Population 
Urban population 
Land area 
Total GDP (billion 
yuan)
GDP per capita 
(yuan)
7.4 million 4 .52 million 
1.9 million 1.1 million 
11748 sq  km 6638 sq  km
106bn 55.9bn 
14357 12368
Source: W enzhou statistical yearbook, Yangzhou governm ent website
Major projects and investment bypassed Wenzhou and Yangzhou, their
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location making them vulnerable to attack by sea and air from Taiwan. Denied state 
funding, their industrial sectors were both undeveloped. After China’s economic 
reforms started, Chinese local governments faced the challenge of securing sources 
of capital for development, as well as deciding how to regulate and direct the use of 
that capital. The local governments of Wenzhou and Yanghzou approached this 
challenge in very different ways, and these are outlined below.
7.2.7 The Wenzhou model
The “Wenzhou model” is one of China’s best know economic models (jing/i 
moshi), due to its rapid economic growth. Wenzhou’s economy is based on the three 
pillars of household industries, sales agents, and market towns (Liu, 1992a). All three 
were vital components of Wenzhou’s flexible economy, which also relied on the 
high degree of initiative and mobility of the Wenzhouese people conducting long 
distance trade. They produced goods for China’s “excluded middle” -  i.e., those 
goods neglected by large scale, soviet style industries that were developed under 
China’s planed economy (Liu, 1992a, p702). Through fulfilling the pent up demand 
of a “shortage economy” for consumer goods, Wenzhou was able to produce and 
prosper in the niche left unfilled by China’s state owned industries early in the 
reform process.
The Wenzhou model depended on the mass initiative of local entrepreneurs 
and the large diaspora of Wenzhouese all over china to create a network for trading 
and gathering information. Moreover, it relied on the co-operation of the closely knit 
community, in pooling locally available resources without material support from the 
Central government. Local government support was also vital in allowing money 
lending, disguising local private enterprises and so on. The cooperation between the
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Wenzhou government and local firms, serving to enhance their growth prospects, is 
another vital aspect of the Wenzhou model This will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 8.
7.2.2 Yangzhou’s economic development
Yangzhou’s economy roughly followed the Sunan model, with an emphasis 
on state led development of collective enterprises. The Sunan model’s heavy 
emphasis on the collective sector stems from China’s rural industrialization program 
in the early 1970s (Yehua, 2002), when small scale industries were to be developed 
in rural areas in order to support agricultural development. These collective 
enterprises became the seeds of industrial growth in the 1980s as China’s economy 
underwent the process of reform and transition. The collective enterprises were able 
to transform their production from agricultural tools and machines to basic consumer 
products, and they were already served with a network of basic infrastructure, 
lowering the cost of development (Spence, 1999).
However, Yangzhou’s distance from Shanghai meant it was too far to benefit 
from Shanghai’s economic growth, and thus its development was not tied into the 
economy of the Sunan area. Yangzhou’s historical background as a trade and 
commercial Centre also meant its industries were relatively under developed.
7.3 Case study methodology
The decision to use case studies to understand Chinese local governments 
was made with consideration to the large number of relationships that needed to be 
explored. The intention to avoid isolating local governments as singular actors from
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their relationships and their local conditions also influenced this choice. Yin (1993) 
suggests that case studies are particularly suited where the phenomenon (the 
economic development process and the local government) is difficult to separate 
from the context (local economic and cultural conditions and China’s economic 
transition process):
The case study is the method of choice when the 
phenomenon under study is not readily distinguishable 
from its context. Such a phenomenon may be a project 
or program in an evaluation study. Sometimes the 
definition of this project or program may be 
problematic, as in determining when the activity 
started or ended -  an example of a complex interaction 
between a phenomenon and its (temporal) context 
(Yin, 1993, p3).
Orum et al (1991) argue that a case study takes a holistic approach to 
understanding a subject or phenomenon, a prerequisite for studying
[Another] feature of case studies is their holistic 
approach. Since the case study seeks to capture people 
as they experience their natural, everyday 
circumstances, it can offer a researcher empirical and 
theoretical gains in understanding larger social 
complexes of actors, actions, and motives. (Orum et al,
1991, p8)
Orum (1991) goes on to point out that a study that is heavily reliant on 
statistical surveys may omit critical factors -  such as social networks -  that may 
affect people’s decision making process. It is vulnerable to dis-integrating or
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isolating actors and individuals from the context within which they act.
The intention of this study is to construct an integrated approach to framing 
the actions of China’s local governments in local economic development. With the 
specific understanding that Chinese local governments exist and operate under varied 
and different local circumstances, case studies seem particularly suited to exploring 
their behaviour. Moreover, this exploration takes place through the period of China’s 
economic transition, which Orum et al (1991) points out, is another strength of the 
case study approach:
[A] case study of a single phenomenon, let us say a 
city’s public decision making or an organisation’s 
informal operations over a long period of time, allows 
the observer to examine social action in its most 
complete form. The investigator is better able to grasp 
the total complex world of social action as it unfolds 
(Orum et al, 1991, p9).
This study emphasises the dynamism and evolutionary adaptations that 
Chinese local governments have undergone in order to face the challenges of 
economic transition, thus understanding their change over time is crucial. The use of 
case studies for this investigation was thus thought to be suitable, for its flexible, 
multifaceted and holistic approach over time.
7.3.1 Data collection
Data was collected from three major sources: through official government 
statistics, through interviews with participants in the economic development process,
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and through official reports. Statistical information were gathered from published 
sources, such as statistical yearbooks and almanacs. Interviews were conducted with 
local officials and businesspeople though personal introduction.
It is interesting to note that the process for data collection was in itself a 
revealing exercise, albeit a subjective one. There were two major issues with the 
data, which can be split between the issue of Chinese officials statistics, and the issue 
of interviews.
7.3.2 Statistics
With the switch from centralised planning to a market system, coupled with 
rapid growth and changes to the economic structure, China’s system for collecting 
and collating statistics was put under strain. Rawski (2000,2001) discussed the 
reliability of China’s statistics, and pointed out several issues underlying their 
weaknesses. Incompatibilities between the old statistical measures used during the 
planned economy versus the new statistics entailed a rapid change in categories, and 
local bias in statistics are all responsible for raising doubts and creating difficulties 
when using Chinese statistics.
Multiplication of the number and the variety of 
industrial enterprises, in combination with rapid 
changes in the statistical system, including the new 
focus on value added, repeated changes in the 
definition of key indicators, and growing demands to 
execute surveys and collect census information, have 
overwhelmed the capabilities of local and regional 
statistical agencies. [...] At the same time, the shift 
from plan to market has redirected the attention of
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enterprise leaders away from government mandates, 
including statistical reporting, toward clients, sales, 
and profits. Many enterprise leaders "pay little 
attention" to statistical reporting, which is widely seen 
as a burden that "does not produce the information that 
operating units really need." Statistical agencies 
complain of firms that assign untrained staff to compile 
statistics, look for chances to cut positions assigned to 
statisticians, or refuse to submit standard reports 
(Rawski, 2000, p7-8).
While Rawski (2000) point out the practical difficulties facing China’s 
statistical agencies, Holz and Lin (2001) highlight concerns with the way the data 
makes standard interpretations difficult.
Overall, Chinese official statistical data are beset by 
three major problems. First, some data may have been 
purposely misreported (such as data on GDP). Second, 
data such as those on fixed assets and farm 
employment are of dubious economic meaning due to 
the way in which they were constructed. Both of these 
shortcomings have been widely noted. A third, largely 
unnoticed problem is the frequent re-definition of 
economic variables and enterprise categories. Such 
adjustments are often not accompanied by a revision of 
the variable or category name(s), and few indications 
are given of such statistical breaks. The resulting 
inconsistencies in time series data are perhaps most 
pronounced in the statistics on the industrial sector 
(Holz and Lin, 2001, p30).
Rawski (2000) and Holz and Lin (2001) both also agree that China’s statistics 
are subject to manipulation for political ends (as statistics are elsewhere in the
124
world), adding a further layer of distortion. Nevertheless, given the timescale and 
scope of this study, and the fact that statistical data forms only one part of the case 
studies, it was not possible to collate an alternative set of data to replace or 
supplement those from official sources. Thus official data has been used as is 
through the rest of this study, in order to illustrate the trends of economic 
development.
7.3.3 Interviews
The purpose of interviews with local officials and businessmen was to gather 
primary data that was not available from statistical sources or from existing reports 
and studies. It was hoped that the interviews would give a more human face to the 
story of economic development and transition. More, it was hoped that interviews 
would clarify information from other sources of data.
In all, 30 interviews were conducted with officials, academics and 
businessmen in Wenzhou and Yangzhou, individually and in groups. Interviews were 
conducted between 2002 and 2006, over 6 field trips to Wenzhou and Yangzhou, 
each lasting about one week. Interviewees were contacted via a “snow ball” effect by 
asking one interviewee for suggestions as to who may be contacted next. This 
method creates a bias in the sampling process, since the interviewees are all selected 
from the same pool of social contacts and within certain social networks, and it is 
recognised that the opinions given in the interviews may represent only a small 
proportion of the total populations. However, the close knit social networks -  
especially within governments and between businessmen -  poses a challenge to 
finding an entry between unconnected social groups. Personal introductions, or the 
knowledge of existing social connections was critical in securing interviews, and the
closer the connection the better. This is illustrated in the following example.
Interviews in the city of Yangzhou were arranged through the Wenzhou trade 
association in the city. As the interviews progressed, it became easier to contact local 
government officials and gain interviews because of personal introductions.
However, while local officials in charge of economic development and reforms were 
able to give their own time for interviews, accessing local government reports were 
more difficult. Local officials were not familiar with the department archiving local 
official reports, and it was not possible to use the archives. This was not unusual, as 
in Wenzhou, government reports were accessible (thanks to academics at the local 
Communist Party College), but could not be photocopied.
In order for interviews to be comparable, a structured set of questions was 
assembled for each interview. Permission to record the interview was sought from 
every interviewee at the start. However, the structured interview was abandoned for 
three reasons. The questions were found to be too limiting, and interviewees were 
not able to follow the questions, which they found too repetitive or irrelevant to 
them. Second, the answers that were given often developed well beyond the scope of 
the interview script, and it was difficult to return to the set of questions without 
disrupting the flow of the interviews. Interviewees found the question -  answer style 
of a structured interview very uncomfortable, and the answers that were elicited were 
terse and unrevealing. Finally, many interviews took place in very informal settings, 
with large groups gathered in restaurants or cafes, resulting in a dialogue between all 
participants, again making it difficult to focus on the questions. The structured 
questions were thus abandoned in favour of an unstructured approach, allowing 
interviewees (individuals and in groups) to develop their narratives and dialogues
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with prompts to keep the discussions relevant.
Most interviewees opted to remain anonymous, and did not allow recording 
in their sessions, though notes were allowed to be taken. Interviews typically lasted 
an hour, depending on the schedule of the interviewees. All interviewees were 
accommodating in their answers, and sought to present a complete version of their 
experiences, sometimes including digressions and personal anecdotes, which added 
colour and interest to the interviews. However, it was often difficult to confirm 
specific anecdotes, since interviewees were rarely willing to give specific names and 
dates.
Figure 7.4: Number and position of interviewees in Wenzhou and Yangzhou
W enzhou Yangzhou
Local officials involved in 
econom ic developm ent 
process
9 5
Local academ ics studying  
developm ent 4 2
Local businessm en and  
others in econm ic 
associations
7 3
Others m et through  
informal gatherings 
(approx)
80 50
Figure 7.4 shows the number of interviews conducted with local officials, 
academics and business people who either took part in influencing the development 
process, has studied it directly, or were affected by the changes. Only those 
interviews that took place in a relatively quiet and contained setting (eg, in offices or 
private rooms) have been counted individually. These interviewees were key, 
however, since the close contact and personal interviews allowed further meetings to 
take place, though usually in an informal setting (eg at restaurants and in more social 
settings) with many more people. Although the large settings provided historical
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context and anecdotes relating to local development, the evidence collected from 
them were used in support of the main interviews, and were given much less weight 
in constructing the main narrative of the development process. The people that were 
met at informal gatherings were counted if they shared information that was 
recorded, as adding the total number of people present at those gatherings would 
have given an unnecessarily and misleadingly inflated figure.
The interviews were assessed using the responses given as indicators of local 
government behaviour within the four categories given -  developmentalist, 
corporatist, clientelistic, and corrupt behaviour. The indicators used was based on the 
discussions from previous chapters (figure 6.7).
As the analysis is concerned with a historical perspective, it was necessary to 
take into account that some of interviewees’ responses dealt with the historical 
development process, which further complicated the issue. Typically, the interviewee 
would give a brief history of local development or the background of the firm or 
organization. Questions were then asked to elicit responses regarding the 
developmentalist or corporatise stance of the government. In additon, as has been 
argued in previous chapters, some local government behaviours can fall into more 
than one category at the same time. Thus the indicators given in figure 6.7 were used 
as a guideline only, rather than as a rigorous assessment criteria.
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Chapter 8: The role of Wenzhou’s local government in local economic 
development -  the development of a private sector within a socialist state
8.1 Introduction
Wenzhou’s economic development is an interesting example of a 
developmentalist local government (as outlined in chapter 6) successfully fostering 
economic growth through the period of China’s economic transition. The success of 
Wenzhou’s economic development has been attributed by scholars (Shi et al, 2004, 
Zhu, 2003, Dong and Ma, 2003) to a combination of local cultural, social, and 
historical factors, with the efforts of local private entrepreneurs. It is argued that this 
specific mix of Wenzhou’s characteristics and its people succeeded in transforming 
an undeveloped region dominated by agriculture and few industries to a national 
model for economic development.
This chapter will discuss the role of the Wenzhou government in the process 
of its economic transformation. Although Wenzhou suffered from political 
stigmatisation in the 1980s, its government nevertheless protected the interests of the 
local economy. It continued to do so throughout the 1980s and 1990s, presiding over 
a private sector which grew vigorously. Wenzhouese entrepreneurs were able to use 
their business acumen to take advantage of China’s transition towards free markets, 
creating small manufacturing firms using local capital, and trading their products 
through an informal social network (described later). In essence, the inventiveness 
and opportunistic behaviour of local entrepreneurs propelled Wenzhou’s privately 
owned economy in the 1980s and early 1990s when private ownership was still 
restricted in China. However, the entrepreneurs relied on the co-operation and 
support provided by the Wenzhou government, which has been historically close to
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its population.
The actions of the Wenzhou government were heavily influenced by local 
culture and the entrepreneurial tradition in the region. Its close connection with the 
local population and culture is in contrast with the weak and ambivalent relationship 
that Wenzhou shared with the Central government. Paradoxically, the negative 
relationship with the Central government arguably allowed Wenzhou’s local 
government more scope for carrying out its own policies, aided by the weakness of 
Central government monitoring.
Thus Wenzhou’s development depended on the local government’s 
developmentalist policies for facilitating private sector growth, and the local 
government’s close relationship with local entrepreneurs, as well as the ambivalence 
with Central government. By considering all three aspects, it is possible to gain a 
deeper understanding of Wenzhou’s development process, and to see the role of local 
government in that process.
8.2 Wenzhou’s economy
Wenzhou is one of the largest counties in Zhejiang by population, with 7.29 
million people. It had the fastest economic growth rate in Zhejiang between 1988 and 
2002, in terms of GDP growth and GDP per capita growth (see figure 8.1).
Wenzhou’s government expenditure can be seen in figures 8.2 and 8.3. From 
the start of China’s reforms in 1978, Wenzhou’s annual government revenue per 
capita and expenditure per capita has been lower than the provincial average. Thus 
not only does the Wenzhou local government receive less income per person than
130
other counties in Zhejiang, it also spends less. Wenzhou’s local state capacity, at 
least in financial terms, is thus weaker than those of other counties in Zhejiang, and it 
also supports the contention that Wenzhou’s economic development was placed on a 
lower level of importance by the central state, which allocated less funds to Wenzhou 
than to other counties in Zhejiang.
Figure 8.1: Comparison of cities in Zhejiang, ranked by GDP per capita growth 1988-2002
1988 1994 2002 G row th 88-02
W enzhou Population (millions) 6.53 6.92 7.39 113%
GDP (billion yuan) 11.258 29.678 106.097 942%
GDP per capita* 1724 4307 14357 833%
Area (sq. km) 11784
Taizhou Population (millions) 5.09 5.26 5.51 108%
GDP (billion yuan) 10.811 24.257 85.831 794%
GDP per capita* 2124 5122 15620 735%
Area (sq. km) 9496
Jinhua Population (millions) 4.19 4.33 4.49 107%
GDP (billion yuan) 10.568 25.346 68.041 644%
GDP per capita* 2522 5857 15169 601%
Area (sq. km) 10918
Shouxing Population (millions) 4.07 4.22 4.34 107%
GDP (billion yuan) 15.208 30.781 92.815 610%
GDP per capita* 3737 7316 21414 573%
Area (sq. km) 8256
Ningbo Population (millions) 5.03 5.22 5.46 109%
GDP (billion yuan) 25.607 46.351 150.034 586%
GDP per capita* 5091 8889 27541 541%
Area (sq. km) 9365
Hangzhou Population (millions) 5.66 5.92 6.37 113%
GDP (billion yuan) 33.37 58.552 178.183 534%
GDP per capita* 5896 9924 28150 477%
Area (sq. km) 16596
* 1988 figure approximate
Source: Zhejiang Statistical Yearbook 1989,199S, and 2003
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Figure 8.2: W enzhou governm ent revenue p e r  capita
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Figure 8.3: Wenzhou governm ent expenditure  pe r  capita
700
600
>; 500
% 400
© 300
S 200
100
Year
— —  Wenzhou government expenditure per capita 
—— —— Zhejiang average expenditure per capita
Source: C om prehensive Statistical Data and  Materials on 50 years of  New Zhejiang, 2000
As a vulnerable “front line” area against Taiwan, Wenzhou was felt by 
Central government planners to be vulnerable to attack, so relatively little investment 
went into Wenzhou, with a total Central investment o f just 655 million Yuan
132
between 1949 and 1981, compared with 2.8 billion Yuan invested in Ningbo over the 
same period (Parris, 1993).
Figure 8.4 SOE fixed capital investment per capita, 1978-1992
*  150
1978 1979 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1988 1990 1991 19921980 1986 1987 1989
»nzhou per capita SOE investment •
Year
"Zhejiang per capita SOE investment China per capita SOE investment
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2000, Zhejiang Statistical Yearbook 2000, and Wenzhou
Statistical Yearbook 2003
Another feature of Wenzhou’s economy worth noting is its relatively low 
starting point. Figure 8.4 shows that Wenzhou received very low levels of investment 
to its state sector since 1978. On a per capita basis, fixed capital investment remained 
below the provincial and national average from 1978-1992, supporting the notion 
that Wenzhou had a weak state sector that was not well funded. With low levels o f 
funding for local government and local state industries, Wenzhou’s economic 
development relied on local resources and capital rather than investment from 
outside.
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Figure 8.5: C um ulative  G D P per  capita growth in W enzhou and Zhejiang  since 1978
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2000, Zhejiang Statistical Yearbook 2000, and Wenzhou
Statistical Yearbook 2003
An examination o f W enzhou’s rate o f GDP growth begins to reveal why it is 
considered to be a unique model for economic development. Between 1978 and 1991 
Wenzhou’s GDP growth rate just about kept pace with the Zhejiang average. 
However, by 1992, W enzhou’s growth rate overtook that o f Zhejiang as a whole. 
During the period 1992-2000, Wenzhou’s GDP grew at 4% above the Zhejiang 
average. The effect o f W enzhou’s growth can be seen in Figure 8.5, which is an 
index o f the cumulative GDP per capita growth o f Wenzhou and the average 
cumulative GDP per capita growth in Zhejiang province starting in 1978. Until the 
early 1990s, Wenzhou’s performance was only marginally above the national 
average but below the Zhejiang average. However, by the early 1990s it began to 
speed up, eventually overtaking the provincial average in 1995. It is therefore 
reasonable to say that one reason the Wenzhou model is so distinguished is due to its 
high growth rate in the 1990s compared with other areas in China. Other models for 
economic development -  especially those involving local government 
entrepreneurship -  were over taken by Wenzhou’s small scale, market based 
economy.
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8.3 Initial conditions for local development in Wenzhou
Interviewees from Wenzhou often introduce Wenzhou by describing its 
terrain: seven parts mountain, one part water, two parts flatland. This picture of 
Wenzhou’s geography explains its isolation from the rest of China, with the 
populated urban areas along the coast being surrounded by mountains in the north, 
west and south, hindering communications by land (Liu, 1992a). The local 
population is also distinctive for its dialect, which is only spoken within 40 miles of 
Wenzhou city and serving to create a very close knit community in this isolated area.
Wenzhou’s rugged terrain was not endowed with many natural resources, and 
even agricultural activity was constrained by the local mountains. Wenzhou city was 
a trading port, but otherwise did not command any major trade routes. The area also 
faced a growing demographic crisis. Between 1906 and 1921, its urban population 
grew by 148% as a result of the Chinese civil war and the Japanese invasion (Liu, 
1992a, p697). Its vulnerability to invasion by sea from Taiwan in the 1950s also 
meant it remained deliberately under industrialised, with little state investment in the 
area. However, all these contributed to Wenzhou’s isolation from the Central 
government, which paradoxically proved to be a valuable resource for the 
development of its private economy.
8.3.1 Distance from the Central government
There are three tangible measures of Wenzhou’s distance from the Central 
government. Its physical distance is the most obvious. By road, Wenzhou is located 
300 km away from Hangzhou, the provincial capital of Zhejiang, and approximately
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1500 km away from Beijing. The city of Wenzhou and its port are separated from the 
rest of the Zhejiang province by the Yandang mountain range, making the area 
difficult to access.
Under the centralised command economy, the Wenzhou government received 
a small budget according to its size and relative unimportance in the planned 
economy. Although state industries were set up in the area, they were small and 
almost a third became bankrupt by the early 1980s (interview 2004, Wenzhou CCP 
college). Furthermore, the low priority accorded to Wenzhou’s SOEs meant 
investment in the local infrastructure was relatively low. From figure 8.4 it is 
possible to see that government expenditure in Wenzhou falls well below the average 
for Zhejiang province. With few state industries of importance and the low amount 
of investment, Wenzhou’s state sector was not well integrated into the provincial or 
national economy.
Politically, the Wenzhou government has had a history of independence from 
the Centre. The Wenzhou communist party was cut off from all contact with Mao’s 
communist committee during most of the Second World War and the Chinese civil 
war, and they developed a self-reliant system, which allowed the communist 
ideology to co-exist with local entrepreneurs (Liu, 1992b). Although the Central 
government attempted to intervene to bring the area under its control, so long as 
elements of the local communist party remained, it was able to reinstate a situation of 
semi-independence once the pressure applied by the Central government was 
removed.
Central government work teams sent to Wenzhou had 
to go back [to their posts], they couldn’t stay forever.
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When they left, things would be quiet for a while, but 
then [private trading and the black economy] would 
slowly go back to normal (interview, 2003, Wenzhou 
economic reform office).
Thus even with work teams sent in by the Central government to solve the 
“problem” of Wenzhou’s capitalistic tendencies (as well as to sort out the lawless 
local situation) did not successfully bring the local government -  or, more 
importantly, the local area -  into line with the Central government’s policies.
Wenzhou’s isolation from the Central government meant it did not benefit, in 
terms of any significant subsidies and aid it might have received from the Centre, but 
this also enabled it to minimised the ability of the Central government to monitor and 
enforce Central policies, and reduced Central government intervention in the local 
government. Without a strong tie between Wenzhou and Beijing or Hangzhou, the 
Wenzhou local government was able to act with a greater degree of freedom to 
experiment with developing the private sector.
8.3.2 Poor local state and weak local bureaucracy
Prior to 1978, Wenzhou’s local government was weakened by the low level 
of funding from the Central government. It also suffered from a poor and inefficient 
structure, with three separate and independent components, with duplication and 
conflict eroding its ability to operate effectively. This weakness in the government 
structure provided an incentive for local government officials to develop close 
relations with local private entrepreneurs. One interviewee explained, it was more 
effective to use personal connections and social networks in some cases than to go 
through government channels (interview 2003, anon, Wenzhou local government).
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There is a historical precedent for this, since, the Wenzhou local government allowed 
private businesses to operate in the period of civil war before the formation of the 
People’s Republic, when the area was cut off from Mao’s Communist government. 
Even with the contact with the Centre re-established, the local state was not in a 
position to completely eradicate private enterprises (Liu, 1992b).
8.3.3 Weak state sector and low levels o f  investment
The weak local state economy, population pressure, and lack of arable land 
created tremendous social pressure for massive out migration from Wenzhou. It was 
not possible for local state enterprises to absorb the local workforce, nor it possible 
to redirect workers to rural areas as arable land was scarce. Thus many Wenzhouese 
sought work away from home. This started the legacy of outmigration from 
Wenzhou. Currently there are some 2 million Wenzhouese people living outside 
Wenzhou in China. This created a business network for those who remained in 
Wenzhou, and has been highlighted as one of the features of the Wenzhouese 
economy that has contributed to its success.
Another consequence of a weak state economy was the creation of the local 
black market and unofficial trading by private individuals, even though such 
practices were forbidden under the command economy. This was the case especially 
in more remote areas, where officials allowed the trading to take place secretly, with 
lower risk of being discovered by higher levels of government.
We started the household contract system well before 
villages in Anhui promoted it, but we couldn’t 
announce it at the time. So we were far more advanced
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before the rest of the country took on the idea 
(interview 2004, Wenzhou CCP college).
A creative solution to the problem of unemployment was the creation of 
household based workshops creating handicraft items and small components for 
consumer goods, which were in desperately short supply under China’s state industry 
oriented development plans. Local entrepreneurs took advantage of this shortage to 
produce and distribute their products nation wide. These small scale, clandestine 
operations were cheap to capitalise, and eventually became the backbone of 
Wenzhou’s flexible, consumer oriented industries.
8.3.4 Independence from Centrally imposed social structures
The work unit, or danwei, is a hugely important part of an urban worker’s 
life, providing housing, education, healthcare and having massive influence over the 
personal life of its members. Issues such as marriage and family planning fall under 
their remit too (Bjorklund, 1986). However, in an area with few state enterprises, 
most of the local population in Wenzhou did not belong to a work unit, and were 
thus not subject to their control. In rural areas, the creation of communes for 
agricultural production teams was also limited, with peasants resisting 
collectivization.
[The] first experiment with private household farming 
took place in Wenzhou in 1956, a result of strong local 
resistance to collectivization [...] Household farming, 
regarded as a setback to communism, was later 
denounced as anti-revolutionary and the cadres who 
supported it [...] were purged in the 1958 Great Leap 
Forward movement. Nevertheless, peasant household
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farming was never completely eradicated [...] in the 
following years. As soon as each political campaign 
subsided it returned. (Liu, 1992b, p307).
Coupled with a local traditional culture that recognised the importance of 
individual entrepreneurialism, the political pressure applied by the Wenzhou 
government against local entrepreneurs was considerably weakened. Along with an 
ineffectual local government, local private enterprises were able to continue to 
operate.
8.4 The 3 phases of Wenzhou’s economic development
Wenzhou’s developmentalist local government was successful in developing 
the local economy by maintaining a consistently low level of intervention in the local 
economy throughout its transition. It encouraged local private sector growth and 
managed to face political pressure from the Central government, eventually 
succeeding in becoming politically acceptable by virtue of its economic growth. The 
sections below will outline events in the 3 phases of Wenzhou’s economic 
development.
8.4.1 Phase 1:1978-1989
Although Wenzhou’s unorthodox economy was in operation before the 
economic reforms of 1978, the reforms allowed the local government greater scope 
to act to develop its local non-state sector (Liu, 1992a). Thus 1978 serves as a useful 
landmark year to begin examining the Wenzhou government’s role in economic 
development.
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With a weak state sector, the total employment in Wenzhou’s SOEs was very 
low. In 1978, only 167000 were employed by the state sector, which accounts for 
just over 3% of the total population of 5.6 million. In contrast, at the provincial level, 
5.9% of the total population in Zhejiang were employed by state industries, and this 
compares to a national average of 7.7% in the same year (Wenzhou Statistical 
Yearbook, 2003, Zhejiang Statistical Yearbook, 2004, China Statistical Yearbook, 
2000). The scarcity of farmland in Wenzhou, with 0.025 hectares available per 
person, meant that resorting to labour intensive agriculture to absorb the unemployed 
was also impossible. Even by 1999 there was a surplus rural labour force of 1 million 
people (Forster and Yao, 1999).
The pressure on the local economy prompted two trends. First, the migration 
of Wenzhouese out to the rest of China eased local over population and 
unemployment, and also played a key role in providing Wenzhou with human capital 
and business opportunities later on in its development (interview, 2003, Wenzhou 
chamber of commerce).
The second trend was the growth of an informal, private market, or the “black 
economy”. By 1978, Wenzhou’s economy already had a significant non state and 
non collective sector, which officially accounted for 9.2% of the total industrial 
output by value. The compares with Wenzhou’s state sector, which accounts for 
37.5% of total industrial output. Although illegal, the lack of alternative sources of 
income has meant that privately owned factories and firms have been operating 
semi-legally and illegally in Wenzhou’s “black economy” since well before 1978 
(Parris, 1993, Wenzhou Jingji Luntan, 2001). This was also true in rural areas, where 
farmers adopted their own system of household responsibility contracting well before
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its endorsement by the Central state in 1978 (Johnson, 1982).
China’s 1978 economic reforms allowed private firms to exist as a means to 
“develop production, enliven the market, satisfy the daily needs of the people, and 
increase employment” (State council, 1981, cited by Young, 1989, p58). In order to 
address the potential conflict that reviving private enterprise would cause in a 
socialist economy, private firms were seen as playing a subsidiary role to the state 
sector. They were to “fill in the gaps” left by the state sector, but their size would be 
limited to seven employees, their access to capital and technology restricted, and 
they would be subject to state regulations. Private businesses were never supposed to 
grow beyond their niche of supporting the state economy, “filling in” for production 
and employment here and there, without undertaking a massive transformation of the 
socialist economy, while state owned firms remained the mainstay of the economy 
(Young, 1989).
However, the initial economic condition in Wenzhou was more suited to a 
developmentalist approach. The local government lacked the resources to develop 
the state sector, while the budding private sector showed promise without needing 
resources from the local government. Thus the local government needed to reconcile 
the possibility of fostering growth in the private sector with the limitations imposed 
on private enterprise by state regulations, and the political animosity towards private 
bueinsses. As a response to this need, the Wenzhou government created a set of 
regulations, creating a new form of ownership -  share holding collectives (interview 
2003, Wenzhou economic reform office). They also consented to illegal or dubious 
practices -  such as the creation of a local credit market -  in order to facilitate growth 
in the private sector.
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Thus the role of the local government in this first phase 
of economic development was to introduce a system of 
regulations, allowing the local economy to function 
under a semi-private market system that has not yet 
received Central government approval. The strength of 
the local entrepreneurial tradition has proven to be 
more than sufficient to drive economic growth, and the 
regulations put in place helped to divert political 
pressure from the entrepreneurs. When asked by 
Central government work teams, we explained that the 
regulations were in line with the Central government 
policy of introducing competition into the economy, 
while ownership was collective, rather than being in 
private hands (interview, 2003, Wenzhou economic 
reform office).
A popular view of the Wenzhou government in this first phase of 
development is to describe it as being “inactive”. For example, Forster and Yao 
(1999) suggest “The early period of reform until 1987 witnessed a period of 
government inaction, as the Centre and province permitted the development of the 
private economy in Wenzhou” (p90). However, Parris (1993) and Liu (1992a) 
argued convincingly that the Wenzhou local government’s role in economic 
development was quite important. It is pertinent here to introduce a concept that 
Chinese scholars of the Wenzhou model use to describe the function of the local 
government. “WuWei” (non action) and “YouWei” (action) are used by Chinese 
scholars such as Shi et al (2004), Zhu (2003), Dong and Ma (2003) to describe the 
attitude of the Wenzhou government towards economic development. The passivity 
of the Wenzhou government played a key part in allowing the surviving local 
entrepreneurs to develop the private economy. Its attitude of “WuWei” meant that
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unlike the “corporatist” mode of behaviour for local governments proposed by Jean 
Oi (1992, 1995), Wenzhou’s local government was not involved in managing 
enterprises itself. A local corporatist government will act as an entrepreneur while 
running its own businesses, directly managing local state enterprises through its 
subordinate departments, or exercising its authority to select managers to run 
businesses. It may also take advantage of aspects of its official and bureaucratic 
authority to secure resources and information, exploiting official channels of 
communications to give those enterprises under its control a certain competitive 
advantage over both private businesses (which were still very much stigmatized in 
the early reform period) and other local state enterprises that did not receive the same 
amount of attention from their local government.
Although successful, Wenzhou did not develop or rely on a specific industry 
or activity. Resources were not concentrated in a few select sectors or firms in order 
to ensure growth. Wenzhou’s development model can be seen as being rather 
decentralised, relying more on the ingenuity of its entrepreneurs to create economic 
growth than on local government direction. Thus the development model lacks a 
definite structure or approach. Unlike the corporatist model of local economic 
development, the Wenzhou government did not act in the role as an entrepreneur. 
Indeed, it may appear superficially that the local government has not contributed 
much to the whole process of development, as Forster and Yao (1999) suggest. The 
economic growth appears to have been driven almost entirely by the actions of local 
entrepreneurs. However, this neglects the fact that the local government was under 
scrutiny during this period by the Central government, and that the operation of a 
market economy in Wenzhou required the creation of new policies and regulations, 
and the co-operation of the local government with local private firms. These policies
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and regulations would otherwise not have been needed in a local economy dominated 
by the state sector. Finally, the local government did participate in actively 
disguising the illegal nature of many de-facto private businesses, by lending them 
the credibility of more legitimate, collective enterprises.
The Central government’s interests in Wenzhou stems from the debate over 
the future direction of China’s economic reforms. Wenzhou was picked out as being 
representative of growth through reliance on the private sector. However, this 
contradicted the ideological stance of the CCP at the time, and thus the Central 
government found itself divided between factions that supported Wenzhou’s private 
enterprises, and factions who saw it as a violation of the country’s socialist ideology. 
Wenzhou’s trials and tribulations were taking place in the larger context of the pro 
and anti-reform debate taking place in the Central government at this time (Levy, 
1995). As a result, various work teams were sent to “fix” the “Wenzhou problem”, as 
Deng referred to it (Wenzhou Jingji Luntan, 2001). Wenzhou’s leaders were also 
subject to changes dictated by the Central government. Between, 1981 and 1992, 
Wenzhou had four changes of leaders. Yuan FangLi in 1981, Dong ChaoCai in 1985, 
Liu XiRong in 1990, and Zhang YouYu in 1992.
The reason for the rapidity of some of the changes stems from the Centre’s 
desire to force the Wenzhou economy to conform. The appointment of Yuan FangLi 
in 1981 was aimed at curbing the “chaos” that Wenzhou was suffering at the time.
He was specifically charged with the objective to “cut the capitalist tail” off 
Wenzhou’s underground economy and black markets. He was also to deal with the 
weak government, robbery, corruption and smuggling that was endemic in Wenzhou 
(Wenzhou Jingji Luntan, 2001). However, when he failed to do so, he was replaced
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by Dong ChaoCai in 1985. Dong was also under instruction to curtail the private 
economy of Wenzhou, and to revive the state sector. He was in turn replaced by Liu 
XiRong in 1990 when he also failed to eliminate private economic activities. This 
shows that the Central government was applying considerable pressure on the local 
government to comply with its ideology, albeit unsuccessfully. The Wenzhou local 
government, then, was far from “inactive”. Rather, by refusing to follow the Central 
government’s demands and resisting the pressure to toe the line, it was actively 
encouraging the growth of the private economy.
As a means of reducing the pressure from the Centre, the Wenzhou local 
government needed to ameliorate the appearance of the local private sector. 
According to Parris (1995) and Liu (1992a, 1992b), as well as several people 
interviewed, this was done through the practice of “Gua Hu”, allowing private 
businesses to borrow the stationary and bank account details of legitimate collective 
enterprises, thus giving what were privately owned concerns the appearance of being 
legally operating collective enterprises.
Thus the Wenzhou government passed a number of regulations and policies 
regarding the operation of these collective-shareholding enterprises, including in
1987 the “Temporary regulations for the management of GuaHu enterprises”, 
“temporary measures for regulating private enterprises in Wenzhou municipality”, 
“Rules concerning the miscellaneous issues of rural collective enterprises”, and in
1988 “Rules concerning the miscellaneous issues of private and collective- 
shareholding enterprises”, and in 1989 “Notice concerning the standardisation of 
policies for collective-shareholding enterprises” and so on (Shi et al, 2004). These 
regulations set the foundations for Wenzhou’s future economic growth by protecting
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the rights of these semi-private enterprises, and giving entrepreneurs a regulated 
structure in which to operate their businesses.
So this series of policies from the Wenzhou government gave local 
businesses a degree of political protection. As long as the debate over the “socialist” 
versus “market” aspects of the Wenzhou model continued to rage, by placing the 
emphasis on the “collective” nature of these firms, the Wenzhou government was 
managing to ease the political pressure on these firms.
The “collectivist” nature of the policies also served practical functions, 
including the protection of the rights of the “collective” shareholders, which were 
sometimes the workers in the firm, or the village in which the firm was based. They 
benefited from the guaranteed allocation of a proportion of profits to them (albeit 
managed by the firm’s managers). Another portion of the profits was directed back 
into the businesses for investment and expansion. The “collectivist” label meant that 
local firms had to reserve 25% of profits into a public welfare fund (though the 
allocation of the funds for worker bonus, welfare, health and so on was at the 
discretion of the firm’s managers). 50% of profits were to be re-invested into the 
firm itself, benefiting all shareholders by increasing the value of the firm. This way 
of allocating funds ensures that there was sufficient justification that these 
collective-shareholding enterprises did indeed serve the collective good (Wenzhou 
interview, 2003, Wenzhou economic reform office).
This kind of close, co-operative behaviour begs the question of how and why 
local officials colluded with firms in carrying out what were illegal activities. The 
section above on Wenzhou’s historical background explored how local officials were
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able to do this. By a series of historical, political, social and geographical accidents, 
Wenzhou’s relative isolation from the Centre meant that enforcement of the Central 
government’s will was sporadic. This view is proposed by Liu (1992b), who calls it 
“sporadic totalitarianism”. In the case of Wenzhou, although the Central government 
was able to bring pressure to bear on Wenzhou’s government and leadership, it was 
only able to do so intermittently. “Work teams” and officials from outside Wenzhou 
were sent in to monitor and correct the situation of the revival of local capitalism in 
Wenzhou. However, they were posted temporarily. The Centre never succeeded in 
“rooting out” the capitalistic tendencies of the Wenzhou government. Several 
interviewees in Wenzhou agreed with this sentiment, repeating the oft heard 
sentiment that at the time “the emperor was far away” (TienGao HuangDiYuan). 
Thus even under a nominally totalitarian and centralised political system, it was 
difficult for the Central government to bring the region of Wenzhou into line.
There is no convincing evidence to suggest that officials in Wenzhou are any 
more altruistic than officials in other areas. In interviews with local officials and 
businessmen, altruism was dismissed as an explanation for the behaviour of local 
officials. Instead, pragmatism, and a good sense for business (even among cadres), as 
well as a certain impotence on the part of the local government, was seen as a much 
more realistic explanation. “MeiYou BanFa De BanFa” (interview, 2004, Wenzhou 
economic reform office) -  the choice of having no choice -  appeared to be what 
determine the attitude of the local government towards private businesses. The weak 
state sector, plus a large population and land shortage, has created a large reserve of 
unemployed labour. This reserve needed to be employed somehow, even if it were 
by illegal means. Fortunately, Wenzhou’s tradition of small household production 
and private entrepreneurship managed to survive the difficulties under the centralised
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economy, and this provided a basis to create employment in the collective and 
private sectors (interview, 2004, Wenzhou economic reform office).
By 1985, the composition of Wenzhou’s total industrial output by ownership 
shows that private enterprises accounted for almost the same amount of output 
(19.1%) as SOEs (19.4%). By the following year, 1986, the industrial output of 
private enterprises (19.6%) overtook that of SOEs (18.4%), and by 1989, the end of 
the first phase in Wenzhou’s economic development, the proportion of total 
industrial output by SOEs had declined further still to 17%, compared to 24% 
accounted for by the private sector.
8.4.2 Phase 2:1989-1997
In 1989, the Tiananmen Square massacre, coupled with a wide range of 
economic problems, prompted the Central government to implement a series of 
measures to slow down economic growth and to recentralise power (Gelber, 1990). 
This could be seen as the moves of a Central government feeling the need to re­
establish its grip on a country that was socially and economically stressed, and in the 
context of China’s recent history, it is the latest in a series of waves of 
decentralisation and recentralisation. However, the international reaction after the 
shock of the massacre was one of caution -  It was not know whether the Central 
government and the CCP intended to proceed with further reforms in the future, or to 
halt and reverse the economic reforms already made (Shambaugh, 1991).
Then, in 1992, DengXiaoPing took his “southern tour”, a rare public
appearance that garnered much media attention. Zhao (1993) suggests several
reasons for Deng’s decision to return to the public view after his retirement, the most
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pertinent reason to this discussion being the need to defend the economic reforms 
against attack from more conservative (“leftist”) elements within the CCP. Although 
presenting no practical solution for China’s overheated economy, Deng’s tour 
nevertheless showed that achieving economic growth through the market and 
through what may be seen as “capitalistic” practices is nevertheless valuable and 
desirable. His tour had a profound effect on supporting the cause of Wenzhou’s 
private economy. Interviews with a toy manufacturer showed that the tour boosted 
confidence in Wenzhou:
...[then] in 1992 Deng Xiaoping took his southern 
tour, to Zuhai and Shenzhen, supporting the private 
businesses and development of the private economy.
To us [in Wenzhou] that was a very important visit, it 
helped push forward faster reforms in the economy 
(interview, 2003, Wenzhou toy manufacturer)
The Wenzhou local government recognised that economic success from 
private development was taxing local infrastructure. The existing transport and 
communications system was unable to cope with the growing economy, and was 
proving to be a bottleneck to future growth. This became even more critical as 
Wenzhou’s advantage of being a “first mover” in adopting free market economy was 
being challenged by the collectivist mode of development in Sunan. At this time, 
Sunan was receiving large amounts of support from the provincial and Central 
governments, while Wenzhou remained reliant on local resources (interview, 2003, 
Wenzhou economic reform office).
With the developmentalist approach to economic growth, Wenzhou’s local 
government embarked on a series of large scale infrastructure projects. Two key
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projects dealt with the poor transport linkage between Wenzhou and the rest of 
Zhejiang. In 1990, construction on the Wenzhou International Airport was 
completed. In 1998 the Jinhua to Wenzhou railway was completed, for the first time 
linking Wenzhou into the national railway system, allowing trains to run directly 
from Hangzhou, the provincial capital, to Wenzhou. Other projects included the 
construction of 220 kilovolt power switching sub stations, bridges over the OuJiang 
river, expansion of port facilities to handle larger container vessels, and so on (Shi et 
al, 2004). The construction of these infrastructure facilities allowed Wenzhou 
products to be exported more easily across the rest of China.
Faced with limited resources and little support from the provincial and 
Central government, Wenzhou’s local government encouraged the participation of 
local entrepreneurs and the population to fund construction. This approach is 
distinctively developmentalist, providing local entrepreneurs access to projects that 
were the purview the local government, and further increasing the participation of 
the private sector in influencing their own growth.
Shi et al (2004) suggest that the total savings in Wenzhou exceeded 20 billion 
Yuan, plus the amount available from Wenzhouese all around the country and the 
diaspora abroad. This provides a rich source of funds for the local government to tap 
into and raise the capital needed to finance large projects. The local government has 
also encouraged individuals, firms, conglomerates and collective enterprises to 
finance small projects on their own, such as small scale hydro-electric power 
stations and small docks to take advantage of the various waterways criss-crossing 
Wenzhou (interview, 2004, Wenzhou CCP college)
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The sale of land use rights provides one of the main source of income for the 
Wenzhou government (interview, 2004, Wenzhou CCP college). Rural agricultural 
land is purchased by officials and the land use rights are transferred to urban 
developers for a much higher price. According to Zhu KangDui, an economics 
lecturer and policy researcher at the Wenzhou Party College, the newly constructed 
local government offices were mostly funded by the proceeds from this kind of land 
transfer (Zhu KangDui, interview, 2004). Such practices are not without their 
problems, however. The massive difference in the purchased price and the price at 
which land is transferred to developers has created some tension between the 
government and the former rural land users, who are demanding to be compensated. 
Nevertheless, the local government has benefited far more than from such land 
transactions than it has cost.
Government departments have employed a variety of methods to raise funds 
individually, sometimes in conjunction with their official functions. For instance, the 
department of vehicles and transportation managed to raise 50 million Yuan through 
the auctioning of motorcycle number plates. New fees have also been applied in 
some cases to serve specific purposes. For example, the “water and transportation 
fee” increases the cost of construction by imposing a fee of 5000 -  15000 Yuan per 
‘"mu” (approximately 340 square metres) of land in areas served by water utilities 
and road network (Shi et al, 2004). This passed the cost of construction and 
infrastructure from the local government to the local population, while introducing 
the mechanism of demand and supply into the process of infrastructure construction.
Aside from constructing tangible infrastructure, the Wenzhou government 
also created new regulations to deal with a number of problems threatening the
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reputation of its economy. Rapid economic growth both in Wenzhou and China in 
the early 1990s has given rise to a huge increase in demand, which in turn 
encouraged the production of counterfeit goods, low quality exports, growing 
environmental problems and the lack of regulations governing the behaviour of 
individual firms. It was difficult to impose a uniform level of quality control on the 
products of Wenzhou’s small-scale household producers. Indeed, many of these 
industries had prospered because they were able to utilise low quality material and 
low cost labour to produce goods at extremely low costs. This was possible given the 
shortage of almost all kinds of consumer goods in China’s economy at the beginning 
of the reforms, when the dominant state sector concentrated on producing industrial 
goods. Consumer demand was high enough that even low grade goods were 
purchased. However, the problem with such a short term approach to economic 
growth soon became apparent.
By the mid 1980’s and early 90’s, Wenzhou successfully sold its products to 
domestic markets within China. Its private firms were competing successfully with 
SOEs in other regions and other provinces. However, in 1985 and 1986, newspapers 
began to report on the low quality of shoes produced in Wenzhou, which were given 
the nickname of “dawn till dusk shoes”, “one day shoes” and so on. Consumers were 
enraged to find that the shoe soles were glued on and that artificial leather was used. 
A point of crisis was reached in 1988, when a Wenzhouese shoe market in Nanjing 
was destroyed by angry customers (Shi et al, 2004).
Other products from Wenzhou also came under pressure. Yueqing, a small 
township outside of Wenzhou city, was known for manufacturing low voltage 
electrical switches. Usually silver is used in the manufacturing process, but Wenzhou
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did not have silver, and the manufacturers substituted it for copper in the switches. 
Compounding the situation was the fact that the switches were relatively simple to 
produce, so even those without much technical understanding started to enter the 
market, further lowering the quality of the products (Sonobe et al, 2004). This 
resulted in two undesirable outcomes that are linked. First, illegal manufacturers 
sprang up in Yueqing, without licensing, registration or regulation. Second, without 
the necessary regulations, the low quality products were sold throughout China, and 
Wenzhou soon gained a poor reputation for producing goods that did not last. After a 
series of investigations and scathing government reports at the national level, a 
notice was issued jointly by six Central government ministries in 1990 regarding the 
unlicensed production and sale of low quality products from YueQing. Among the 
recommendations, it strongly stated that the YueQing local government needed to 
“observe the rule of law” and to “stop the production and sale of low quality goods 
from any unlicensed firms, danwei, and individuals” as well as to “stop those goods 
leaving the factory.” (Office of the State Council, order number 29, 1990).
This presented the Wenzhou local government with a dilemma. The low 
quality goods sold under the Wenzhou banner was destroying its reputation, inviting 
criticism from other local governments, the Central government, as well as rousing a 
violent reaction from the general population. However, shutting down the illegal 
producers would seriously damage the economy. Instead of choosing either path, the 
local government ignored the directives issued from the Central government, and 
instituted a series of policies designed to regulate local firms. Manufacturers were 
encouraged to improve the quality of their goods. In order to distinguish themselves 
from low quality counterfeit and anonymous producers, certain manufacturers also 
began to promote their own brands (Sonobe et al, 2004).
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It must be noted that the firms were profiting from the sale of low cost, low 
quality goods (Sonobe et al, 2004), and two of the entrepreneurs interviewed even 
suggested that later growth in Wenzhou was financed from the capital accumulated 
by selling fake, low quality goods (interview, 2003, Wenzhou Chamber of 
Commerce). Despite this, the local government was well aware of the long term 
damage that a bad reputation could do to the economy. Indeed, the repercussions are 
still felt by Wenzhouese businesses now. In a television interview, the CEO of 
AuKang corporation (a maker of shoes based in YongJia, a Wenzhou township) was 
asked:
“Your shoes have become very well known in China, 
and they have received the compliment of being one of 
the top ten shoe makers in China. Why then are the 
packaging labelled ‘Zhejiang province, YongJia 
township’, but does not make clear it is made in 
Wenzhou? Are you exploiting the fact we don’t know 
YongJia is part of Wenzhou? If you labelled your 
shoes ‘Made in Wenzhou’, will you still be able to sell 
them?” As a representative of Wenzhouese shoe 
makers, and indeed as representative of all Wenzhou 
manufacturers, Wong ZhenChao was silent before the 
questions of the presenter. After a long pause, he 
replied, “polishing Wenzhou’s name is so hard.” (Jin,
2001, 18)
Between 1990 and 1994, the Wenzhou government concentrated on 
improving the quality of goods produced in Wenzhou as well as shutting down 
illegal, unlicensed and unregistered producers. By 1995, 88.9% of all goods 
produced in Wenzhou passed quality control inspections (1.27% higher than the
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provincial average), with 98.93% of export goods passing quality control (Shi et al, 
2004).
The improvement in quality illustrates the relationship between Wenzhou’s 
developmentalist government and local private firms. Although the Wenzhou 
government had no ownership claim over firms, the initiation of the campaign for 
improving product quality required a close co-operation between government, 
businesses, and business associaitons. The informal, social network between 
government officials, semi-govemment officials (in Wenzhou’s business 
associations, for instance) and private entrepreneurs proved to be a valuable channel 
for communication and co-ordinating this effort.
8.4.3 Phase 3: 1997 onwards
The success of Wenzhou’s small scale, flexible, labour intensive industries 
was remarkable. However, with the continuing changes in the Chinese economy, 
Wenzhou faced challenges from other parts of China adopting similar methods for 
economic growth. Ironically, the success of the Wenzhou model, the acceptance and 
adoption of the market model (“market socialism”) as the direction for future 
economic growth in China also increased the competitive pressure faced by 
Wenzhou’s manufacturers. Furthermore, many of Wenzhou’s firms faced critical 
shortages of energy, land, and raw materials, as well as rising labour costs because of 
its rapid economic growth, which threatened to make Wenzhou less competitive 
(interview, 2004, Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce).
In response, the Wenzhou government has initiated a number of strategies 
aimed at upgrading both the industries in Wenzhou, from producing simple goods, to
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becoming high tech manufacturers. For instance, W enzhou’s University City was 
consolidated in 1999, on a joint stock ownership model (People’s Daily,
19/11/1999). The consolidated collage was set up on a new university campus, 
completed in 2004 outside o f Wenzhou city, with the aim of increasing the 
availability o f high skilled employees in Wenzhou.
Figure 8.6 Composition of  W enzhou’s industria l ou tpu t by ownership 
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Firms in Wenzhou have been fortunate enough to avoid the complex, 
disruptive process o f privatization. Their transition from “state” and “collective” 
ownership was a matter o f removing the status granted to them by the local 
government for protection, and allowing existing managers to formally take over as 
private owners o f the firms. As China’s economic transition progressed and private 
enterprises became increasingly acceptable and restrictions were removed, most 
Wenzhou collective firms dropped the label o f being “collectives” and became fully 
fledged private enterprises. This can be seen in Figure 8.6 by the change in the 
makeup o f Wenzhou’s total industrial output. In 1997, collective enterprises and
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TVEs made up 57.4% of Wenzhou’s total industrial output, while private industries 
made up 38.1% of industrial output. By 2002, the proportion had changed to 32% 
and 65.5% respectively (Wenzhou Statistical Yearbook, 2003).
However, despite (or because of) Wenzhou’s success, firms and individuals 
from Wenzhou are eagerly looking for investment opportunities elsewhere in China. 
As was previously mentioned, land suitable for development is scarce in the 
mountainous terrain of Wenzhou. The shortage of critical resources locally, such as 
electricity and raw materials, has led to higher input costs. Local labour costs have 
also risen, with low paid jobs increasingly being taken by migrants from other parts 
of Jiangsu province. There is also a shortage of human capital, a trait that can be 
ascribed to Wenzhou’s entrepreneurial culture. The founder of a large valve 
manufacturer in Wenzhou laments that there are not enough managerial level staff 
available, and he is worried about finding suitable successors. In the mean time, 
almost all managerial level decision is still being made by him (interview, Wenzhou 
Chamber of Commerce, 2004). The construction of the new university city is an 
attempt by the Wenzhou government to solve the shortage of skilled labour by 
improving higher education.
The increase in input prices has meant that local entrepreneurs invest outside 
Wenzhou, in Shanghai, Beijing and other large metropolitan areas. Whereas the poor 
reputation of Wenzhou in the past made investments difficult, Wenzhou’s economic 
wealth means new ventures have sufficient resources to compete in large urban 
markets.
[A] large venture has recently opened in Shanghai to 
recycle old car tyres. They used to be based here, but
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compared with Wenzhou, there are more old tyres in 
Shanghai. [They’ve] moved completely away to set up 
there (interview, Wenzhou chamber of commerce,
2003)
The strength of firms from Wenzhou has become a double edged sword, 
allowing Wenzhouese firms to make bold decision to move away from their homes, 
at the same time depriving the local economy of investment. In terms of 
development, Wenzhou’s economy has reached a level where the local economy can 
no longer sustain the growth rate it achieved over the past 20 years.
Wenzhou is too small, and it doesn’t have the 
connections with surrounding cities to form a large 
economic cluster. [It’s closest major market] Shanghai 
is too far away, and there aren’t any other large 
markets that are close enough. I think Wenzhou will 
remain a medium sized city (interview, Wenzhou CCP 
college, 2004).
Coupled with the high cost of basic inputs and a shortage of land, 
Wenzhouese firms are seeking cheaper places to invest in. The lack of investment 
opportunities within Wenzhou has also created a new phenomenon, that of the 
“Wenzhou gangs”, who speculate on real estate prices.
These groups of well-heeled individuals from 
Wenzhou, a prosperous city in East China's Zhejiang 
Province, recently went from city to city buying prime 
properties with the aim of reselling them for quick 
profits (China Daily, 2004).
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Whatever their real impact on the Chinese property market, their transactions 
have drawn criticism and have caused sufficient alarm in Wenzhou for the local 
government to issue restrictions on home purchase loans.
Wenzhou's economic success is undeniable, but the result has been rising 
costs sue to natural constraints. Although the local government has been sttempting 
to compensate by upgrading the workforce, it is impossible to overcome the natural 
limitations of Wenzhou’s terrain. Nevertheless, this can be seen as a natural progress 
of economic development, where surplus capital and profits from Wenzhou’s 
successful firms are seeking outlets elsewhere. Strict controls on the flow of money, 
however, remains outside the scope of the Wenzhou government’s remit, as financial 
regulation is dealt with by the Central government.
A number of new initiatives have been launched by the Wenzhou government 
to counteract the threat of increased economic competition and the effects of local 
firms moving away from Wenzhou. The new Wenzhou University city was 
constructed to bring all higher education institutions in Wenzhou onto one modem 
campus, with shared facilities and more resources available to students. Wenzhou 
University actively pursues forming academic ties with institutions abroad, and 
encourages foreign students to attend exchange programs, as well as arranging visits 
to foreign universities to leam from their teaching experience (interviews, Wenzhou 
University, 2006). The Wenzhou government has also initiated joint co-operative 
programs with Taizhou and Luishui to develop a local “economic cluster” that would 
enable further development to take place, with joint transportation networks and 
development goals.
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8.4 W enzhou’s developmentalist local government
The development of Wenzhou relied on a close co-operation between local 
government and private entrepreneurs. In the three phases of Wenzhou’s 
development, the local government minimised its attempts to control and manage 
local firms. The ownership of firms were obfuscated in order to avoid direct conflict 
with Central government policies, while allowing private entrepreneurship to remain 
and flourish, but the original managers and owners were allowed to remain and run 
the firm. The local government also allowed private entrepreneurs to fund local 
infrastructure, which used to fall under the purview of the local state. Moreover, the 
regulations of the local economy were developed and changed with the needs of the 
local economy, while restrictive policies from the Central government were 
reinterpreted to suit local conditions, or where this was not possible, they were 
sidestepped. Wenzhou’s development relied on the creation of an environment where 
local private entrepreneurship was allowed to grow and, to a certain extent, 
determine its own requirements. This enabled development in Wenzhou take place 
with locally available resources, with lower levels of investment and hard 
infrastructure, and with a “weak” local state.
Thus the actions of Wenzhou’s developmentalist local government divided 
into two components, one internal and one external. First, the Wenzhou government 
recognised and developed the potential of the private sector. This included the 
creation and implementation of regulations for new collective shareholding 
ownership types, for privately funded infrastructure projects, allowing the creation of 
a local capital market, and so on. Second, Wenzhou managed it relationship with the 
Central government, resisting political pressure to cut off its “capitalist tail”, and 
negotiating the interpretation of Central government policies to suit its private sector
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ownership and development, whilst pushing the success of its economy in support 
for more market oriented development in the economy.
A number of anecdotes from interviews conducted in Wenzhou suggested 
that there was a critical phase at the start of the 1980s when Wenzhou’s local 
economy began its transformation from operating a “black economy” to legitimating 
its many local private enterprises. In August of 1981, Yuan Fanglie was ordered to 
go to Wenzhou in order to “fix” its intractable problems of its ineffective 
government, poverty, and the persistence of private enterprises. Yuan was the deputy 
governor of Zhejiang province at the time, and he was able to act with extraordinary 
authority granted by the Zhejiang provincial government (interview, 2003, Wenzhou 
CCP college). He restructured the local government, unifying the territories and 
often conflicting bureaucracies of three separate counties in Wenzhou, a procedure 
that was approved by the provincial government. He also succeeded in restoring 
order in Wenzhou by eliminating predatory officials from the government. However, 
he did not manage to terminate the presence of private enterprises in Wenzhou. 
Instead, Yuan was instrumental in recognising the importance of private businesses 
to Wenzhou’s economic future.
Although Yuan was instructed to clean up the remnants of Wenzhou’s private 
economy, he was unable to do so. First, the state sector was unable to produce the 
growth in the economy even with additional subsidies from the Central government. 
Although he succeeded in obtaining additional investment, Yuan was unable to solve 
the problem of poverty in Wenzhou. Second, the government lack the capacity to 
curtail private enterprises, which were small scale, and often involved the collusion 
of the official enforcers. Finally, anecdotal evidence suggests that in 1982 he was
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confronted with the evidence that the (albeit illegal) practice of agriculture by 
individual households produced better results than that of communal farming. He 
was also shown the operation of small, private underground factories, which yielded 
much higher returns than state enterprises.
In October of 1982, Yuan instituted a policy of recognising the importance of 
the “two households” -  the “individual household (ge ti hu)” and the “priority 
households (zhong dian hu)”. A conference was held where the representatives of 
these private entrepreneurs were told that their activities would be encouraged by the 
local government. Thus in future, should there be pressure from higher levels of 
government on these semi-legal enterprises, the local government, and specifically, 
Yuan Fanglie, would be held accountable.
This was the first time the Wenzhou local government recognised the private 
enterprise as a vital component of its economy. Although it did not completely 
legitimate private enterprises - for the local government had no authority to do so - 
this was a key step towards strengthening the link between local private businesses 
and the local government. Most importantly, it allowed the Wenzhou government to 
formulate policies in aid of the private sector. Interestingly, it also set the precedent 
for the behaviour of then Wenzhou government’s approach to the private sector. The 
private sector was given permission by the local government to grow, while the local 
government was responsible for deflecting the political pressure from the 
conservative, anti-reform elements within the Central government. Rather than 
directing or managing the economy, the Wenzhou government has taken on the task 
of providing the environment in which private enterprises could operate with 
minimal levels of hindrance.
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The local government has sought to protect local entrepreneurs after 1982 to 
the best of its abilities, as illustrated in the previous sections in this chapter. 
Moreover, it took drastic action in protecting the reputation of Wenzhou by targeting 
counterfeit goods. It also helped Wenzhou’s development by creating large markets 
for traders and buyers to meet. By attracting buyers to come to Wenzhou, it increased 
its profile and served as publicity (interview, Wenzhou trade association, 2004). 
Although these aere not formulated as part of a coherent development strategy, they 
were effective and appropriate to serve Wenzhou’s development.
8.5 Conclusion
The Wenzhou government played a key role in the economic development of 
its economy. However, its efforts were also helped by fortuitous timing. In the first 
and second phases, the private sector in Wenzhou was able to take advantage of its 
relative freedom and flexibility vis-a-vis the state owned and collective enterprises 
and exploit market opportunities all over China, while the rest of China was 
undergoing a transformation in their economic structure. While other local 
governments were engaged in managing their local firms, Wenzhou’s government 
was creating in its economy the conditions and regulations necessary for private 
enterprises to survive and operate.
The success of Wenzhou’s private economy depended on a level of trust 
between the private businesses and the local government. In part, this trust rests on 
the knowledge of the local government’s partial impotence in local affairs -  that it 
risked crippling its own economy and risking social turbulence if it had to carry out 
the orders of the Central government. Conversely, this also meant that local
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businesses and the local government had many shared interests, especially in the area 
of sheltering the private sector. Aided by the social network, the wishes of each party 
can be passed onto the other, without necessarily using official channels of 
communications, thus bypassing Central government oversight. Wenzhou’s 
developmentalist strategy showed that a weak, non-interventionalist local 
government can use social ties and distance from Central government control to 
foster growth in its economy against political opposition.
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Chapter 9: The role of Yangzhou’s local government in local economic 
development -  Economic transition from collectives to private enterprises
9.1 Introduction
Yangzhou’s economy went through a gamut of different economic 
development modes, from a state economy, through local state and collective 
ownership, to becoming a privately owned market economy. At each stage, the 
Yangzhou government has been proactive and involved in directing the local 
economy. Yangzhou’s location in central Jiangsu meant it has been influence by the 
“Sunan” model form southern Jiangsu, where local corporatism or entrepreneurial 
local governments were deeply involved in managing the local economy and firms 
within the local economy.
However, there is a difference in the case of Yangzhou’s economy. A key 
component for the early success of the Sunan model is the nearness of Shanghai, 
which proved to be an invaluable market for the products of the collective enterprises 
(Lin, 1995). Proximity to Shanghai also allowed surrounding regions to gain from 
the movement of industrial activities out of the city in the early 1990s as Shanghai 
sought to reorganise itself spatially and emphasis tertiary, service based functions in 
the city itself (Zhang, 2003). Shanghai’s access to foreign markets provided Sunan’s 
collective enterprises with a ready outlet for their products abroad, attracting buyers 
as well as serving as a shipping point for their goods. This concentration of 
infrastructure, industry, metropolis and international connections was a potent mix in 
injecting vitality into Sunan’s economic development process (Yehua, 2002).
Yangzhou’s distance from Shanghai neutralised this advantage. While
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Yangzhou cannot be described as either economically backward or destitute, its 
economic and industrial development has been mediocre, producing and processing 
agricultural and food products during the time of Central economic planning. This 
was due to Yangzhou’s historical development of its commercial, rather than 
industrial, economy. This led to relatively low levels of state investment in the area.
9.2 Background: Economic changes in Yangzhou
Located in the Centre of Jiangsu province, Yangzhou is situated between a 
prosperous south and a poorer north. Sunan, the southern area of Jiangsu, has cities 
such as Nanjing, Suzhou and Wuxi, as well as close economic ties with Shanghai. 
Sunan is a highly urbanised and industrialised area, the origin of the Sunan model, 
and the base of the “Kunshan miracle” in attracting massive inflows of FDI, while by 
contrast, Subei, northern Jiangsu, is a predominantly agricultural area without the 
benefit of economic spill-over from a major metropolitan area such as Shanghai.
Suzhong (central Jiangsu) is demarcated by the Yangtze river. Yangzhou is 
located roughly 230km upstream from the mouth of the river. Historically, Yangzhou 
sat at the junction of the Yangtze river and the Grand Canal, a crucial transportation 
and trading Centre for agricultural goods travelling from the fields of southern China 
to the political Centres in the north. Consequently, Yangzhou developed as a 
sophisticated commercial port, culturally enriched by the patronage of traders and 
salt merchants who congregated within its walls. The surrounding area is flat and 
fertile, making it an excellent area for agriculture, and small deposits of minerals and 
fossil fuels have also been found (Yangzhou Nianjian, 2005).
However, industrial production in the area was limited, concerned mainly
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with producing agricultural tools, small household crafts items, and food processing. 
Economic planners in Yangzhou in 1950 were faced with the reality that there were 
just “one and a half’ factories of significant scale in the city - a flour mill, and a 
small electrical power station (interview, 2005, Yangzhou CCP college). 
Compounding this lack of industrial capacity, the importance of Yangzhou as a 
transport and trading Centre has been in constant decline following the slow collapse 
and neglect of the Grand Canal and connected water transport systems. Alternative 
and more modem transportation links to the county were poorly developed. In 1924, 
when planning began for a railway line to link Yangzhou with the city of Nanjing, 
local farmers and residents protested against the construction. Deeply traditional, 
they feared the negative impact that the noise and smoke steam engines would have 
on the local livestock, and the project was abandoned. In 1930, another construction 
project, this time for a highway, was partially abandoned because of local protests. 
This meant that Yangzhou was bypassed by the beginning of the 20th century as a 
centre of commerce, since modem transportation links to Yangzhou were relatively 
underdeveloped, especially in terms of linkages to cities in Central Jiangsu (Zhu, 
2001).
Politically, Jiangsu’s fragmented administration meant the local governments 
of Yangzhou and surrounding areas were in competition. Under the centrally planned 
economy, local governments did not need to develop co-operative ties with their 
neighbours, nor were they encouraged to do so. Successive political campaigns such 
as the Great Leap Forward encouraged competition between local governments to 
achieve the highest output figures, and during the late pre-reform period, local 
governments competed to obtain the greatest amount of budgetary slack. This has not 
been improved in the post reform era, where with the high degree of emphasis on
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territorially based development strategies, there is a critical lack of co-operation 
between neighbouring governments at the local level. Even with the county of 
Taizhou, which was created from part of Yangzhou’s territory in 1996, there is 
competition with Yangzhou (interview, 2005, Taizhou CCP college). This has been 
somewhat exacerbated by Jiangsu provincial government’s proposal in 2000 to 
“further elevate Sunan development levels, stimulate Suzhong’s rapid growth, take 
advantage of Subei’s late development status”, which has placed the cities of the 
Suzhong region in competition with each other to be the economic leader of the 
region (Yi, 2003).
Thus Yangzhou’s post reform economy developed with special emphasis on 
the importance of local state owned and controlled firms, which were placed in 
competition with industries from surrounding areas. Local industrial policies, 
management and institutions were shaped for the purpose of achieving the highest 
growth rates in the area so as to reach the top of the economic league table.
It’s important to be at the top of the economic growth 
rate table. It’s published every year and regions are 
ranked by the speed of growth. [If you] are at the top 
of the table it’s easier to get noticed and promoted 
(interview, 2005, Yangzhou Economic Reform Office).
9.3 Yangzhou’s statistical data
The ancient administration of the many waterways in Suzhong served as the 
basis for drawing administrative boundaries, and these have remained mostly intact 
(interview, Yangzhou 2005). This historical accident, though useful while the 
waterways served their function as important trade routes, is economically divisive,
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as the administrative boundaries were economically arbitrary, and foster little 
economic co-operation and spill over between the various Suzhong cities, as each 
city is politically bound to its administrative region.
Between 1988-2002, Yangzhou’s GDP growth was one of the slowest in 
Jiangsu (see figure 9.1). In comparison with other cities in Jiangsu, both GDP and 
GDP per capita grew slower than other cities. Figure 8.2 shows that Yangzhou’s 
GDP per capita was roughly equal to the provincial average from 1978 until 1992, 
when it began to diverge. By 2000, Yangzhou’s GDP per capita (10515 Yuan) was 
12% lower than the Jiangsu average (11773 Yuan).
Figure 9.1: Comparison of cities in Jiangsu, ranked by GDP per capita growth 1988-2002
1988 1994 2002 Growth 88-02
Population (millions) 5.51 5.71 5.84 106%
Suzhou GDP (billion yuan) 16.51 72.09 208.04 1260%GDP per capita* 
Area (sq. km)
2995 12615.687
8488
35733 1193%
Nanjing Population (millions) 4.88 5.18 5.63 115%
GDP (billion yuan) 13.32 46.69 129.76 974%
GDP per capita 2728 9007.8973 22858 838%
Area (sq. km) 6588
Nantong Population (millions) 7.62 7.82 7.80 102%
GDP (billion yuan) 11.13 34.52 88.73 797%
GDP per capita 1459 4411.5103 11356 778%
Area (sq. km) 8001
Xuzhou Population (millions) 7.44 8.43 9.04 122%
GDP (billion yuan) 8.46 31.84 79.14 935%
GDP per capita 1138 3776.0392 8763 770%
Area (sq. km) 11258
Yancheng Population (millions) 7.50 7.81 7.96 106%
GDP (billion yuan) 8.49 22.96 67.33 793%
GDP per capita 1132 2940.4629 8464 748%
Area (sq. km) 14983
Yangzhou Population (millions) 9.08 9.36 9.56 105%
GDP (billion yuan) 13.57 47.04 106.35 784%
GDP per capita 1718 5021 11122 647%
Area (sq. km) 12425
(Source: Jiangsu Statistical Yearbook 2003)
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Figure 9.2: Y angzhou G D P p er cap ita , 1978-2002
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Figure 9.3 Employment b reakdow n by sector
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The economic composition of Yangzhou was dominated by its primary sector 
until the 1980s (see Figure 9.3), with nearly 40% of GDP being accounted for by the 
primary sector. Although the secondary sector was also responsible for
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approximately 40% o f total GDP, it was composed mainly o f rural industries set up 
in support o f agricultural production, and was closely linked with agricultural 
activities. Only in 1984 was there a clear trend where the secondary sector overtook 
the primary sector. During this time, the local government was enthusiastically 
promoting the process o f rural industrialization, and shifting labour and other 
resources away from the agricultural sector to newly formed rural industries. The 
transition o f Yangzhou’s economic structure can be seen in the change o f GDP 
composition in this period, as the importance o f the primary industries decline 
steadily while the proportion o f output from secondary industries grew until 1993, 
then declined. Tertiary sector output has grown steadily from the start o f the reforms, 
but it must be noted that their growth reflects primarily the ease o f entry for small 
and new firms into the tertiary sector, rather than serving as an indicator of 
Yangzhou undergoing an industrial transition towards a service based economy.
Figure 9.4: Industr ia l  employment by ownersh ip  in Yangzhou
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Examining ownership patterns in Yangzhou, it is possible to see a distinct 
trend in the growth o f employment in both the collective and state sectors after the 
first phase o f agricultural reforms, from 1984 onwards (see figures 9.3 and 9.4). The 
change in government policies on rural development shifted the emphasis towards
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the development o f collective enterprises rather than further expanding agriculture, 
and the amount spent on agricultural support, as a proportion o f total government 
expenditure, fell from more than 25% in 1978 to just 5.2% in 1985. This shift from 
agriculture to rural industries signaled a period o f rapid rural industrialisation, with 
total employment in TVEs growing from 186 300 in 1978 to 247 500 in 1991, an 
increase o f almost a third.
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However, the growth in TVE employment was overshadowed by the massive 
growth in the state sector (see Figure 9.5). In 1978, the state sector employed 
190 900 workers, over half of the total non agricultural employment in Yangzhou.
By 1991, it employed 340 300 workers, accounting for 55% o f non agricultural 
employment. By 1993, 373 500 workers are employed in the state sector, which 
accounted for almost 60% of non agricultural employment (Yangzhou statistical 
yearbook, 2003). By the early 1990s, however, there began a rapid decline in the 
numbers employed by both the state sector and by TVEs. Conversely, in the same 
period, employment in the private sector (including both private enterprises and 
“individual” enterprises) began to expand rapidly. From 26 600 in 1991, the private
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sector employed 210 200 workers by 2002.
Thus the economy of Yangzhou was dominated by the state sector at the start 
of economic reforms, and the strategy for developing state enterprises along with 
collectively owned firms seemed to give the best of both worlds, as the collective 
firms remained under the influence of the local government, but operated within a 
free market economy, and state owned enterprises helped create a stable “backbone” 
of industries for local economic stability. They were less competitive than local 
collective firms, but under the direction of the local government, the activities of 
both sectors were co-ordinated in order to avoid direct competition (interview, 2005, 
Yangzhou Economic Reform Office).
It is interesting to note that analysing the changing economic structure of 
Yangzhou with employment figures alone is far from satisfactory. There is no 
reliable way to tell the contribution of the state, collective and private sectors to 
overall economic growth in Yangzhou. However, without reliable numerical data for 
industrial output by ownership, it is impossible to demonstrate the changing 
contribution of firms under different ownership types. Indeed, the lack of such a 
crucial piece of data is unfortunately not limited to foreign scholars alone. Even staff 
at the Yangzhou CCP college expressed frustration at the lack of information.
The information is there, but [the Statistics Bureau] 
won’t release it, because they are afraid of being 
wrong. It also makes writing reports more difficult. If 
they published the actual numbers, then it’s more 
difficult to generalise and they would have to check 
their figures before publishing their reports (interview,
2005, Yangzhou CCP college).
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9.4 Four phases in Yangzhou’s development
Yangzhou’s economic development followed the course of China’s move 
from a state economy, through collective ownership, to the creation and growth of a 
private economy. The Yangzhou economy’s government directed development is 
apparent in all phases of its growth. It can be described as local corporatist state, or 
entrepreneurial local state. In each phase the government took different actions, 
creating local state enterprises, consolidating local firms, privatising local firms, and 
so on, but within these Yangzhou’s local government remained closely connected to 
and in control of firms in the local economy.
9.4.1 1978—1985 Agricultural reforms and the creation o f the collective 
economy
Agricultural production in Yangzhou was mainly concentrated on growing 
and producing rice, grains, cotton and vegetable oils, as well as specialist products 
such as silk cocoons. The first phase of reforms involved changes to the agricultural 
sector of Yangzhou’s economy, especially the implementation of the household 
contract responsibility system. Although explicitly forbidden by the Central 
government, which considered it anathema to socialist values, the practice was 
nevertheless widespread. By 1981, when it was officially sanctioned by the Central 
government, some 45% of agricultural production teams in China were already 
dismantled and the new responsibility system put in its place (Lin, 1992a, p37).
The adoption of the first phase of agricultural reforms required only a low 
level of government resources and involvement, as it remained up to each household
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to satisfy Central government production quotas. Once the state quota was satisfied, 
any surplus crops could be sold at the discretion o f the farmer at market prices. 
Figure 9.6 shows that between 1979 and 1984, the value o f Yangzhou’s agricultural 
production grew by 50%, almost twice as fast as the growth from 1975-1979 (26%) 
(Yangzhou statistical yearbook 2003).
Figure 9.6: Agricultural output value of Yangzhou (1979=1)
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The initiation o f agricultural reforms must be considered in the context o f the 
legacies left by Central economic planning, with communal farming, small holdings, 
low levels o f mechanisation, and over staffing. Although China’s agricultural 
policies were praised at one stage for having apparently absorbed massive numbers 
of unemployed through its deliberate labour intensive farming practices (Taylor, 
1988), in reality under-employment and very low levels o f productivity per worker 
were prevalent problems. As Taylor (1988) points out, it was unwise politically and 
economically to have a large number o f workers ^em ployed  in the countryside, and 
wraferemployment seemed preferable. Industrial development under Central 
economic planning depended on the production o f agricultural surplus, which was 
then channelled into the industrial sector. The solution was to increase labour
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intensity for crops, both to absorb unemployed workers, and to increase agricultural 
output.
The primary vehicle for accomplishing this end was to 
raise the labour intensity of farming by promoting 
multiple cropping, intercropping, deep ploughing, 
extensive fertilization, and expanded irrigation. [...]
Recently published statistics indicate that the labour 
intensity of crop production did rise though 1978. [...]
[AJverage annual labour days expanded per hectare in 
growing all major crops rose sharply between 1953 and 
1978. For example, from 1953 to 1978 the labour 
intensity of raising rice, millet and tobacco more than 
doubled, the labour intensity of growing sorghum, 
rapeseed, cotton and hemp more than tripled, and the 
labour intensity of growing wheat, soybeans, peanuts 
and sesame more than quadrupled. (Taylor, 1988, 740- 
741)
Furthermore, the fixed plan prices for agricultural products discouraged 
individuals from increasing their production. The introduction of a system of pay 
according to “work units” -  the amount of time worked rather than actual 
productivity -  distorted individual incentives even further. Workers often put in the 
time without putting in the effort.
Everyone was paid the same everyday, to do the same 
work, they did not want to work harder, why should 
they? So [agricultural production] was very inefficient 
(interview, 2005, Yangzhou CCP college).
With the introduction of the household responsibility system, individual
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farmers were encouraged to produce more. Once their quota for “plan production” 
was fulfilled, they were allowed to sell their extra produce and keep the profits. This 
led to increased agricultural production in the early 1980s, and farm income was 
increased (interview, 2005, Yangzhou CCP college). By the end of 1985, average 
rural income was 501 Yuan, compared with 762 Yuan in urban areas, leaving only 
33% difference between urban and rural areas. The household responsibility system 
began to impact agricultural production in small scale, informal production.
It could be just a small back garden, a small comer of 
land where [the farmers] grew some extra vegetables to 
sell, and they would make extra income for their 
family. This then gradually expanded to include more 
land, before it [the household responsibility system] 
became officially approved (interview, 2005,
Yangzhou CCP college).
However, the initial phase of growth in agriculture did not last long. As 
farmers increased their production over the state quota, their produce flooded the 
informal market. This resulted in a drop in the price of agricultural goods, slowing 
the growth of rural productivity and household incomes. By the end of 1991, the gap 
between rural income (941 yuan) and urban income (1621 yuan) grew to 42% (Yang 
& Tai, 2005).
The introduction of reforms in the agricultural sectors presented new 
problems. The incentives provided by the household responsibility system meant 
labour intensive practices were abandoned in favour of more efficient means or 
production, leading to underemployment and surplus labour in rural areas once 
again. Moreover, the surplus of agricultural goods in the local markets had begun to
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depress the growth of agricultural income, leading to a slowdown of rural economic 
growth. This double threat to rural household income and to social stability set the 
stage for the next step in Yangzhou’s economic development, as the local 
government implemented policies to develop rural industries.
9.4.2 1985-1990 Growth and consolidation o f the collective sector
The reforms to agricultural production in Yangzhou had a paradoxical 
outcomes. On the one hand, its success raised the level of rural household incomes as 
well as increasing the production of agricultural goods, all with the minimal level of 
local government involvement. On the other hand, it became a victim of its own 
success, depressing local agricultural prices (the national market being difficult to 
access due to poor transport infrastructure) and raising the spectre of mass 
unemployment in rural areas.
The reduction of rural unemployment has been a long standing issue for the 
Central government (Talyor, 1988), as massive unemployment poses both economic 
and political problems for the government. Economic migration to urban areas could 
occur as a result of increasing income gaps and persistent unemployment in the 
countryside. In 1980, with 86.8% of Yangzhou’s population classified as 
“agricultural” (Yangzhou Nianjian, 1981), the prospect of massive rural to urban 
migration was highly unappealing, with the urban areas unable to absorb and cope 
with such a large influx of rural population. Although the movement of the rural 
population was restricted by the household registration system, nevertheless, should 
the difference in living standards between rural and urban areas become sufficiently 
great, illegal migration could potentially overload the hard and soft infrastructure in 
urban areas, or else create massive dissatisfaction in rural areas. Thus rural
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industrialisation was proposed as the solution so the rural population could "enter the 
factory without moving into the town” and “leave the soil but not the village” (Lin, 
1997, p74) -  industry and employment would go to the rural towns and villages.
The pre-existing network of rural industries in Yangzhou, set up under the 
economic plans to support agricultural production, were set up as the seeds for 
growing industrial activities in rural areas. The policy of rural self sufficiency under 
centralised planning meant that rudimentary workshops had already been created to 
produce basic agricultural tools and machines (interview, 2005, Yangzhou CCP 
college). The infrastructure was already in place to serve these industries, reducing 
the cost of setting up new firms. The local government also took it upon itself to play 
the role of entrepreneur, setting up new enterprises in rural areas, taking advantage of 
a series of highly favourable policies from the Central government to develop rural 
areas. These included tax breaks for new rural firms, for those serving the local 
agricultural industry and the local communities, and for small scale power plants, 
cement plants, and coal and iron mines. Moreover, the Agricultural Bank of China 
was instructed to set aside a portion of its loans specifically for rural industries 
(Wong, 1988, p6-7), so obtaining capital for these new projects was possible.
In the early 1980s, China’s consumers still suffered from a lack of consumer 
goods, offering the opportunity for even relatively inefficient rural industries to profit 
from producing basic consumer products and selling them at the same price as those 
produced in more costly urban areas (Young, 2000). Thus it is not surprising that 
there was a massive expansion of collectively owned rural industries in Yangzhou, 
driven by the local government, which was in addition able to give these new firms 
their political support (interview, 2005, Yangzhou CCP college, 2005). Driven by the
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need to satisfy the shortage economy, and by “investment hunger” -  the perceived 
need for continuous expansion -  local officials continued to borrow massive amounts 
from banks to fund new enterprises (Shen & Ma, 2005). While there were tax breaks 
given to new rural enterprises, and no remittance needed to be made to the Central 
government, it was possible for local government to extract revenue from these firms 
by imposing impromptu fees.
At the same time, the collective sector was growing rapidly all over China. 
With the shift in economic policies emphasising the development of light industries, 
collective enterprises were springing up to fill the massive “shortage economy” of 
China, especially in the production of consumer goods (Cao, 2000, pi 3). The 
Yangzhou local government was thus involved in creating many small scale rural 
firms, using its influence and connections to ease the bureaucratic process, acquire 
inputs, and gathering capital. The collective sector, consisting mainly of small scale 
firms scattered in towns and villages, were easily dominated by the local 
government’s influence, even though the label of “collective” ownership suggested 
that it was the local community which owned and operated those firms.
Jin and Qian (1998) suggest that there are three main objectives for local 
governments developing a strong local collective sector. First, these firms served to 
increase rural income, which is a key objective that China’s local governments 
needed to fulfil as the drivers for economic development. Second, local collective 
firms served to increase employment in rural areas, reabsorbing the surplus labour 
released by employing more efficient agricultural production methods. Finally, the 
relationship between local governments and the collective sector is financially 
rewarding for the local government, providing an additional source of revenue
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income. With the tax exemption for newly formed rural firms, remittance to the 
Central government is decreased, while the local government was able to find 
various, non tax means to carry out its policy objectives. For instance, the effects of 
unemployment if one firm collapsed can be mitigated by transferring workers to 
another collective firm, although this was unpopular and simply spread surplus 
workers around, creating overemployment in other collective firms.
It was common for them [the Yangzhou local 
government] to request that we take on workers from 
other firms in the area. It’s bad to have people 
unemployed, so workers are transferred around. We 
had to be strict and set the new workers very high 
targets, and only kept them if these targets were met.
Otherwise our own productivity would have fallen 
(interview, 2005, Yangtze River Pharmaceuticals).
The growth of Yangzhou’s collective sector was matched by the growth of 
the state sector. The creation of new firms were not all limited to the rural collective 
sector, and local state industries played an important part in Yangzhou’s economy at 
this point. Local state firms, more formally and fully under the control of the local 
government, were directed to purchase inputs from collective firms. The aim was to 
allow Yangzhou’s small, scattered and unspecialised industrial sector to become 
larger, more concentrated and specialised by serving the larger state firms (Huang, 
1995), so strengthening Yangzhou’s industries sufficiently to enter the national 
market and compete with other domestic Chinese firms.
9.4.3 1990-1998 Reforms to the collective economy
Reforms to the collective sector began soon after the period of economic
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retrenchment in 1988-89, in the volatile period before and after the Tiananmen 
square massacre (Dittmer, 1990). Economically, the Central government was 
concerned by runaway inflation and an overheating economy, and it moved to 
severely restrict the granting of new loans by the state owned banks. This had the 
desired effect of reducing inflation in the Chinese economy, but the sudden lack of 
credit also impacted the locally based collective economy, which had until this point 
depended on the easy availability of loans from the Agricultural Bank of China to 
fund new projects and expand existing productive capacity.
With the proliferation of rural firms and the rapid creation of collective 
enterprises in the previous 5 years, Yangzhou faced the problem of an over­
diversified economy consisting of many small scale, low tech, and inefficient firms. 
They were set up while the incentives given by the Central government were 
favourable, and remained profitable as long as China remained a “shortage 
economy” with economic distortions from the remnants of economic planning 
(interview, 2005, Yangzhou economic reform office). However, as these distortions 
were gradually eliminated, and as both foreign investors and private domestic firms 
became increasingly numerous, the inefficient firms became increasingly 
unprofitable. An official described the rural economy as being like a “plate of 
scattered sand” (yipan sansha) (interview, 2005, Yangzhou economic reform office). 
The small rural firms were difficult to manage, and vulnerable to the economic 
downturn, having little in reserve to endure the harsh anti inflationary measures 
imposed by the Central government.
In recognising this challenge to the growth of its economy, the Yangzhou 
government undertook the task of reforming the local collective sector, consolidating
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smaller firms into larger conglomerates. It also changed its approach by 
concentrating its energies on developing fewer “backbone” or “fist” industries that 
were to carry the local economy forward. Xue (1994) explains the “Yangzhou 
phenomena” as follows:
The main purpose of the Yangzhou phenomena is to 
put effort into the nurturing and development of the 
large scale economics, pushing forward the 
restructuring of the economic structure to its 
advantage, to gain the advantages of economies of 
scale, and to increase the speed [of development] on 
the basis of improved efficiency (Xue, 1994, pi 2)
Yangzhou implemented a new development strategy, targeting key industries 
such as ship building, large vehicle manufacturing, cable manufacturing, textiles, 
chemical processing, and food processing for development (Ma, 2001). It was 
reasoned that the concentration of resources in a few industries will allow them to 
grow faster. These “backbone” industries, were also known as “quiantou” (fist) 
industries, as they were encouraged to “punch” out of the local market to become 
nationally competitive champions, leading the way for Yangzhou to export its 
products all over China, and eventually, to other countries.
The core of Yangzhou’s economic policies in the mid 1990s was to 
emphasise the development of economies of scale, and to improve efficiency. This 
has much to do with the Central government’s retrenchment campaign, which not 
only denied central bank loans and grants to collective enterprises, but also once 
again subsumed local government authority to set up new enterprises under the 
authority of the State Planning Council, the State Economic Commission, and the
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People’s Bank of China. State owned enterprises, on the other hand, were to receive 
priority access to loans, raw material, energy, and transportation (Dittmer, 1990).
The change in attitude by the Yangzhou government thus reflected the situation, 
where continuing to expand rural industrialisation and both collective and private 
firms was impossible, while expanding the state owned sector seemed to be an easier 
alternative.
9.4.4 1998-present Opening the local economy to investment
The per capita GDP growth rate over the past 5 years, 1994-1998 inclusive, 
placed Yangzhou just below the Jiangsu provincial average (18.4% versus 18.8%). 
However, in absolute terms, a gap has been growing between Yangzhou’s GDP per 
capita and the provincial average since 1991 (see Figure 8.6). Thus even though 
Yangzhou’s rate of economic growth matched the provincial average, its absolute 
GDP per capita was falling behind the rest of Jiangsu.
Figure 9.6: Difference between GDP per capita in Yangzhou and Jiangsu
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Source: Yangzhou statistical yearbook 2003, China statistical yearbook 2003
Accordingly, the Yangzhou government began to review the local economy,
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and the role of the state and collective firms within it. It was during this period of 
time that the privatisation process started to take place. At the beginning, the 
privatisation process was slow. In 1994, the local state sector accounted for 57.1% of 
all industrial employment, while the collective sector accounted for 33.4% (see 
figure 8.4). Total private sector employment was only 9.2% of the total. In 1998, 
private sector employment had grown to 17.6%, while the collective sector shrunk to 
25.2%. The local state sector remained the largest employer, however, retaining 
57.3% of the industrial workforce. The privatisation process only began to affect the 
local state sector in 2002, when it shrank to 44.4%, while the private sector increased 
to 44.6%. Total employment in the collective sector was halved from 25.2% in 1998 
to 11 % in 2003. However, it is not possible to draw a firm conclusions based on this 
data, as total industrial employment shrank in the same period, and thus the relative 
growth of employment in the private sector could be an effect of the decline of 
industrial employment, rather than being the result of privatization or a real growth 
of private enterprises.
Interviews with local officials revealed that the privatisation process was 
largely driven by pragmatic and practical considerations, especially in the case of 
loss making firms.
If a firm was making losses, the government will not 
support it. Like everyone else, the government wants to 
make money too. Privatising the firm, retaining 
“golden shares”, is a good way to make money 
(interview, 2995, Yangzhou Economic Development 
Office).
Privatised firms were either sold to management, who took on the firm’s
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debts, or the firms were converted into shareholding enterprises, with the local 
government keeping “golden shares” -  non controlling shares -  in the firm. This 
allowed the local government to gain revenue from both taxing the firm as well as 
from receiving dividends from the shares. Moreover, it was emphasised that such an 
option was found to be ideologically acceptable, since the government retained 
nominal “ownership” in those firms. It was hoped that the privatised firms would 
stop being a drain on local financial resources and become a source of income for the 
local government (interview, 2995, Yangzhou Economic Development Office).
Between 1994 and 2002, private sector employment grew from 57,300 to 
210,200. By 2004, private enterprises in Yangzhou employed a total of 460,000 
people (Yangzhou nianjian, 2005). Currently, the local government is also making 
clear its support for the development of indigenous private enterprises. The 
document, “Discussion about accelerating ‘total liberalisation, popular 
entrepreneurship, popular wealth creation, creating a middle class’” was distributed 
in 2004, and proposed a number of policies to change local rules and regulations in 
order to encourage the formation of private businesses (interview, 2005, Yangzhou 
Economic Development Office). The main aim of the policy was to lower the 
barriers to entry for new entrepreneurs, decreasing fees for registration and 
streamlining the process for registering new small enterprises, waiving firms 
registration fees for those who are unemployed, loosening the regulations over 
household registration, and removing the fees for graduates to register and work in a 
private enterprise. This reduced the start up costs for small enterprises as well as the 
cost for private firms to hire new workers, a particularly important fact in view of the 
potential for the private sector to absorb unemployed workers.
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This suggests that the Yangzhou local government aims to create an 
environment favourable for the small entrepreneur, a strategy targeted specifically at 
resolving the problem of rural unemployment (Yang & Tai, 2005). Ironically, 
officials admit that the inspiration for their new development policy was based on the 
experience of Wenzhou’s private economic growth.
Everyone’s using the Wenzhou model now. The 
development strategies [of China’s local governments] 
are all converging to become service governments, 
serve private businesses. Everyone’s going private, it’s 
common (interview, 2005, Yangzhou economic 
development office)
However, there are many potential barriers to the growth of private 
enterprises in Yangzhou. The most critical is the lack of capital, which is the result of 
slower reforms in the Chinese financial sector. It remains difficult for private 
enterprises to obtain loans from state owned banks without intervention from 
officials. Loans obtained also tend to be expensive to repay, relatively small, tightly 
controlled, with short repayment periods (interview, 2005, Wenzhou Business 
Association in Yangzhou). Although the changes in regulations for new private firms 
may encourage more entrepreneurs to form their own businesses, there remains the 
problem of sustaining the growth of a firm when it required additional funding.
There is also an issue with the predominant type of private enterprises in 
Yangzhou, which tended to rely on the low cost of input factors -  cheap land and the 
availability of low paid workers from neighbouring regions -  to remain price 
competitive. There is only a low level of investment in both marketing and 
technology, with fewer “nationally renowned” brand names being based in
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Yangzhou than in Sunan, Zhejiang and Guangdong (interviews, 2005, Yangzhou 
Economic Development Office). This can potentially hinder the potential for the 
future growth of those private enterprises when they face competition from more 
renowned rivals with better technology. It also raises the issue of “slash and bum” 
entrepreneurship, where entrepreneurs exploit the incentives given by the local 
government, the low cost land and labour, then shifting their activities away to 
another region when these initial advantages disappear (interview, 2005, Wenzhou 
Business Association in Yangzhou). The presence of labour intensive, low cost, low 
tech firms may solve the unemployment problem in the short run, but without 
developing deeper linkages with the local economy, there is the risk that the local 
economy remains predominantly the low tech, low cost, and thus easily replaced if 
another source of cheap labour becomes available elsewhere in China.
The issue of creating economic linkages also applies to the most 
unambiguous change to Yangzhou’s economic development strategy, that of 
attracting foreign investors. Between 2000 and 2002, the total amount of utilised FDI 
in Yangzhou grew from US $92.22 million to $462.99 million (see figure 9.7) 
Yangzhou’s share of FDI as a proportion of the provincial total also grew from just 
0.6% to 6.3% between 1999 and 2002 (see Figure 9.8).
Figure 9.7: Comparison of FDI in Yangzhou and Jiangsu
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The shift in direction -  from developing large, indigenous conglomerates, to
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attracting outside investors and building development zones -  coincides with the 
transfer of Lee Jianje, the former mayor of Kunshan, to becoming the party secretary 
in Yangzhou.
Figure 9.8: Yangzhou FDI as proportion of provincial total, 1996-2002
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The extraordinary success of Kunshan’s economic development relied on its 
ability to attract domestic and foreign investors, many of whom were from Taiwan. 
Kunshan, located in the Sunan area next to Shanghai, was an economically backward 
area. Unlike neighbouring regions, Kunshan did not adopt the “Sunan model” of 
development through promoting TVEs. Its economy was dominated by agriculture at 
the beginning of China’s reforms, and it did not benefit from the burst of growth 
experienced by TVEs in the 1980s (Yehua, 2002). However:
In 1984, with the shift of emphasis of the reforms to 
urban reform and open-door policies, the new 
leadership initiated economic and regional planning 
that set ambitious targets. [...] A major strategy to 
reach these objectives was the decision to establish 
"Kunshan Economic and Technological Development 
District” [...] in the eastern part of Kunshan Town 
(Yuhua, 2002, p i731, emphasis mine)
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As the change in leadership is decided by higher levels of government, the 
appointment of new leadership usually signals a change in the attitudes for the local 
government. The spectacular success of Kunshan, which attracted US$500 million of 
investment in 1998 demonstrated that it was possible -  indeed, it was critical -  for 
local governments to positively affect the direction of local economic development. 
The appointment of Lee suggests that the new economic strategy is to concentrate on 
attracting FDI into Yangzhou.
The critical element in Yangzhou’s new development strategy is its openness 
and outward orientation. Compared with the local corporatist approach to 
development, shaping Yangzhou as a destination for investment signifies a change in 
Yangzhou’s government, which now emphasises the need to provide service to 
businesses, rather than maintaining managerial control and ownership over local 
firms. Moreover, the emphasis has not just been on foreign investors, it includes 
domestic investors as well. One of the main investment sources in Yangzhou comes 
from Zhejiang, to the south. The investors are mostly small and medium scale private 
industries, expanding from Zhejiang’s well developed private economy. Among the 
more prolific entrepreneurs are those from Wenzhou. The interviews in Yangzhou 
suggested that these entrepreneurs tend to be those who have had trading 
relationships in Yangzhou in the early 1980s. Specifically, many came over as a 
result of the textiles and clothing industries in both Wenzhou and Yangzhou 
(interview, 2005, Wenzhou Traders Association). The evolution of this trading 
relationship is highly symbolic of the difference in the development of the two cities, 
with small traders in Wenzhou first arriving in Yangzhou to sell to the local 
collective firms, then becoming investors themselves and moving their business to
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Yangzhou altogether.
Yangzhou provided two main advantages for investors from Wenzhou: lower 
land cost and cheap labour. Land cost in Yangzhou cost only 1720th of that in 
Wenzhou, and rural workers form Northern Jiangsu provide a readily available pool 
of cheap labour (interview, 2005, Wenzhou Traders Association). Thus many of the 
workers in the new industries are migrants from the poorer regions of Subei, Anhui 
and surrounding areas. Local Yangzhouese workers employed in the factories are, by 
contrast, in the minority, and they demand higher levels of pay than the migrant 
workers (2005 interview, Wutinglong International Toys Presents City).
Thus the question arises of the potential benefits that accrue to Yangzhou 
from pursuing outside investors to develop its economy. Yangzhou’s 11th five year 
plan, starting in 2006, emphasises that Yangzhou “take a further step towards 
openness”, and that the use of foreign investment was to be both “deepened and 
broadened”, while more effort is to be concentrated on attracting investors 
(interview, 2006, Yangzhou development office). It is hoped that the flow of foreign 
investment would stimulate indigenous firms in the local economy. However, even 
in describing its plans for developing the private sector, the use of outside investment 
is highlighted as a critical component.
9.5 The role of Yangzhou’s local government in economic development
A cursory examination of Yangzhou’s economic history suggests that the 
local government has adopted a number of development strategies. A summary of 
the dominant strategy in each of the 4 phases is presented below (figure 9.9).
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F igure  9.9: S um m ary  o f Y angzhou’s developm ent experience in 4 phases
Key developm ent 
strategy Agricultural reforms
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Source: Own elaboration
In each phase, the Yangzhou local government adopted a different 
development strategy in response to changes in the economy. In phase 1, the 
agricultural reforms introduced the household responsibility system, allowing 
farmers to sell surplus crops to the market. At the same time, the relationship 
between the Yangzhou government and firms in the state, collective and private 
sectors changed due to economic reforms at the national level. SOEs were 
transferred to local government control, and their development and consolidation 
with collective enterprises became the basis for the next phase o f Yangzhou’s 
development policy, carried out with the aid o f credit from the Agriculture bank.
In phases 1 and 2, the private sector remained small and neglected, until the 
start o f privatisation in phase 3. Nevertheless, Yangzhou’s development policies 
continued to concentrate on developing scale economies in key industries in phase 3. 
Developing SOE and collective firms continued to be the focus o f Yangzhou’s
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economic policy, until the start of phase 4. By 2001, the focus of the government 
switched from being intimately involved in the management and direction of the 
local economy, to one of being a “service” government, ostensibly more concerned 
with fulfilling the needs of local businesses than in running local state enterprises. 
This is a radical departure from Yangzhou’s previous approach to economic 
development, and in exploring the role of Yangzhou’s local government, this serves 
as a useful marker for the transition of the local government from a corporate mode 
of development to a more developmental mode.
Through the 4 phases, Yangzhou’s local government slowly shifted its mode 
of development and focus. Starting with the agricultural reforms, the local 
government began to implement policies as the planned economy was dismantled.
By 1985, the Yangzhou government became increasingly entrepreneurial, developing 
an economy based on the local state sector and supported by the collective sector. 
This persisted until 2001, with attempts to create large conglomerates and to balance 
profitable firms with loss making firms through mergers. However, even before the 
start of phase 4 in 2001, some privatisation took place, and the private sector, along 
with outside investment, became increasingly important as the local state and 
collective sectors declined. At this stage, the local corporatist government became a 
“service government”, assisting private firms in lieu of managing firms in the local 
state sector.
9.6 The local government as corporate manager
The role played by Chinese local governments has been compared by Oi to 
that of the board of directors and managers in a corporation (Oi, 1992, 1995, 1999). 
The local government, as the highest authority in the local political economic
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structure, is placed in the position of being both managers and directors of firms in 
the local economy. It is possible to frame the four phases of Yangzhou’s 
development in this view, with the local government taking on various roles as the 
economy evolves, much like a firm growing. Figure 9.10 charts the evolution of 
Yangzhou’s local government in relation to Yangzhou’s economy as if it were a 
corporation. Indeed, the strategy of the local government through the thirty year 
period seems to reflect the phases of growth of a firm, being set up, consolidated, 
merged, and then privatized. Thus the strategy of the local government mirrors the 
linear progression from state to market, from state to collective to a private economy.
Figure 9.10: The changing relationship of Yangzhou’s local government and local enterprises
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Within this framework, the local government may control the management of 
local firms in many different ways, through both informal and formal channels, as 
well as giving rise to the possibility of ambivalent relationships such as clientelism. 
The local government may also engage in more negative relationship of corruption 
by either individual officials or by entire government departments:
Local collective enterprises, which in many instances received either part or 
full initial financing from the local government, often bear the brunt of the [illegal] 
charges. They have become milk cows for local agencies. Usually, the better the 
enterprises fare, the more payments are demanded. (Lu, 2000). The private sector is
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affected by corruption as well:
To small private businesses heavy charges of all kinds 
from government agencies have become a major 
source of discontent [...]. As a result, many have 
become reluctant to expand their businesses, and some 
have even folded (Lu, 2000, p286).
In Yangzhou, there seems to be a difference between the role of local state 
firms, and private enterprises. More resources were allocated for the creation and 
sustenance of the local state sector than for promoting and facilitating the growth of 
the private sector. As Lu (2000) suggested, local state enterprises are an important 
source for local government income, which is kept off official records as extra- 
budgetary income, and received more political support from the Central government 
during the economic and political retrenchment of the early 1990s (Dittmer, 1990). 
Lu’s (2000) exploration of organisational corruption in local governments suggests 
that these activities could be seen as the local state, or departments within the local 
government, acting as a kind of entrepreneur:
The role of the Chinese state, though sometimes 
facilitating growth, is not as positive and 
“developmental” as many have perceived. It may be 
described as “entrepreneurial,” though not in the way 
some scholars have understood this term. It is 
entrepreneurial because the state (as in state agencies) 
is involved in profit-generating activities by seizing 
opportunities provided by the reform. I prefer to call its 
“bureau-preneurialism,” for it has a predatory 
dimension involving government bureaus and 
bureaucrats. (Lu, 2000, p274—275)
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Seen from the point of view of the Central government, this 
“entrepreneurialism” is at odds with the prescribed objective of developing the local 
economy. This activity adds to the cost of transactions for local firms, engenders 
mistrust in the local bureaucracy, and also compromises the rule of law. However, it 
is entirely possible that the local state “entrepreneur” sees it in a different light. 
Viewing the local government and local economy as a corporation, there is the 
question of profit distribution. The investment and management of firms generates a 
very tangible benefit for the local government, and there is thus an incentive to 
maximise this income. Developing a successful local state run economy is one 
possible way to achieve this objective. Extra income generated by a growing state 
sector leads to additional income from taxes and fees.
However, the development and growth of the local economy and the 
objectives of an “entrepreneurial” local government are only partially aligned. Local 
economic growth per se only benefits the local government (in terms of its revenue) 
when the local government has the capacity to extract rents from that growth. In the 
context of the gradual reforms in China, this meant that as parts of the planned 
economy were phased out, the newly liberalised parts, acting in accordance to their 
new imperative to maximise profits and income, would seek to exploit the remaining 
price distortions implicit in the planned system for their own benefit (Young, 2000). 
There is then the incentive to protect these new sources of rent in order to preserve 
them, even as the initial cause (remnants of the planned economy) are removed 
through further reforms, thereby creating a new source of distortions in the local 
economy.
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This is particularly relevant in an area such as Yangzhou, with its dependence 
on the state economy. The powerful influence of the state economy over local 
economic activities gave rise to many opportunities for those industries freed from 
planning constraints to exploit remaining distortions in the economy. The existing 
political economy means that the rent from this exploitation accrue to the local 
government, which has an incentive to preserve the status quo in order to continue to 
benefit from the additional income. This is could be detrimental to the local economy 
in the short term, as resources are allocated to firms that may be inefficient, but are 
protected against competition by the local government. In the long term, attempts to 
preserve the distortions may stifle much needed reforms in the local economy, and 
also may lead to behaviours that are ultimately unsustainable and harmful to the local 
economy as a whole.
Young (2000) argues that much of the effort expended in the earlier 
economic reforms simply devolved industrial ownership to the lower tiers of local 
governments. Although at first this may seem similar to the devolution of the 
responsibility for promoting economic growth, it has instead had the effect of 
creating vested interests within the local government at the cost of overall economic 
benefits to the local economy.
Oi (1992) argues that the extraction of profits from the local state enterprises 
is a part of the cycle of investment and growth. She argues that to view these as the 
actions of a predatory state neglects to take into account the way that this income is 
redistributed, in furthering the growth of local industries through short term and long 
term loans and investment, made more necessary because of an unreformed fiscal 
sector and the lack of locally available credit. In short, not only is this behaviour not
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predatory, it is a natural and necessary part of the local corporatist system.
Nevertheless, as we examine the case of Yangzhou’s economic development, 
from the initial burst of setting up new collective firms, to the subsequent 
consolidation of the state and collective sectors, it becomes more difficult to apply 
Oi’s arguments. If predatory behaviour -  including the natural revenue extraction 
that is expected to take place in a local corporatist system -  is beneficial to the local 
economy, then an alternative reason needs to be found to explain Yangzhou’s poor 
economic performance.
It is possible to suggest that Yangzhou’s poor economic performance is due 
to the local government being a poor entrepreneur. Individual local state firms may 
be under private management, bringing in some of the advantages of the private 
market, but the ownership and ultimate control over the appointment of managers 
and the disposal of assets remain firmly in the hands of local governments. Oi (1992) 
points out what this means:
The contract responsibility system charges factory 
managers with the burden of running the factory 
efficiently and profitably -  but with only limited 
control over factors of production. Those who lease 
collective factories are dependent on higher executive 
management (that is, the local officials who are 
sometimes, concurrently, the chairman of the village’s 
largest industrial corporation) to make key decisions.
Where the factory manager may make suggestions 
about personnel, development, investment, and product 
line, the implementation of these changes and 
programs require official approval. Factory managers
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who make good suggestions or happen to run the 
factories targeted for development or expansion may 
receive large bonuses, but the engine fo r  change and 
development is local government (Oi, 1992, p92, 
emphasis mine).
The extraordinary process of China’s economic transition had placed local 
governments in the position of becoming entrepreneurs in their own right, and 
Central government policies gave them the necessary incentives to do so. They also 
enjoyed economic and political advantages in the initial stages of the reform specific 
to its position as the local government. However, China’s local governments were 
not designed to conduct business. Their obligations extended beyond the need to 
maximise profits, and thus their decisions in terms of managing individual firms, as 
well as directing the entire local economic “corporation”, might not achieve or aim 
for profit maximisation. Their policies may easily come into conflict with the interest 
of the individual firms under their control.
9.7 Conclusion: Yangzhou in transition
Yangzhou’s local government was heavily involved in the progress of its 
economy from a state planned economy toward a more open market economy. 
Through the ownership and management of local firms, applying industrial policy to 
develop specific sectors, and finally adopting the privatisation process, Yangzhou’s 
local government played the role of a local corporatist state. Viewing Yangzhou’s 
local government and local economy as a corporation is useful in framing the various 
phases of its local development. When considering its ability to manage the local 
economy, however, the critical point to consider is that unlike a corporation, 
Yangzhou’s government had more obligations and conflicting interests than a profit
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maximising corporate entity. Its behaviours are also governed by different rules and 
regulation, as the local government is subject to the dictates of provincial and Central 
government policies.
In the long run, the continual involvement of the local government proved to 
be detrimental to the growth of those firms under its control, and to the growth of the 
local economy as a whole. The targeting of specific industrial sectors for 
development was due to the government’s perception that those sectors made the 
best “national” and “international” champions, based on the local government’s 
desire to create a “scale economy”, where the development of large scale industries 
would provide the region with access to larger domestic and international markets. 
However, this concentration of resources and deliberate neglect of the development 
of other sections of the economy that had possibly greater potential for growth meant 
that growth in Yangzhou’s private sector was stunted. Even in 1998, 20 years after 
the Central government initiated reforms, Yangzhou had less than 15% of its 
workforce employed in the private sector (Yangzhou Statistical Yearbook, 2003).
The local economy remained dependent on the state owned enterprises for 
employment and growth, both of which hindered the efficient operation of the firms. 
The conflicting objectives of the local government -  to maximise their own revenue, 
to maintain the level of employment in the state enterprises, to use the firms in 
directing the local economy on the one hand, and the desire to promote growth on the 
other -  arguably contributed to a reluctance to reform, and a slowness to reform the 
local economy.
The effects of continued local government involvement has also stifled the 
development of local institutions, necessary to allow the local economy to function
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with less government involvement. The relationship between internal government 
departments could be confusing, but legally they exist within the same framework, 
and disputes and disagreements can be resolved by appeal within the apparatus of the 
local government (interview, 2005, Yangzhou CCP College). However, with the 
development of a market economy, communications and disputes between the 
management of different firms no longer pass through government channels, and 
there is the need for new institutions in order for them to function. These institutions 
remain under government control and scrutiny, as business associations are required 
to have a member of the board appointed by the local government. The local 
government is also slow to allow new associations to be created. For instance, 
investors from Zhejiang, one of the largest group of domestic investors in Yangzhou 
took two years to set up their new local trade association (interview, Yangzhou CCP 
college, 2005).
Changes in the direction of Yangzhou’s development suggests that the local 
government is moving from local state corporatism towards a more developmentalist 
strategy, with lower levels of direct involvement in the local economy. The process 
of privatisation freed local collective and local state firms from the managerial 
control of the local government, eliminating most of the structure of a local 
“corporation”. This was a parallel process, of the local government moving from 
corporatism to developmentalism, and of local firms moving from state and 
collective ownership to private ownership.
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Chapter 10: A comparison of the local economic development methodologies in 
Wenzhou and Yangzhou local governments
10.1 Introduction
A comparison o f Wenzhou and Yangzhou’s development process reveals two 
local governments that have adopted very different approaches to local economic 
development through China’s economic transition. These differences have been 
summarised in table 10.1.
Figure 10.1: C haracteris tics  o f  W enzhou and  Yangzhou local governm ents
Developmental typology Developm ental, clientelistic Entrepreneurial / Corporatist, clientelistic
Development aims Econom ic growth imperative Political developm ent incentive
Political situation
Isolation from Central governm ent
Non com plience with Central governm ent 
ideology
A ccessib le  by Central governm ent
Structural com plience with central 
governm ent policies, adapting new  Central 
policies a s  they em erge
Development strategy
P a ssiv e
Bottom up, grass roots
Market driven econom y
Low levels of intervention in activities of firms
Active
Top down, industrial policy
Policy driven econom y
Direct m anagem ent or indirect intervention in 
m anagem ent of firms
Source: O w n elaboration
Figure 10.1 suggests that both politically and economically, the two localities 
differ from each other. The patterns o f development differed in terms o f how the 
local governments were involved in the development of the economy, and it seems to 
be a simple task to assign each government their mode o f development. W enzhou’s 
passive, laissez-faire approach throughout the post reform period indicates that it is a 
developmental local government, while Yangzhou’s involvement in shaping 
industrial policies and managing local firms shows that it adopted an entrepreneurial
203
and corporatist approach to development.
Wenzhou and Yangzhou both enjoyed periods o f economic growth, and this 
could be attributed to the different types o f economic strategy adopted by their 
respective local governments. Wenzhou’s developmental ism was stigmatised in the 
early years o f China’s economic reforms, but became increasingly mainstream as 
China’s economy moved toward a free market. Yangzhou benefited form the 
advantages o f interventions by the local government, which was politically approved, 
but inefficiencies in its economy were revealed when it came into competition with 
private sector firms from the rest o f China, forcing a change in Yangzhou’s 
development strategy. The pattern o f their growth rates can be seen in figure 10.2.
Figure 10.2: W enzhou and  Yangzhou G D P  per  capita growth ra te
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Yangzhou had a higher GDP per capita (363 Yuan) than Wenzhou (238 
Yuan) in 1978 (Wenzhou Statistical Yearbook 2003, Yangzhou Statistical Yearbook, 
2003). Plotting a trend line through Wenzhou and Yangzhou’s GDP per capita 
growth rate (figure 10.2), it can be seen that Yangzhou also enjoyed a faster growing 
economy than Wenzhou for the first ten years after reforms began. However,
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Wenzhou’s growth rate overtook Yangzhou in the early 1990s, by 1997 Wenzhou’s 
GDP per capita (8553 Yuan) overtook that of Yangzhou (8455 Yuan).
10.2 Political incentives versus economic necessity
The fiscal incentive given by the Central government to encourage local 
economic development (see chapter 4) was one of the key motivators for local 
governments to concentrate their efforts on their local economies. By forcing local 
governments to utilise their own resources and allowing them to keep the rewards, 
areas where the potential for economic growth was stifled by Central economic 
planning were freed from the tether. The difference in the speed of development was 
recognised as China was divided into three belts (east, central and west), allowing 
each belt to specialise and also allowing the “ladder step” effect to take place -  as the 
eastern region grew, it would spread its wealth to the central and western regions 
(Fan, 1995). However, the incitement to grow economically sometimes resulted in 
economically harmful activities, such as local protectionism, the creation of over 
capacity in a single industry, lack of economic specialisation, and so on (see chapter
i).
Nevertheless, the drive to achieving economic growth was strengthened by 
the prospect of promotion for successful officials, as well as through the use of 
“league tables” to compare the performance of different regions. Officials in each 
region would strive to be at the top of the performance league, thus introducing a 
strong element of competition between different regions.
For the Yangzhou government, this type of official competition is very much 
in evidence. In an informal interview with local government officials, when asked
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about the economic performance of the local government, it was admitted that the 
economic performance as recorded in statistics were “full of water” (ie, they were 
inflated) -  this was considered to be common practice. Indeed, one official said the 
current policy in evaluating local economic performance was to use the local 
government’s own revenue and budget figures instead of the measurements of GDP 
because GDP figures were known to be unreliable. It was explained that the pressure 
for promotion was the main cause for “adding water” to statistical indicators 
(interview, 2005, Yangzhou CCP College).
The political aspect to Yangzhou’s economic development can be seen in 
how cautious it was in creating, maintaining and reforming its local state sectors. By 
avoiding changing its local economic structure, Yangzhou’s local government 
avoided the potential short term costs (including unemployment) that would have 
resulted from privatisation and closure of its more inefficient local enterprises. This 
also meant that the local government could continue to extract its revenue from the 
local state sector. However, the inefficiencies in this system became more and more 
apparent as China’s national economy shifted towards a free market approach to 
growth, while shedding the last vestiges of the planned economy, which the 
collective sector exploited for their profit. Nevertheless, the political incentive of 
maintaining economic growth (or at least avoiding economic pain) meant that no 
major changes were made to the Yangzhou economy.
Indeed, Yangzhou’s real economic transformation, in the last phase of its 
development from the late 1990s came as the result of political change. The 
appointment of Li Jinji to the local government was followed by a period of reforms 
to the entire local economy. The local state and collective sectors were rapidly
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privatised, and Yangzhou began to attract investors domestically and internationally. 
Moreover, growth in the private sector was encouraged, boosted by the privatised 
state and collective enterprises. It can be argued that this shift in leadership gave 
sufficient impetus for Yangzhou’s local government to shift it s development 
approach, rather than continuing on developing the flagging local state economy.
Aside from the political competition for promotion, a more pragmatic reason 
for local governments to strive for rapid economic growth is the growth in their local 
budget revenues. With China’s fiscal reforms (beginning in 1980), the revenue and 
expenditure of local government budgets were decentralised and became 
increasingly dependent on the ability of local governments to collect taxes from the 
local economy, giving local governments an incentive for achieving rapid economic 
growth rates in order to increase the potential amount of taxation, and hence the 
amount available to the budget. There was, however, also a perverse incentive to 
concentrate on the development the most taxable sectors and the firms from which it 
is easiest to extract rents for the local budget. Moreover, both legal and illegal means 
were used to extract rent from the local economy. The involvement of the local 
government as an entrepreneur in the local economy seems to be a logical extension 
of this, since this then lends more legitimacy to the local government to extract its 
revenue from the firms under its control Yangzhou’s entrepreneurial government was 
thus politically expedient, and also made fiscal sense.
Wenzhou differs from Yangzhou in that it was politically isolated from the 
Central government. The area is linguistically distinct, historical independent, and 
has a strong local cultural identity, insulating Wenzhou from Central government 
authority (Parris, 1993), while poor access due to primitive transportation links to
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and from the region until relatively recent times meant monitoring and controlling 
the area was particularly difficult.
This isolation gave Wenzhou a greater amount of flexibility to implement 
development policies, which may be deviant from what the Central government 
would otherwise allow. However, the political flexibility must be seen also in terms 
of its economic impact. Wenzhou’s location on the coast was also considered to be 
“vulnerable to attack”, and thus major industrial projects were not planned in the 
area. Government investment in infrastructure was equally sparse, resulting in a 
weak industrial structure in Wenzhou.
Thus the ability of the Wenzhou government to implement the Centre’s 
policies was curtailed by the lack of Central government support, politically and 
economically, leaving the local government isolated in dealing with the issues of 
local economic development. Without a firm industrial foundation on which to base 
its development, Wenzhou also resorted to agricultural reforms, albeit prior to 1978, 
when China’s national economic reforms began. One local government official 
lamented that Wenzhou’s (covert) implementation of the household responsibility 
system pre-dates those in Anhui, even though the latter is often trumpeted as the first 
official example of agricultural reforms in China (interview, 2004, Wenzhou 
economic reform office).
The economic weakness of Wenzhou plus its political isolation created 
massive pressure on the local economy, creating a black economy that was seen as 
problematic by the Central government. Ironically, this capitalist tail was not 
removed, but encouraged to flourish by local officials, who, being unable to give
208
material support, instead leant their political support to the businesses. The Wenzhou 
local government’s contribution to the development of its local economy was to 
provide it with a political shield with which to defend against the predominant 
ideology of socialist economic development. The opposition from the Central 
government was such that local government officials, including (or especially) those 
appointed by the Central government, faced demotion and transfers for supporting so 
controversial a method of development as using the private sector. Ownership 
through shareholding, creating networks of private money lenders, and so on were all 
critical components in Wenzhou’s development. Thus in contrast with the political 
incentives for economic development in Yangzhou, Wenzhou’s local government 
faced a political disincentive for developing their economy in the way they did. In 
allowing the local entrepreneurs to pursue their business, Wenzhou became a 
developmental government, formulating the environment in which the private sector 
would grow, rather than managing the firms or setting particular industrial policies.
However, it is then necessary to consider why this course of action was 
pursued despite the political risks it entailed. With few options for local economic 
development, and with private development so heavily discouraged, it was entirely 
possible for Wenzhou to become a failed local state. Indeed, in terms of its actions, it 
could be considered at least a dysfunctional local state, from the point of view of the 
Central government, as it failed time and time again to heed the demands of the 
Central government to desist its pursuit of private economic development. Nor was 
the altruism of local officials a sufficiently strong explanation for the actions of the 
local government, otherwise the development of private enterprises would only take 
place where local officials were altruistic. To assume that officials in Wenzhou are 
all equally altruistic seems unrealistic, and raises the question of why Wenzhou’s
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officials happen to possess high levels altruism.
This frames the economic imperative of the local government, which is 
proposed here as the reason for Wenzhou’s economic development path. The 
economic reasons for developing private enterprises are clear: failed local state 
enterprises, with low levels of resources available to develop them or the local 
infrastructure, means that the local government did not possess sufficient resources 
on its own to bolster the state sector. Despite political incentives for local 
government officials to conform to national guidelines on developing a socialist 
economy, and the threat of political punishments for adopting non-conformist 
policies, the local government simply had no choice other than to allow the growth 
of the local private economy, or else it would preside over economic stagnation in its 
jurisdiction. Somewhat ironically, this would then fail both the political and 
economic imperatives, since an undeveloped economy is unlikely to improve the 
chances of promotion, regardless of the degree of compliance with Central 
government directives. Becoming a developmental local government was both low 
cost -  thus avoiding for the local government the problem of where to find additional 
resources for developing the local economy -  and a good use of the human capital 
that Wenzhou managed to accumulate through its large, mobile population. Wenzhou 
was already in possession of a functional black market. Once regulated, this would 
provide the local government with a source of revenue that was previous denied it 
due to the “illegal” and thus unrecorded nature of private transactions. Legalising 
these transactions is thus a highly effective way to tap into an economic potential.
It is also necessary to consider the close social network and ties between 
Wenzhou’s officials and the local population. Here the issues of clientelistic
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behaviour and corruption are encountered, one being an almost essential component 
in the private sector-local government partnership, the other being far less desirable, 
but nevertheless an almost inevitable result of the close and informal nature of 
government -  business relationships.
The culturally isolated nature of Wenzhou has also given rise to the 
development of very dense social networks within the area, between individual and 
families and especially between Wenzhou and its diaspora. The desperate economic 
conditions and over population drove the migration of many Wenzhouese to 
elsewhere in China and all over the world, but these foreign communities have 
maintained close links with home. The development of trust, between individuals 
and groups of individuals, is important, for local traders depend on each other to 
maintain their informal, verbal contracts to fulfil their obligations. The presence of 
this dense, informal, trust based network extends into the local government, where a 
relationships with a government official was particularly valuable. In turn, the 
officials gain personally out of the relationship, making the process reciprocal. Thus 
Wenzhou’s developmental approach to fostering economic growth benefits the 
government at two levels -  through increased revenues on the organisational (local 
government) level, and through social networking at the individual level (for 
individual officials).
The differences in the development path taken by Wenzhou and Yangzhou 
can be explained in light of the differences based on the local economic and political 
imperatives. Yangzhou’s entrepreneurial approach to managing the economy stems 
from its politically structured incentives to pursue economic growth in competition 
with surrounding neighbours, and like an entrepreneur, it was encouraged to
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implement actions with short term gains, or to minimise short term losses. Wenzhou, 
on the other hand, engaged the Central government on political terms to develop its 
local private economy, for economic reasons. The political structure acted as a 
disincentive for local officials to toe the Central line. Thus its behaviour was mainly 
political, in aiding the local private sector, although its motivation stems from chiefly 
the economic pressure to develop and grow the local economy.
This brings up the fascinating dynamic of the relationship between local 
governments and local firms. Each relies on the other to fulfil essential functions. In 
turn local firms and local government develop relationships, particularly in the 
absence of formal frameworks and regulations in the aftermath of economic reforms. 
These informal relationships, it will be argued next, are also essential in shaping the 
development strategies of the Wenzhou and Yangzhou local governments, even 
though each government had a different relationship with local firms.
10.3 Informal relationships with local firms
The relationship between firms and local governments was outlined in 
chapter 4. Firms could fall under direct control of the local government (as in 
Yangzhou’s entrepreneurial, corporatist approach), or they created informal links 
with the local government through social networks and unofficial channels. The 
constant changes in economic reforms means that in order to find a degree of 
stability in the midst of shifting regulations, firms found it useful to form informal 
relationships with the local government, or with individual local officials (Wank, 
1996). The relationship with local officials could determine the success or failure of 
a firm, as the manager of the Yangzejiang Pharmaceutical company points out:
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[Our chairman] took this company and expanded it into 
the largest pharmaceuticals firm in Jiangsu. It became 
larger than Jiangsu Pharmaceutical [a rival, state 
supported firm], but he was removed from office 
because he disagreed with local officials and would not 
do as he was told. That was in 1991. By 1993, profits 
from Yangzejiang had declined to one tenth of their 
former level, but the officials refused to reappoint [the 
chairman] until 1997 (interview, 2005 Yangzejiang 
Pharmaceuticals)
Yangzhou’s collective sector, developed during the second phase between 
1984 and 1991, fell under the control of the local government, directly and indirectly, 
through ownership or through management, with Yangzhou’s government retaining 
the right to appoint managers. As can be seen in the example above, a bad 
relationship could result in managers being removed, despite having achieved good 
growth rates. Aside from being critical in appointing managers and acting as the 
“board” for local firms, the local collective sector also depends on the co-operation 
of the local government to obtain access to information, bureaucratic support and so 
on, while the local government benefits from being able to use the local collective 
sector to fulfil its policy objectives.
Unlike the “hands on” approach taken in Yangzhou’s development, 
Wenzhou’s economic growth depended entirely on the local government protecting 
local firms from the political pressure of the Central government. Without this 
protection they would not have been able to operate. Moreover, the local 
government’s introduction of innovative forms of ownership -  the “rural co­
operative shareholding ownership” in 1987 and the “private shareholding co­
operatives” in 1988 (Ma, 1998), for example -  were attempts to both disguise the
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“private ownership” content of local firms, and also to enable private entrepreneurs 
to have a “legal” and local government approved framework in which to develop and 
operate. Thus not only was the Wenzhou local government protecting the private 
economy, it tried to legitimise it.
Yangzhou’s informal relationship with local firms was different, in that it part 
controlled and part aided in their development. Local officials were involved in 
obtaining loans and setting up firms, some government departments outright owned 
local firms. Even individual departments not involved directly with economic 
production -  for instance, the buildings / hospitality department -  were involved in 
running businesses -  in this case a hotel where official hospitality and events were 
held (interview, 2005, Yangzhou CCP college, Yangzhou economic development 
office). These firms could be seen as an unofficial part of the local government, able 
to exploit the advantages offered by having a close link with local officials, yet 
compliant to the demands of local government policies. The Yangzhou government’s 
entrepreneurial development strategy brought the firms much closer to the local 
government, and their success was a function of the economic acumen of the local 
bureaucratic entrepreneurship.
This relationship reveals what lies at the root of local development in 
Wenzhou and Yangzhou. In terms of its economic imperative, Wenzhou was able to 
allow the local private sector to develop because it was the only sector that was 
growing. The state sector was a failure, and the local government did not have the 
resources to control the private sector. The relatively benevolent informal 
government-firm relationship in Wenzhou could thus be seen as the result of a fair 
balance of power -  political power, on the one hand, held by the local government
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(ability to protect firms from political reprisals), and economic power, on the other 
hand, held by firms (the private sector was what kept the economy growing).
In contrast, firms and local government in Yangzhou shared an unbalanced 
relationship. Yangzhou’s local government had political power through which it held 
economic influence -  the ability to obtain grants, the ownership of the local state 
enterprises, and so on. It was thus the political incentive -  to keep growing, and 
conversely, to prevent economic pain, which dictated the relationship between local 
firms and local government. Local firms were either under Yangzhou governmental 
control, or -  in the case of private firms -  were too weak and neglected to be noticed 
by the Yangzhou government until the late 1990s.
10.4 Bottom up versus top down -  grass roots and bureaucratic 
entrepreneurs
Yangzhou’s development depended on the local government imposing its 
economic development strategies as a matter of course. The economic reforms that 
took place were to allow local firms to remain in collective or government hands, 
while operating in a “market environment”. The management of larger collective 
firms and local state enterprises were contracted out, but the appointment of 
managers was ultimately in the hands of local officials.
The system of contracting out managerial positions stems from the Central 
government’s principle in 1987 of the “state regulating the market and market 
conducting enterprises”, allowing state owned enterprises to gain autonomy while 
remaining under state ownership (Wu, 1997, p i239). By separating ownership and 
management, the objective was to allow competitive and rent seeking behaviour to
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take place, which would not happen under a planned economic system as the 
government departments and officials receive no incentive to improve the 
performance of the SOE. In contrast, a contracted manager would be given the 
incentive of increased payments with increasing performance of the firm (and 
conversely, the disincentive of decreased payments with bad performance). This type 
of management, although not the same as private ownership, allows the firm to 
operate as if under private ownership, in theory giving manager the same set of 
incentives, although it limits the ability of managers to sell and transfer assets. 
Ownership is retained by the local government.
However, although this division of ownership and management is able to 
reproduce some of the incentive structures of private ownership, it has its problems, 
such as encouraging short term profit seeking. Most importantly, the ownership 
retained by the local government still gives the local government substantial 
influence over the operation of the company, through the appointment of compliant 
managers. Putting aside the limitations on the powers of the manager to run the firm 
(which is included in the management contract, and differs from firm to firm), 
intervention by the local government in the running of these firms could come when 
there is a conflict of political objectives with the economic imperatives of running a 
profitable firm. Thus the efficiency of this peculiar hybrid ownership-management is 
curtailed by political considerations of the local government. Within the boundaries 
of local political considerations, firms may become relatively more efficient than 
they were operating without any incentives under the planned economy, but gains in 
their efficiency would not be allowed to come at the cost of local political objectives.
In the case of Yangzhou’s state sector, this appears to have been a severe
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constraint on achieving economic efficiency for local state and collective firms. For 
instance, the Yangzejiang Pharmaceuticals firm was successfully grown from a rural 
collective firm to being one of the largest pharmaceutical producers in the country. 
However, prior to its privatisation, while it was under the ownership of the local 
government, the management was requested to take on workers from another, failed 
pharmaceutical firm, although there was no requirement for additional workers at the 
time (interview, 2005, Yangzejiang Pharmaceuticals). In terms of running the firm 
efficiently, such a request would seem absurd, even though it allows the local 
government to reduce the negative impact of unemployment from firm closures. 
Overall, if this type of transfer was widespread throughout Yangzhou’s local state 
economy, it would reduce the efficiency of firms asked to take on extra, unneeded 
workers, but such actions may also discourage managers, regardless of their 
economic incentives, as they would effectively have to shoulder the burden of local 
government policies while also managing the firm. It is not know how widespread 
this practice was, but the interviewee did not seem to regard it as abnormal 
behaviour.
Thus it could be argued that overall economic efficiency is not the priority for 
local government officials. Although financial incentives improved the efficiency of 
these firms, they remained shacked to policy and political concerns rather than being 
truly free to pursue economic objectives. Indeed, they could be seen as an extension 
of the local government’s policy tools, which would also make the local government 
very unwilling to lose the use of such a powerful tool. Privatisation was slowly 
introduced but became increasingly acceptable in Yangzhou because it was no longer 
possible for the local government to provide continuous support to local state and 
collective firms -  many of which fell into debt despite the restructuring and reforms
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in the mid 90s, relying on the local government to transfer funds from elsewhere to 
subsidise their operations -and only then was the process of selling off firms and 
shares begun. “It was costing us too much,” was the pragmatic answer given by a 
Yangzhou economic planner when asked about the timing of the privatisation 
process (interview, 2006, Yangzhou CCP college). Through privatisation, the local 
government gained the financial benefit from the sales, and maintained its status as a 
shareholder in order to receive dividends from the more successful firms. However, 
its influence over the management of firms was finally diminished.
By exerting its influence over local firms, the Yangzhou local government 
aimed to serve both its economic and political objectives, but the conflict between 
the two convinced it to retain just the potential economic gains from a shareholding 
type ownership. Wenzhou’s economic growth, by contrast, did not involve the local 
government in the same type of relationship with local firms. The majority of firms 
in Wenzhou were small and privately owned and operated, albeit under various 
guises of collective ownership. They were set up without government intervention 
and largely without government aid, thriving initially in the illegal black markets 
before becoming increasingly co-opted and regulated by the local government. Their 
management remained in private hands, the result of entrepreneurs setting up small 
ventures in household handicraft production, or of families in villages setting up co­
operative ventures. The chief distinguishing feature of the Wenzhou economy is the 
social network holding it together, allowing individuals to raise capital from friends 
and relatives, bypassing -  or at least minimising -  the involvement of the local 
government. The Wenzhou government thus had little influence over the 
management of the firms, and in terms of directing their activities.
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The production chain of private firms in Wenzhou is another unique feature 
of Wenzhou’s economy that depended on the strong social network to function. Here 
individuals and households are in direct communication with each other through 
their own contacts to help set up the production chains of more complex products, 
allowing each individual to concentrate and specialise on the production of a single 
component or on assembling the product. This also increased the flexibility of the 
production, since each household or individual “link” in the chain can more easily 
swap out their production equipment as needed using relatively small amounts of 
capital. Again, in this process the involvement of the local government is avoided or 
minimised.
In the creation and the running of firms, Wenzhou’s local government exerted 
little influence. The decisions are made by those who own and operate the production 
chains, who in turn make their decisions based on market information collected 
through their social networks and through the spread of Wenzhou’s diaspora 
throughout China. Their response to the market was based on both the desire to 
maximise their profits and on a hard budget constraint that had no recourse to 
transfers and subsidies. As much as possible, Wenzhou’s private entrepreneurs 
operated completely in response to the market signals they received, rather than 
basing their decisions on the development policies of the local government. It was 
grass roots growth at the smallest scale of the individual, with very low levels of 
government regulation or supervision to hinder its development and growth.
The progress of the local private economy succeeded in correcting 
Wenzhou’s dysfunctional economy, but the entrepreneurs cannot claim all the credit. 
The grass roots growth was aided by the local government’s political non-action, as
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well as by the creation of local trading and exchange markets. It also began to 
regulate the private economy, “making the black grey, and the grey, white,” said one 
official, describing the process of making private firms more legitimate (interview, 
2004, Wenzhou Economic Reform Office). The regulation of the private economy is 
perhaps the most important step, for it heralded the start of the acceptance of private 
economic development as a legitimate strategy in China. As well as being aware of 
Wenzhou’s “capitalist tail”, the Central government’s experimental approach to 
economic reform suggests that it is plausible Wenzhou’s progress was being 
carefully monitored as a potential model for economic development. The accidental 
-  or rather, pragmatic -  developmental strategy of Wenzhou’s local government has 
influenced not only its own development, but also economic policies all over China.
In Yangzhou’s state owned and managed firms, the entrepreneurial and 
managerial functions were embodied simultaneously by the local government, which 
also held the ownership rights to some firms, while exerting influence -  albeit 
informally -  in others. The operation of the firms suffered from direct intervention in 
the case of fulfilling local government obligations as, although they operated with 
“market style” transactions -  the prices of their inputs and outputs were ostensibly 
set through market mechanisms -  and a certain degree of economic incentives were 
in operation regarding their management, there was little scope for firms to pursue 
opportunities if the government perceived them to be contradictory to its aims and 
objectives. This being the case for individual firms, the development of the economy 
as a whole was also directed by the local government, which set clear guidelines for 
the development of a “scale economy”, concentrating on the production of a few, 
specialised products. This was not a response to the market, but was specifically 
chosen as a means for the local economy as a whole to respond to the competition it
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faced from other regions. The direction of the development for these “backbone” 
products was a political decision rather than a natural economic adaptation to the 
circumstances. Although circumstantial, the evidence is that almost all these firms 
were privatised, or failed to survive. Directions for managers were issued from the 
local government, rather than being the cumulative effect of firms responding to the 
changing circumstances, and remains reminiscent of a planned economy, writ small 
at the local level.
In contrast to the top down development strategy of Yangzhou, Wenzhou’s 
socially distributed economy has been allowed to grow from the bottom up, as 
individuals and households respond to the needs of the market and to their motive of 
profit maximisation. The lack of involvement from the local government, in setting 
up, managing and maintaining the local firms almost backfired as Wenzhou faced 
economic pressure over the unregulated proliferation of low quality goods, and 
political pressure over its illegal economic practices. Its response to these pressures, 
to increase regulation over local firms, still allowed the firms to operate and manage 
their own production, rather than creating a bias for some sectors and against others. 
The decisions necessary to adapt to changing demands and market conditions were 
taken at the lowest levels, without the need for the local government to intervene.
10.5 Conclusion
The involvement of the Wenzhou and Yangzhou local governments in the 
development of their economies has been shaped by their relationship with the 
Central government and Central government incentives, the structure of local firms 
and local firm ownership patterns, and by their assessment of the costs and risks of 
their development strategies. These combined to determine what mode of behaviour
the local government adopts, whether corporatist, developmental, clientelistic, 
predatory, or a combination of these.
Ultimately the Central government provides the incentives and the 
institutional structure within which local governments are allowed to operate. These 
may be negated or reinterpreted, but they form the same structure within which all 
Chinese local governments operate. The degree to which these policies can be 
modified to suit local conditions depends on the Central-local relationship, and the 
control over the local government the Central government can exert through political 
and economic pressure. For Yangzhou, this control was relatively greater than that of 
Wenzhou, and therefore Yangzhou’s development adhered more to what was 
acceptable to the Central government, through developing state and collectively 
owned firms, neglecting private ownership, creating a structure where the Yangzhou 
government and local firms were closely interlinked. Wenzhou’s political isolation 
weakened Central government control, and also forced the Wenzhou government to 
protect its budding private economy, which provided the only means for its 
economic development. Moreover, its local culture encouraged private 
entrepreneurialism, regardless of whether it was acceptable to the Central 
government.
The structure of the local economy, in particular, the ownership and control 
over local firms, was key in determining the speed and depth of local economic 
reforms. This is partially explained by the potential benefits that can accrue to the 
local government through local firms. Control and ownership over local firms gave 
Yangzhou’s local government scope to manipulate the local economy and achieve its 
policy objectives. Reforms and changes to this situation -  for instance, through the 
introduction of policies favouring the private sector -  were therefore not attractive,
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and there was little incentive to pursue them. However, Wenzhou’s local government 
faced a situation where the greatest good lay in pushing reforms as far as was 
possible to support its private economy, as it did not have the benefits of owning or 
controlling a sustainable state or collective sector. Moreover, its relationship with 
local entrepreneurs allowed its economic reforms to be tailored to the needs of local 
firms. This in turn further facilitated local economic growth, to the advantage of the 
Wenzhou government.
Finally, the assessment of the cost and risk of development to the Wenzhou 
and Yangzhou local government is apparent at each stage in their development, and 
this influenced their behaviour. The relative benefits of developing a local state 
corporation, versus the cost of supporting a weak private sector, meant that at each 
stage in Yangzhou’s development, the local government chose to pursue local state 
corporatism, until this strategy became unsustainable. Conversely, the Wenzhou 
government committed to pursuing the relatively uncertain development of its 
private economy rather than the relative certainty of continuing to suffer a weak state 
economy. The cost of following Central government policies appeared to be greater 
than the cost of insidious disobedience, and given its special situation, the Wenzhou 
local government was able to weather the political pressure brought to bear on it. 
Thus at each stage, Wenzhou’s government continued to stand by its private 
entrepreneurs.
The role of China’s local governments in economic development was, and 
continues to be determined by the Central government. To encourage and foster local 
economic growth is the ostensible goal of all local governments. However, the role 
played by local governments in each specific region varies with their own set of
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relationships and circumstances. The comparison of Yangzhou and Wenzhou shows 
that even with similar backgrounds and the operating with the same Central 
government policies, the two governments took different paths for economic 
development and obtained different results.
Nevertheless, by combining the influences of the Central government, the 
local economic structure, and the relative costs and benefits of different policies for 
the local government, it was possible to provide both a typology for local 
government behaviour, and to account for their choice of actions. It also suggests 
that a proper understanding of incentives and their interaction with local 
circumstances is necessary to determine the outcome of local economic development 
in China. This provides a flexible lens through which to examine the behaviour of 
other Chinese local governments in future studies. A more detailed comparison of 
other Chinese local governments would be useful for creating a more nuanced 
understanding of China’s economic transition, and the direction it is likely to take in 
the future.
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Chapter 11: Conclusion -  the role of the local government in China’s economic 
transition process
This study set out to create a framework for understanding the role of China’s 
local governments in the process of local economic development. As China’s 
economic transition has progressed through the past 30 years, local governments 
were given increasing responsibilities for economic development. Their actions and 
the environment within which they operate have also changed significantly as 
China’s economic reforms continued to reshape the political economy within which 
local governments operate.
In this attempt to define their role, this study has sought to use a holistic 
approach, considering the local governments as an actor operating within a network 
of relationships. The relationships define the boundaries and possibilities for local 
government behaviour, though their effects can sometimes be counter intuitive. A 
“positive” relationship might not necessarily lead to a positive outcome, as in the 
case of Yangzhou’s relatively closer ties with the Central government during the 
reform period. Wenzhou’s weak relationship with the Central government, on the 
other hand, served to give the local government more freedom to encourage local 
entrepreneurs to grow.
Similarly, relationships within the local area also play an important role, 
though again the qualitative difference between Wenzhou and Yangzhou’s 
relationship with local firms is crucial. Although Yangzhou’s government had 
extremely close ties with local firms, exerting considerable influence over their 
management, it was ultimately unsuccessful in maintaining economic development
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through the local state sector. Wenzhou’s government, which did not enjoy the same 
degree of control or influence over local entrepreneurs despite having close ties with 
them, was successful in sustaining economic development.
This brings up the question of whether the comparison is fair. It is possible to 
argue that the Yangzhou’s slower economic growth, and Wenzhou’s rapid 
development, was due more to the characteristics, virtues, and shortcomings of the 
local state and private sectors respectively, than it was to the actions of the local 
governments. Local state firms suffer from several disadvantages compared with 
firms operating under private ownership, and are less efficient in the long run. 
However, there was considerable uncertainty in the early part of China’s reforms 
over the relative efficiency of collective firms versus private firms for local 
economic development, partially due to ongoing political and ideological debate, and 
partially due to the uncertainty of where China’s economic reforms were ultimately 
headed. While Yangzhou decided to pursue its advantage in developing an economy 
dominated by the local state and collective sector, Wenzhou chose to nurture its 
private sector. As China’s reforms proceeded, it became clearer that the local 
corporatist model for economic development would be supplanted by private 
economic development, Yangzhou chose to continue its efforts in the local state 
sector. Since a local state sector could not have existed without local government 
involvement, it was the choice of the Yangzhou government to continue pursuing 
local state sector development resulting in Yangzhou’s slow economic growth as 
China’s economy became increasingly privatized and market oriented. The 
inefficiencies of the local state sector is inextricably linked with the actions of the 
local state. Thus regardless of the relative efficiencies of the local state sector and 
private enterprises, the decision of local governments remain the key variable in
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influencing the speed of local economic growth.
Having taken into consideration the relationships within which local 
governments operate, their modes of development determine the actions and policies 
adopted for the development process. As was discussed in chapter 5, the categories 
used to categorize local government types -  local corporatist, developm ental, 
clientelistic, and predatory -  can be used in a more flexible way. As this study has 
argued, local governments tended to behave in many different ways, and their 
behaviour could not be neatly compartmentalized into any one of the categories.
They are not mutually exclusive behaviours, and although engaging in behaviours 
described by two or more of the categories may be contradictory or counter 
productive, local governments have done so. Yangzhou’s attempts at developing a 
local state sector involved local corporatist behaviours as well as clientelistic 
behaviours, and its outlook (in terms of extracting benefits for the local government 
from local state firms) can arguably be classified as being predatory. Similarly, the 
development of Wenzhou’s private sector relied heavily on clientelistic relationships 
between the local government and firms to establish a channel of communications 
that would otherwise have been impossible through existing, official channels.
This more flexible view of the developmental mode of local governments, 
coupled with the recognition of the importance of local government relationships 
with the Central government and local firms, shows that local governments are 
highly dynamic and adaptable to the challenges throughout the 30 year period of 
China’s economic transition. The view of local governments developing their 
economies according to set economic “models” lacks this flexibility, and places local 
governments at odds with each other. Fundamentally, the same influences pervaded
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the decision making process of China’s local governments, and these influences 
affected the actions of local governments. Due to China’s gradual approach to 
economic development, it was impossible for local governments to formulate and 
pursue a long term development plan, and thus the formation -  or rather, evolution -  
of their development policies came from the pressures and opportunities of their 
existing situations. Attempts to capture and frame this fluid, dynamic and ever 
shifting process into a model can only be the first step toward understanding the 
behaviour of local governments, providing the necessary snapshots and observations 
that then needs to be developed.
However, what this brings up is the question of how effective of efficient 
local governments are at developing their local economies. The activity and 
dynamism of local governments do not necessarily correlate to their degree of 
success in achieving economic growth. Yangzhou’s entrepreneurial approach to 
economic development is arguably more active and dynamic than Wenzhou’s 
protective attitude towards local firms. However, while Yangzhou suffered from its 
inability or unwillingness to abandon the development of its local state sector, the 
Wenzhou government less interventionalist attitude allowed its local private 
entrepreneurs to flourish. In this case, Wenzhou was arguably more flexible than 
Yangzhou, since it too entered -  out of necessity -  a phase of promoting its (albeit 
semi-fictional) “collective” sector. When there was no longer any need, this was 
dropped and the private sector was allowed to grow openly. For all its dynamism and 
entrepreneurship, Yangzhou’s local state sector continued to be developed until it 
was no longer viable, and then the Yangzhou government entered a phase of 
privatization. Yangzhou was not able to recognize the coming necessity to develop 
its private sector and its capacity to faciliate the operation of a private economy.
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Thus this study suggests that, viewed as entities within a network of 
relationships, the success or failure of China’s local governments do not depend on 
the quality of those relationships. Having positive support does not necessarily create 
the necessary conditions for success, just as negative or ambivalent relationships do 
not necessarily lead to failure. The dynamism and activity of local governments also 
does not necessarily bring success. This is not to say they are irrelevant, but rather, 
they can -  and have -  produce counter-intuitive outcomes. It would seem that it is 
the local government’s attitude -  its ability to be flexible and adaptable through time 
-  which shows success. Wenzhou’s pragmatic approach helped it to maximize 
economic growth, even though it faced some difficult challenges. Yangzhou’s active 
pursuit of a development model seems to have cost it the ability to “sail with the 
wind” until it became inevitable that the local state sector was to be privatized.
This clearly requires much more research to form a testable hypothesis, for it 
would appear that rather than studying the policies, actions and behaviours of 
China’s local governments, the objective is to try and determine the degree of 
adaptability and flexibility shown by the local governments. The actions and 
behaviours are the results of this deeper characteristic, and the local-Central 
relationships and local conditions serve as the backdrop, the circumstances which 
reflect the consequences of these actions. Rather than seeing local development 
policies as an end result in their own right, this study suggests that instead, they serve 
as pointers, examples to a set of deeper characteristics within a local government that 
is more likely to lead to success. Thus it is dubious whether Wenzhou’s development 
policies would have worked as well in Yangzhou, for they are the results from 
Wenzhou’s specific backdrop. However, the sheer pragmatism and dedication of
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Wenzhou’s government to its entrepreneurs indicates a level of commitment that 
brought forth the policies and process that took place during Wenzhou’s 
development.
More case studies need to be carried out to see if the conclusions of this study 
holds true for other Chinese local governments. The specific circumstances of each 
local government will prove to be different, but to find the underlying factor 
common between all local governments avoids the superficial differences and 
apparent contradictions that make comparisons difficult. Future studies may also be 
able to better refine the characteristics that determine the “flexibility” of a local 
government, its ability to be pragmatic, which seems to emerge from a historical 
perspective, for flexibility is necessarily a function of changes over time, and 
studying a single time period -  a snapshot -  by its nature will freeze and render this 
flexibility invisible. Future studies must take into account the historical variable of 
local government behaviour.
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